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ABSTRACT 
The Canterbury water economy is moving from a development 
to a mature phase. Increased water demand for agricultural purposes, 
especially irrigation, will place considerable stress on available water 
supplies and accelerate conflict with other water users. 
A complex institutional system exists for managing water 
resources in North Canterbury. This. study examines these institutional 
arrangements and the decision-making processes of the North Canterbury 
Regional Water Bpard. The focus is upod an ex poste evaluation of 
the events which lead to the preparation ?f water allocation plans for 
the Waiau and Hurunui Rivers. It is shown that those groups and 
interests whose social power is not institutionalised are unlikely to 
secure more than marginal changes to the status quo. Greater changes 
can be secured only by directing political activity at the policy making 
level. 
The study concludes that existing institutional arrangements 
lead to suboptimal social decisions. Various strategies for strengthening 
water management institutions and policies are outlined. 
: ,.-< -. ,', ' 
1. 
1.0 THE MULTI-DIMENSION ROLE OF WATER 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with issues relating to the allocation 
and use of water in North and Central Canterbury. New Zealand. 
Between 1968 and 1982 a series of droughts accelerated a change 
from a dryland farming system to a more intensive system based on 
irrigation. The popular view holds that large-scale irrigation develop-
ment is essential to the future economic growth of the Canterbury 
region. As the area under itrigation increases. society will become 
~ore aware of the effects tha~ this expanded demand for water will 
have on non-agricultural interests in the region. Traditionally. 
water has been regarded as a resource to be harnessed so that it 
does not flow to waste. However. concern about the environment has 
changed with a greater interest evidenced in the protection of naturaJ 
river flows for in-stream uses. such as fish and recreation. In the 
future, therefore, water will often have to be allocated between these 
competing and sometimes mutually exclusive uses. 
The important question is to determine how society might 
allocate scarce resources among competing uses. The existence of a 
complex network of law. public agencies and procedures for water 
allocation shows that water is scarce at various times and places. How 
these mechanisms operate and their suitability for regulating and 
allocating water constitutes the major objective of this study. 
The way a resource is allocated. used and managed is 
influenced by the economic, social and political environments. and 
legal procedures and requirements. It is necessary to investigate 
these issues. and the interactions between them to determine how water 
is allocated. This combines with a further objective which is to 
analyse the consequences of the interrelationships between rights J 
powers. law and economics on the performance of a resource manage-
ment agency and the relation of power to resource allocation. 
Irrigation development is largely an irreversible process. 
2. 
demanding substantial amounts of capital, land and labour, often 
generating long-term changes to the environment and rural 
communities. The time of single-use, single-purpose resource 
development is rapidly fading as society places increasing demands 
upon its water resources. A more affluent and urbanised society is 
showing a growing interest in the scenic, recreational and ecological 
consequences of water management programmes. This is coupled with 
a concern for the costs and benefits of irrigation schemes. 
Th,is study is not founded on any premise which suggests that 
one use of water is "good" while another is "bad", although there is 
some une1ase in the region for it is believed that irrigahon is a 
favoured' water use. At present, there appears little likelihood of a 
policy being introduced which will require agriculture to forego some 
water. However, there is a growing awareness among resource 
managers that agricultural uses may have to do with less water in 
order to protect other uses. To know whether there are grounds for 
this concern, it is necessary to inves "gate the present allocative 
process and the participants involve , to understand how the whole 
system functions. 
Most water users accept that water resources should be so 
allocated that the greatest benefit to society as a whole is generated. 
Naturally, each user has a different interpretation of what is an 
"optimal" use of water. It might be that which is economically best for 
the nation, the region of the farmer, any of which might not be, in a 
welfare economics sense, the optimum optimorum. In contrast, optimum 
might refer to an engineering or biological viewpoint. Thus, the 
factors affecting the concept of optimum water use are dependent on 
one's viewpoint. This complex relationship of views is readily 
illustrated by Figure 1. 1. Moreover, each organisation has a different 
planning horizon which affects attitudes and behaviour, further 
complic ating the allocati ve process. 
3. 
Figure 1.1 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE OPTIMUM USE OF WATER 
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Source: After Heiler (1980) 
One way of achieving the most economically efficient allocation 
of water is to rely on the market. The market prices water at a level 
which ensures that it is aJlocated to its best alternative use. The 
present system does not rely on the market for a number of reasons: 
(a) goals in addition to economic efficiency exist, for example, the 
distribution of wealth and the 'stabilisation of economic activity 
(Musgrave, 1972); (b) not all uses can be quantified, and compared, 
in monetary terms; and (e) a long-standing belief that Canterbury 
has abundant water resources. Combined, these reasons have pre-
vented the market being used as an allocative mechanism with the 
result that the water management system is today highly 'socialised'. 
r 
-=:-:-
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4. 
In New Zealand, the Crown is deemed to be the owner of the 
nation's water resources. At the regional level control over water use 
is vested in a Regional Water Board [RWB] comprising both elected 
and appointed persons. The RWB functions in conjunction with the 
North Canterbury Catchment Board [NCCB] and, as they have an 
identical membership, they are really one and the same organisation, 
but with different responsibilities. The NCCB administers the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 (SC&RC Act) while the RWB 
administers the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 (WSC Act). 
Together, they form a multi-functional, political institution representing 
the population of North and Central Canterbury in water and soil 
I . I 
management. Figure 1. 2 shows the area managed by the NCCB and 
RWB. 'This system of water management has been selected by the 
constitutional decision-makers (Parliament) as the best means of 
generating the maximum social welfare from the use of the regional 
water resources. 
A case study~aI'I'S9aL is used to pursue the study objective, 
with the focus being a description and evaluation of the allocation of 
water from the Waiau and Hurunui Rivers in North Canterbury. The 
study covers the period 1972 to 1981 during which time the Crown 
sought the necessary legal consents to irrigate 22 500 hectares of land 
in the Amuri Basin (Figure 1. 2). Two irrigation schemes are involved: 
the Waiau scheme covering 17 000 hectares with a further potential of 
6 000 hectares and the Balmoral scheme of 5 500 hectares. 
Concurrently, the RWB was investigating the water resources 
of both catchments and preparing draft water allocation and manage-
ment plans. The plans included proposed minimum monthly river 
flows and specified how available water in excess of that minimum 
might be allocated amongst competing uses. 
The applications to abstract water for irrigation, and the draft 
water allocation plans were opposed by some farmers and other river 
users representing special interest groups. They argued that the 
quantity of water allowed for irrigation was too great and the minimum 
/ 
./ 
* Balmoral Irrigation Scheme 
Figure 1.2 
STUDY REGION 
Boundary of North Cantebury Catchment Board and 
Regional Water Board 
~ Waiau Plains Irrigation Scheme 
5. 
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flows too low. In contrast, the Ministry of Works a Development [MWD] 
considered that the proposed minimum flows for the Hurunui River were 
too high, arbitrary and unnecessarily refined (MWD to RWB: 19.9.79). 
The case study describes the problem, identifies the parties and 
their interests and follows the decision-making process, examining each 
part of the process leading to the final outcome. This is a descriptive 
approach, showing who participates, who wins, who loses and the costs 
involved in reaching the decision. An alternative approach uses a 
normative model which suggests how decision-making 'ought to proceed. 
,Resourge management analysis is concerned with bot~ approaches: 
how resources are actually allocated in the "real" world compared to a 
theoretical ideal, leading to wise use and management' of the resource. 
How a resource ought to be managed can generate fierce arguments 
about values, the relevance of technical data, and mobilise competing 
factions and groups (Boardman, 1981: 20). Because resource manage-
ment is a complex phenomenon, the normative ideal is rarely achieved. 
However, this should not prevent attempts to find better normative 
models. Moreover, periodic reviews of the decision-making process 
and institutions can be fruitful. Policy issues requiring further 
consideration are identified at the end of this study. 
The impetus of this study arises from the resource allocation 
problems likely to occur when there are new proposals to develop 
regional water resources. For example, allocation of water from the 
Rakaia River concerns many Canterbury interest groups. This study 
into the functioning of existing institutions and allocation procedures 
aims at making a contribution to the management of the region's 
water resources. 
1. 2 STUDY STRUCTURE 
To further the objectives of this study, Chapter 2 develops a 
framework for analYSing water resource management. The framework 
has three parts. The first recognises that any particular stage of 
water development requires certain allocative mechanisms to maximise 
social values. Mechanisms and institutions evolve as demands on a 
-.:.~--.~,,;.-.,:,.,;,.,:~.:~~,,:: .. ~~; 
~~~~~~~!~;~~ 
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resource increase and conflicts become evident. The particular stage 
reached in Canterbury is identified and some mechanisms for resource 
allocation suggested. The second proposes that resource allocation 
is determined by the power structure which exists in the decision-
making system ,and the rules developed by society to guide resources 
allocation. Both are closely interrelated and together determine how 
benefits the parties will benefit from the resource. 
The third component of the framework examines the decision-
making process more closely. It suggests a model in which linkages 
between the issues, participants and final decision can be traced and 
I I evaluated~ 
The discussion of the Canterbury water economy in the first 
part of this Chapter will show that there are competing demands for 
a resource which is considered to be scarce, or at least in limited 
supply. Once the competing groups appreciate that water is scarce, 
they place pressure on the resource manager, that is, the=- R WB, to 
favour them the allocation plan. Subsequently., other groups and 
interests will then seek to modify the original decision and improve 
their positions, (Mitchell, 1979: 307). Decision-making is a process of 
choosing between values and' alternatives. All too often the decision-: 
maker is faced with situations where values of society are vague and 
ambiguous, but those of interest groups are quite clear. The final 
decision represents "the public interest" and is the outcome of an 
attempt to reconcile the conflicting values of the bargaining groups. 
This view sees resource management and the resulting decisions as 
evolving from a group struggle (O'Riordan, 1971 (a)) . 
The significance of institutional arrangements is a common 
theme in many resource management studies. An institutional 
structure is often made up of a number of interrelated elements and 
the failure of one element to work effectively will affect the remainder. 
Chapter 3 reviews some studies which have focused on the concept 
of institutions, providing an understanding of the concept and a 
basis upon which the institutional structure in Canterbury can be 
evaluated. In this study institutions are broadly defined to mean: 
"An interrelated set of entities and rules that serve to 
organise societies' activities so as to achieve social 
goals." (Fox, 1976) 
8. 
The agencies and policies which regulate water use and distrib-
ution are described. It is apparent that if agencies are to avoid 
becoming emmeshed in a "crisis-management" syndrome, they should 
be both adaptive and flexible (Holling, 1978). Whether existing 
agencies have retained the ability for adaptive response to changing 
needs is examined. 
Chapter 4 describes and explains; the real world process of 
resource allocation and decision-making in the Amuri Basin. Many 
of the conflicts are apparent in other resource allocation situations 
and reflected in this one geographical area. It clearly illustrates 
the conflicts between values (production and preservation); local 
economic development v. "out of area" interests; the long-term 
planning horizon v. the short-term planning time frame, and the 
issue of whether a river flowing to the sea without abstraction is a 
river "flowing to waste". The problem could be viewed as one of 
"irrigators versus the rest", but this reasoning is too simplistic for it 
overly defines the parties and their reasons for involvement. The 
chapter looks closely at the participants and their effect on the 
decision outcome. 
Until this point the study is descriptive. Chapter 5 evaluates 
the actual allocation process in terms of the analytical framework 
established management in Chapter 2. Unfortunately, there is no 
consensus on what constitutes an "optimal" resource allocation 
procedure, but mechanisms. exist which could be incorporated into 
the present decision-making system to move it closer to an ideal. 
Throughout the study the emphasis IS on identifying the power 
structures and rules which affect resource allocation. Dominant 
political groups may exert a force on other sectors which will impose 
direct or indirect costs (disadvantages). Hence the objective is to 
develop mechanisms which will reduce decision costs among the 
i;::;:::~:;,;;;~;:c},/~j 
I~~;~~':":- .:.:.::;._~!. ~:~-~ rll;,;;j 
fJi;;;f.t~-~~~~~; 
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participants. 
1. 3 THE WATER RESOURCES OF CANTERBURY 
The rest of this chapter explains the hydrological characteristics 
of the regional water resources and their uses. This knowledge is 
necessary in order to understand the problem with which this study is 
concerned. 
The study region is the same as that of the North Canterbury 
Ca:tchment Board and Regional Water Board, encompassing 19 051 km 2 • 
rqe principal rivers are shown in Figure 1. 2. ~egional water 
resources occur as both surface (river) flow and ground water. 
A predominantly westerly air flow over the Southern Alps 
determines the hydrology of the main Canterbury rivers. Moist, 
north-westerly air streams bring heavy iain to the mountains, melting 
the snow, causing high flows in the main rivers which rise in the 
Southern Alps. In contrast, the secondary rivers in Central Canterbury, 
such as the Ashley, Eyre and Selwyn, rise in the foothills. Easterly 
depressions bringing rain storms from the south to the foothills results 
in high flows in these rivers. North-westerly winds have little 
effect on the flow rates in these rivers. 
However, both north-westerly and southerly air flows affect the 
hydrology of North Canterbury rivers such as the Waiau and Hurunui. 
North -westerly air flows predominate in all seasons in the upper 
catchment of the Hurunui River. 
The general absencEt of large lakes in Canterbury results 
in sharp flood peaks, but Lake Sumner in the upper Hurunui River 
catchment acts as a storage facility and "evens out" flood flows. 
Glaciers and large snow-fields in the headwaters of the Rakaia River 
hold a considerable amount of snow and act as storage reservoirs 
with water being released slowly. The minimum flows for the Rakaia 
occur in winter; for the Waiau, Hurunui and Waimakariri, in early 
autumn; and for the Ashley and Selwyn in summer. Appendix 1 
[-
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illustrates the seasonal flow variations for the main Canterbury rivers. 
Groundwater is an important source of livestock, domestic, 
public and irrigation water supply. Its ready availability has meant 
that public water supply agencies have not had to construct large and 
expensive water storage fac~ties .for urban and rural use. The 
presence of groundwater on the Canterbury Plains is determined by 
a hydro-geological boundary between glacial outwash gravels and post-
glacial alluvium. Depending on the geological nature of the sub-
surface material, groundwater flows in eith~r confined or unconfined 
aquifers. Water for use in metropolitan Christchurch comes from 
I I 
confined aquifers. 
Bowden (1974, 1977) states that groundwater is not a 
significant factor in the water resources of either the Waiau or 
Hurunui catchments. There is no evidence of any extensive ground-
water storage in these catchments and water yields from wells are 
related to the surface flow in rivers. 
1. 4 THE WATER USERS 
1. 4.1 Introduction 
Problems arise in Canterbury because uncertain rainfall and 
ri verflows result in inequalities in water availability and use. The last 
decade has seen wide variations in rainfall, and planning for 
uncertainty may have to become an integral part of water management. 
An important element of water resources planning is knowledge of how 
the system will operate under a wide range of possible future demands 
and hydrologic conditions. The more regular occurrence of dry periods 
and low rainfall has lead to' a perception of scarcity and more interest in 
irrigation. Some schemes which were investigated many years ago are 
now being "dusted off" and reasse~sed with greater enthusiasm by 
those who stand to benefit. 
An inadequate knowledge of the extent of groundwater 
resources, including directions of flow, water levels and recharge 
rates compounds water planning problems. This stems, in part, 
11. 
from the lack of data from the 25 to 50 per cent of unreported wells 
and other unauthorised abstractions of water. 
In their attempts to achieve the multiple-use water of resources, 
both the users and resource managers are hampered by a lack of 
quantifiable information showing the needs of the recreational and 
wildlife interests. Heiler et. aI., (1970) have outlined some of the 
problems- experienced in quantifying water resources: double 
counting when underground water rises to form spring-fed streams, 
the ,impact water storage could have on water availability and the 
engineering efficiency of reticulation systems (water losses from 
. I I 
gravel races). Many water users hold rights for amounts far in 
excess of that actually required, so that water shbrtages may be 
artificially induced and not the result of natural conditions. 
The following sections look at a range of water uses 
(agriculture, recreation, domestic, commercial and wildlife), and 
describes their involvement in water management. 
1. 4.2 Agriculture 
Taking water for livestock use is not restricted. A farmer may 
bore a well or extract from a watercourse to supply drinking water for 
livestock. A water right is required for any other agricultural use, 
such as irrigation or in milking sheds and yards. 
Border-dyke irrigation, which takes water directly from the 
rivers, has been practised in Central and South Canterbury since th~ 
mid-1930's. The major schemes are: Redcliffs (1936), Levels (1937), 
Ashburton-Lyndhurst (1945), Mayfield-Hinds (1948) and Valetta 
(1958). Irrigation depending on groundwater is a more recent 
development, but the "puffs and feathers of spray" are now a 
distincti ve feature of the agricultural landscape. 
The droughts of 1968-71 and 1981-82 focused attention on the 
risks associated with dryland farming and a variable water supply. 
Irrigation is sometimes regarded more as "insurance" against years 
7 
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of low rainfall rather than as a new farming system. Evans and. Cant 
(1981) compared dryland and irrigation farming zones in the Lyndhurst-
Pendarves area. and concluded that irrigation is used to offset 
drought in bad years rather than to intensify production in all years. 
Howevar. the recent development of large-scale dairying by North 
Island farmers in the Lyndhurst-Pendarves area may be the start of 
a changing perception of irrigation. 
Davison (1979) surveyed those farmers affected by the Waiau 
Plains Irrigation Scheme to assess how they intended to adjust to the 
changes which would be required. He concluded that irrigation 
I I 
would result in larger and more valuable farming enterprises involving 
a radical change in management systems. The incentive to develop 
is spurred by the high levels of investment and debt which farmers 
incur in irrigation development. 
The area of land irrigated in New Zealand showed a marked 
increase from 1967 to 1976 but has since tapered off (Figure 1. 3) . 
Heiler (1975) attributed the increase in total irrigable land to dryland 
farming in some areas reaching an upper production limit. and to 
the provision of government assistance. for on -farm development. In 
Canterbury. the irrigated area grew slowly between 1976 and 1979 
(Table 1.1). but the potential is large: 161 400 hectares are under 
active investigation and another 600 000 hectares of Class I to IV 
soils may be suited to agriculture (Chandler and Lewthwaite. 1982) . 
Figure 1.4 shows current and proposed irrigation schemes in 
Canterbury. 
This potential demand for water raises the prospect of 
increased conflict between water users. From the agricultural 
viewpoint. more work on the efficiency of irrigation water use is 
required. Pricing may be a mechanism for inducing economic 
efficiency. combined with a greater farmer awareness of how to 
manage irrigation systems to achieve efficient on-farm use of water. 
(Williman et. al.. 1982). 
! .---
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Water rights are presently approved only if the use is both 
beneficial and "positive". That is, uses which consume water, discharge 
into or dam water are positive uses. Recreational uses are not 
considered to be positive uses of water and protection for recreational 
uses such as canoeing, angling and jet-boating must be sought through 
other mechanisms. The most common mechanism is the water 
allocation and management plan. However, this suffers from the 
disadvantage, compared to waterrights, of not having legal recognition. 
The legal system gives preferences to positive uses to the detriment 
of recreational uses. 
Under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 water resource 
r 
TABLE 1.1 
IRRIGATION IN NORTH CANTERBURY 
Area of Land Under Irrigation Method of Irrigation 
(ha) 
Item 
1976 1979 
1976 1979 Sprinkler BID Other Sprinkler BID 
(ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) 
I - -
Fruit 376 285 286 6 80 177 -
Vegetables 1 409 1 228 1 392 3 14 1 198 23 
Other Crops 5 893 6 036 5 835 52 6 5 991 31 
Total Cro2s 7 678 7 549 
Pasture 12 562 16 398 10 073 2071 358 13 427 2631 
Lucerne 3 423 2 417 3 079 336 8 2 178 242 
Other Land 186 61 110 73 3 41 17 
Total 23 849 26 425 20 775 2541 469 23 012 2944 
Total 147 668 (16%) 149 230 (17.7%) South Island -
Total 164 348 (14%) 166 226 (15.8%) New Zealand 
-
Source Agricultural Statistics (N .. Z. Department of Statistics) 1976, 1979 for years ending 30 March. 
BID = Border-dyke 
Other 
(ha) 
106 
7 
14 
332 ! 
-
9 
468 
---:l::'!!!:-; 
l.r~E:: 
.... 
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IRRIGA TION IN CANTERBURY 
SCHEMES AND PROPOSALS 
Boundary of North Cantebury Catchment Board and 
Regional Water Board 
KEY 
I. Emu Plains, 4 000 ha (P) 9. Loburn, 300 ha (E) 
2. Waiareka Downs, 400 ha (E) 10. Waimakariri-Ash1ey, 
3. Balmoral, 5 500 ha (E) II. Central Plains, 140 
4. spotswood, 2 000 ha (P) 12. Te Pirita, 4 000 ha 
5. Waiau Plains, 17 000 ha (E) 13. North Rakaia, 2 300 
6. Glerunark, 1 510 ha (E) 14. Fereday, 800 ha (E) 
7. Glasnevin, 4 050 ha (P) 
8. Peaks-Medbury-Waikari E Existing 
Hawarden, 14 000 ha (P) P Proposed 
Source : Williman, 
15. 
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30 000 ha (P) 
000 ha (P) 
(P) 
ha (E) 
et. al. , 1982 
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managers are required to plan for the multiple-use of water, with all 
uses to be treated equally. The problem is whether the current 
water allocation systems can recognise and cater for the demands of 
recreationists. 
Recreational water users in Canterbury became actively 
involved in water allocation and management issues when the Waiau 
River allocation plan was prepared. However, the quantity and 
distribution of water, its characteristics and present use, avail-
ability and suitability for recreation are only now being comprehen-
sively surveyed in Canterbury. 
The distance between recreational resources and the demand centres 
has a marked impact upon water use (Parker and Penning-Rowsell, 
1980:157). For example, if water is taken from a river for 
irrigation, there is no evidence to show that recreational users will 
travel to other rivers. This is known as "substitutability": to what 
extent can the recreational (or wildlife) use of a river be substituted 
for by another river? Research into this issue is currently being 
carried out in Canterbury in a project being co-ordinated by the 
Agricultural Economics Research. Unit at Lincoln College. 
Conflict sometimes occurs between recreational uses, for 
example, 'noisy' and I quieti uses such as canoeing and jet-bpating; 
jet-boating and angling; active recreation and wildlife conservation. 
The ecological balance of a lake may be upset by artificial stocking. 
Canterbury has few lakes where recreational conflicts occur but 
management problems arise with some lakes: pollution from 
fertilizer runoff in Lakes P!larson and Grasmere; angling and power 
boating on Lake Pearson. The use of the Canterbury back country 
lakes for other than angling and wildlife study is limited by their 
small size, isolation and cold temperatures. 
Water resource planners have responded cautiously to the 
increased interest in water-oriented recreation. In part, this results 
from a lack of accurate, quantitative information: how many jet 
1
"-'-'" ... -..... 
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boaters use the rivers; how many 'passive' users are there; what 
is their distribution; when are the water resources most often used? 
In the absence of an estimation of the total benefit natural resources 
provide to society, especially their recreational value, insufficient 
resources are allocated by society to preserve natural environments. 
For example, there are concepts such as option value and existence 
value which can, with some effort, be calculated for specific natural 
resources. Option v~ue is the willingness to pay for the opportunity 
to choose from among competing alternative uses of a natural 
environment in the future. Existence value is the willingness to pay 
for the knowledge that a natural environment is preserved (Greenley, 
I· 1 
et. aI., 1981). Such a study could well be undertaken to assess the 
value of some Canterbury water resources. In the long-term, however, 
and even with increased research, there will remain a subjective 
element to recreational use planning. 
1. 4. 4 Domestic and Industrial 
Abstraction from groundwater or river sources for reasonable 
domestic use does not require a water right. All commercial and 
industrial users, and all local authorities supplying water for 
residential (domestic) use require a water right. Local authorities 
around Christchurch who pump from groundwater would be concerned 
about agricultural development projects which could affect the quality 
of the water they distribute. 
1. 4. 5 Wildlife 
Wildlife and nature conservation are not "positive" uses of 
water and have no 'rights' which can be legally protected. A move 
towards protection occurred in 1979 when the Manawatu RWB granted 
to the Wellington Acclimatisation Society, a water right for "the 
maintenance of a trout fishery" .. The Board drew a distinction between 
this use of water which included the protection, maintenance and 
improvement of trout stocks, and the 'act of fishing'. (Watson, 1980). 
An attempt to obtain a water right to protect the right to fish 
on the Rakaia River was made in 1982 by the Salmon Anglers Association 
i .. 
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to the North Canterbury RWB. The application sought lito ensure 
that the amenity value of the salmon fishing is maintained for the 
members of the association who use the river for this purpose ll • 
The Board declined to hear the application on the ground that 
fishing was not a positive use of water. The right to fish in the 
Rakaia River could not be conferred by a water right. 
The distinctions drawn by the two water boards points to the 
need for clarification and improvement of the legislation covering 
water rights. 
01. 5 CONCLUSION 
A greater commitment to irrigation to increase agricultural 
production is widely regarded as a way of stimulating regional 
economic growth (Canterbury United Council, 1981). The output, 
measured in terms of increased exports and employment, is but one 
way of improving the regional well-being. Other uses also contribute 
to regional development. 
Deficiencies in the legal and administrative rules disadvantage 
passive water users. Water rights are generally approved by a RWB 
if the use involves the abstraction or achlal use of water. It can 
be argued that lack of legal status or recognition does not necessarily 
mean that in-stream users are disadvantaged. However, the con-
'0 
ceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 puts forward the view that 
resource allocation is very much dependent on the relative rights 
and powers of each participating ogroup. If one or more groups lack 
legal recognition or protection, their interests must be affected by 
those which have the support of the legal rules. Institutions (laws 
and entities) exist to achieve social goals, but even if some goals 
are recognised as desirable, their recognition is fruitless if they 
cannot be adequately protected. 
An examination of institutional deficiencies and mechanisms for 
resource allocation is best conducted in terms of a conceptual frame-
work. This framework, consisting of three interrelated components, 
F~~~~ 
i 
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is developed and explained in Chapter 2. The framework provides 
the basis for the analysis of institutional arrangements in Chapter 
3. 
[.--
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2.0 CONCEPTS IN WATER ALLOCATION 
2.1 INTROD UCTION 
Throughout 1982 extensive media coverage was given to the 
exceptionally low rainfall and its effect on the rural sector. Commen-
taries in the press ranged from financial losses of $300 million to 
emphasis on technological innovation such as irrigation scheduling. 
The effect of this media coverage and general public interest has 
made the allocation of water a strong political force in Canterbury. 
I 
Water is widely believed to have a major role as a catalyst for 
.economic development. The prOvision of water stimulates rapid 
growth where the associated resources of soils, climate and capital 
are available. Significa!lt regional benefits come from irrigation 
development as Hubbard and Brown (1979) have shown for the 
Lower Waitaki region. Similar economic and social advantages could 
occur in Canterbury if the proposed irrigation schemes are 
eventually constructed. 
Water resource development, use, and management is a 
public responsibility resulting from political decisions which ignore 
economic analyses. Political recognition of environmental concerns 
and regional economic development are well-known reasons for 
overriding economic arguments. Musgrave (1972: 167) recognises 
the legitimacy of pursuing political or non-economic goals in public 
investment decisions. However, he questions the extent to which 
such departures from the/pursuit of economic efficiency is desirable. 
Allocation of the water resource of Canterbury requires a decision-
making system which recognises the diverse social values inherent 
in the water resource system. This study emphasises the inter-
relationships between the resource and the political and social 
institutions and how these institutions govern resource use. The 
primary concern is with the water allocation planning and management 
system and how it distributes the resource among competing users. 
The allocation process is examined in a three stage 
analytical framework. Firstly, I believe that the water resource 
F~ 
I 
I 
i 
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management system in Canterbury exhibits characteristics of both 
a developing and a mature water economy. Identifying those 
characteristics which apply to Canterbury points to the most appropriate 
institutions for water allocation. Second, a hypothesis is presented 
for testing which suggests that the process of resource allocation 
is dependent on the relative powers and rights of the parties to 
the issue. This approach closely follows the proposition of Alan 
Randall (1982): that it is more beneficial to see 
"equity, or justice, in the terms of process rather 
than outcome" 
and that 
"whatever emerges from just pr,ocesses is ipso facto, 
just or equitable". 
Consequently, it is necessary to examine the rules which determine 
the allocation process. From that starting point the allocation 
process can be evaluated and, if necessary, changes suggested 
which will go further toward maximising social welfare. Randall 
seeks an institutional setting which promotes the economically 
efficient use of water and, at the same time, encouraging the voluntary 
exchange of the resource among users. He advocates a system of 
transferable property rights in water to achieve this. Whether a 
system of marketable water rights is desirable in Canterbury is left 
until Chapter 5, where the case study is analysed. The third 
component is an explanation of a model for analysing the decision-
making process, and especially the influence of participants. This 
c 
model suggests that decisions are the outcome of a "struggle" and 
bargaining process between resource managers and those affected 
by the decisions. 
2.2 A WATER ECONOMY 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Economics is concerned with the allocation and distribution of 
scarce resources among competing uses over time. In many instances 
water is a scarce resource and rules exist to govern its use and 
allocation. Scarcity makes water an economic good and, therefore, 
I, 
1 
r 
Item 
1. Long-run supply of 
impounded water r 
2. Der!13nd for delivered 
water 
I 
3. Physical condition uf 
impoundment and delivery 
systems 
4. Competition for water 
among agricultural, 
industrial and urban 
uses, and instream 
flow maintenance 
5. Externality, etc. pro-
blems 
6. Social cost of subsi-
disation increased 
water use 
After Randall (19B1). 
TABLE 2.1 
Characteristics of Development and Mature Phases 
(a) 
Development phase 
Elastic 
Low, but growing, 
elastic at low prices, 
inelastic at high 
prices 
Most is fairly new 
and in good condition 
Minimal 
Minimal. Some drain-
age problems and 
pollution of ground-
water 
Fairly low 
~h '. ~ 
;'! 
'" ,i ~,: 
,::E~ I ~ ~::: 
(b) 
Mature phase 
Inelastic 
High and growing; 
elastic at low prices. 
Inelastic at high 
prices 
A substantial proportion 
is aging and in need of 
expensive repair and 
renovation. 
Growing 
Pressing; rising water tables, 
land salinisation, saline 
return flows, groundwater 
pollution etc. 
Rising 
.1l :.·· 
(c) 
Canterbury 
River supplies under 
stress 
Growing. Not priced. 
Mostly new. 
Growing. Increased 
competition 
Developing. Drainage problems; 
pollution of groundwater from 
fertilizers 
Rising 
:~~. :e~~ f['I'<· :'::\i;j~ ill ""'~\., ,~,ftf:f': ~ . 
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it is possible to refer to the existence of a water economy. This 
sphere of economic activity begins in a development phase 
gradually evolving into a mature phase (Watson and Rose, 1980; 
Randall, 1981 and 1982). Both phases have different characteristics 
which are described in Table 2.1 (columns (a) and (b)). Figure 2.1 
illustrates the two phases. 
Figure 2.1 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND ~ffiTURE PHASES OF 
I 
A WATER ECONOMY 
'·1 
(A) Development Phase (B) Mature Phase 
p 
p' 
D 
MSC 
~ 
Water delivered 
p 
MSC MRC 
M 
Water delivered 
The level of aggregate water demand during the development 
phase (Dd) is low, with demand being relatively elastic at low prices 
and inelastic at high prices. Obtaining supplies of water during the 
development phase is not particularly expensive and does not involve 
externalities. In other words, the marginal social cost (MSC) of 
supply is equivalent to the marginal resource cost (MRC). The 
quantity of water supplied can be readily augmented with small, but 
increasing, marginal costs. 
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The level of aggregate demand increases as the water economy 
moves into the mature phase. Additions to supply become more 
expensive to secure, and externalities drive a wedge between MRC 
and MSC, as indicated by the line A-B in Figure 2.1(B). External-
ities, in the context of irrigation development, might involve: loss 
of wildlife habitat, water pollution and other negative effects. This 
study will examine the institutional arrangements designed to strike 
the trade-offs depicted by the divergence between MSC and MRC. 
Political and technological attention in the development phase I 
~ocuses upon expanding lirrigation and increasing production. 
Irrigation development activity is well-known for generating political 
activity especially where irrigation is perceived to be essential for 
survival of agriculture and rural communities. The irrigation funda-
mentalism image is that agriculture is the corner-stone of any viable 
society (Davidson, 1969; Musgrave, 1972; Watson q Rose, 1980) 
and this traditional view is a significant political force. Conflict between 
uses at this stage is minimal: there is generally sufficient for 
everyone. Consequently scheme planning, as in New Zealand, is 
concerned only with the cost of providing the resource. This is 
the resource cost (which also includes operating and ni"aintenance 
costs), whereas opportunity cost, which is the value of water in its 
best alternative use is of little concern. In the development phase, 
opportunity cost is considered to be zero. 
The mature phase commences when social conflicts become more 
evident: competition for water and capital and calls for greater 
efficiency in water use become more evident. Economic interest is 
directed towards basic respurceallocation issues and research is 
conducted into the institutional barriers to economically efficient water 
allocation. In this phase, politicians, planners and water users give 
more attention to other mechanisms such as water pricing, as policy 
instruments to encourage a greater efficiency in the physical and 
economic use of the resource. Also in this phase, resource planning 
recognises the significance of externalities, and opportunity cost and 
social cost are considered along with resource cost. Social cost is 
the correction of observed costs to take account of any unpriced 
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adverse or beneficial effects of water supply and use. Randall 
(1982: 22) states that an economically efficient, equilibrium state is 
reached when resource cost, opportunity cost and social cost of water 
are all equal at the margin, and all are equal to the price of water, 
shown as p* in Figure 2.1(B). The price o(water to the user m . 
should be a sum of each of these components. If each is fairly 
calculated then water i~ being. used to its best value to society. 
The Canterbury water economy exhibits characteristics of both 
, development and mature phases (Table 2.1, column (c)). There is not 
the same physical resource scarcity as in parts of Australia where 
. I 
extensive water storage and distribution systems are required. The 
water harvesting scheme at Glenmark is the first large-scale (1 500 
hectares), community scheme of its type in North Canterbury. Much 
of the capital infrastructure (water races, headworks) is new and in 
good condition. Problems of water-logged soils and decreased water 
quality have either not become apparent, or are minimal. However, 
irrigation schemes are heavily subsidised through pUblic funding, 
including suspensory loans and favourable interest rates. 
That conflict occurs is indicative of a water economy with the 
characteristics of a mature phase. For example, the concern that 
water allocation plans and minimum flows are not sufficient to protect 
in-stream uses; lack of technical skills and methods to place values 
on activities such as recreation in a format which can be used in 
conjunction with economic cost-benefit studies of irrigation schemes. 
Some areas, such as Culverden, are experiencing rising water tables 
andc-tlrainage problems, while the Lincoln-Southbridge locality has 
recorded nitrate pollution qf groundwater wells. Nitrate contamination 
derives mainly from intenSively used., inland clover pastures. Some 
of these concerns would not normally have surfaced at the current 
stage of irrigation development " and the wider public interest in 
irrigation can be attributed to a greater public· and social interest in 
the state of the environment. No longer can irrigation schemes be 
justified merely because they are technically feasible with some 
increased production and protection against dry years. Water 
allocation planning is a more complex exercise in multiple objective 
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analysis with trade-offs between economic benefits and environmental 
costs being more closely identified. 
2.2.2 The Demand for Water 
Problems associated with water allocation are more readily 
appreciated by considering the supply and demand for water by various 
users in a particular time period. This approach to explaining the 
economic consequences of water scarcity does not require quantifying 
the amount of water required, or the dollar value of production for 
each unit of wate~ available for irrigation. For the purposes of 
qiscussion it isl assumed that water is available to irrigate either, or 
both, an area qf wheat or oats. 
The concept of diminishing marginal product shows that as 
more units of a variable commodity, for example water, become available 
and are applied to a fixed factor (land), a point is reached where 
adding extra equal amounts of water will yield smaller and smaller 
increases in total output. Figures 2. 2 (a) and (b) show how this 
applies when water is used to grow wheat or oats. A corollary is 
the concept of diminishing marginal returns. When thseost of the 
variable commodity, water, is considered, a user becomes less willing 
to pay for each successive additional quantity. Figure 2.2 (c) shows 
that if water is priced at $3 per unit, then an irrigator would apply 
.:; $ units to the area of wheat. At $3 no water is used to produce oats. 
If water is priced at $1 per unit water will be used to irrigate both 
wheat and oats. Using both crops (wheat and oats), Figure 2.2(e) 
shows that when the price of water is high only wheat is irrigated, 
while at a lower price some oats are also irrigated. 
This example is extremely simplified, but none-the-less, it 
demonstrates how the actual product mix along a farm's aggregate 
demand curve for water varies according to the priCe of water. The 
pricing mechanism provides the signal necessary for an efficient 
allocation of water amongst alternative uses. We are now in a position 
to relate the MSB of irrigation to the MSC of supplying water. 
The demand curves in Figure 2.1, while representing the 
- ,-- -- - , 
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Figure· 2.2 
SIMPLE ANALYSIS OF WATER DEMAND 
(a) Wheat (b) Oats 
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demand for water in both phases of a water economy, can also be 
interpreted as being derived demand curves. That is, the demand 
for a factor of production (water), is derived from the consumer 
demand for the good (agricultural products) that the factor is used 
to produce. In agriculture, the demand for water used in irrigation 
is a function of: (a) the type of agricultural product (horticulture, 
pasture, field crops), (b) prices of inputs such as fertilizer, 
materials and labour, (c) prices received for agricultural outputs, 
and (d) the state of technology, for example, the availability and 
use of automatic timing mechanisms to operate gates to flood border-
strip paddocks. 
Whether irrigation schemes will be constructed depends on the 
availability of markets in which to sell the produce. Highly valued 
horticultural crops (blackcurrants, grapes, fruit) will improve a 
scheme's economic viability. However, there is little point in growing 
these products if a suitable market does not exist. 
Inherent in Figure 2.2 is the nation of the value of a resource 
at the margin. Efficiency is achieved when value at the margin for 
one use is equal to that in each other possible use. If water is 
diverted from use A to use B, with the result that the loss in net 
social value in use A exceeds the gain in use B, the reallocation is 
inefficient. An economically efficient use of the resource occurs when 
these values are equal at the margin. Of course, the value of water 
in alternative uses can only be accurately assessed if there is detailed 
knowledge about the uses. For example, the value of water in 
producing a grain crop can be calculated, but there is inadequate 
information on the value of water in angling. In agriculture a value 
can be placed on each cusec of water but not for recreation. As more 
information on the value of recreation becomes available, then all 
things being equal, the demand -curve for water amongst the uses will 
shift to a position of greater economic efficiency in resource use. To 
illustrate, Le Page (1980) showed that inc reasing the horticultural 
area in the proposed Lower Rakaia scheme from 100 hectares to 1 450 
hectares raised the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) from 10.2 per cent 
to 15.0 per cent. Of this increased area, 930 hectares would produce 
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6 500 tonnes per year of blackcurrants compared to the present 
production of 700 tonnes per year. However, he considered that a 
realistic area for horticulture would be 500 hectares. While a small 
shift in the area devoted to horticulture showed a higher return than 
sheep and cropping, the problem was finding markets for the sub-
stantial amount of extra produce. 
Competition for water in the mature phase is intense. Instit-
utional mechanisms are required to ensure that society is receiving 
the best returns from its use. One theoretic8;lly favourable argument 
is the pricing mechanism whereby water is supplied at a price reflecting 
its marginal cost. Pricing serves to influence
l 
the way a resource is 
used by placing emphasis on efficient resource use. Randall (1982) 
believes that a pricing system established by water authorities would 
suffer from the disadvantages of (a) the high cost of adequate inform-
ation and, (b) political pressures on the authority to divert from its 
pricing in order to pursue other social or political objectives ~ 
Alternatively, but still incorporating the idea of pricing, is a 
market in water, where the emphasis is on opportunity cost. A water 
market is not a new idea and is widely discussed in economic literature. 
The advantages and problems of this concept in a region where water 
is 11 socialisedll are considerable and complex. However, I believe the 
concept deserves consideration because of the issues it highlights and 
the directions it points to for change. In Chapter 5, I return to the 
idea of a market in water and discuss its potential in the context of 
existing institutional arrangements. 
2.2.3 Summary 
Economics is concerned with the efficient allocation of scarce 
resources. Two concepts are important in water allocation. First 
is opportunity cost, where the true economic cost of anything is 
measured by -the value of the highest valued alternative use foregone. 
Second, is that of value at the margin so that, all other things being 
equal, if less water than expected is available for irrigation, the least 
valued agricultural products are those most likely to be foregone. If 
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market prices change, however, this situation may not result. This 
explains, in part, why dairying is attracting interest in new irrigation 
districts. On irrigated land dairying can give a higher return than 
sheep· farming, and this land-use change more closely reflects the 
true value or opportunity cost of the water. 
The potential value of irrigation water is not realised when it 
is used only for "drought insurance". It behoves irrigation scheme 
planners to ensure that water is u~ed effic~ent1y. Davison (1979) 
suggests that in the Aniuri basin, the heavy .investment and increase'd 
debt levels incurred bYI farmers as a result of the irrigation scheme, I 
means they will have to maximise production levels. Failure, however, 
to reach these new levels would show that the potential value of the 
water is not being captured by society. Other users would be 
justified in questioning how the irrigation water is used and whether 
it could be used more valuably in other uses. 
If expanded irrigation does not eventuate, some of the regional 
water resources will remain unused for an indeterminate time, to the 
possible detriment of the region. Legitimate regional economic and 
social interests point towards expanded irrigation, but this should 
recognise the value of other uses. Water management authorities 
should seek to bring competing uses more into an equilibrium, and 
facilitate the allocation of water to higher valued uses (Wollman, 1962). 
Where economic tools are not used to their potential, redis-
tribution of water among competing uses involves assigning weightings 
to each use. As such, resource allocation becomes a political exercise 
where the actual and poten~tial users seek to gain the maximum amount 
of water they can. Existing users are usually in a more powerful 
position and their interests are embodied in the legal system. Potential 
uses and those less well recognised by the legal structure must find 
methods to assert the validity of their requirements. 
This situation is well illustrated by Figure 2.3. At the point 
where the total product curve begins to plateau out (point A), water 
is being used to achieve the optimum biological potential of a produc_t, 
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for example, pasture. This situation could occur if water is supplied 
at zero cost; a characteristic of the development phase. If the user is 
required to absorb some of the costs of supply (the private marginal 
cost (PMC)), then the level of application falls back to point B. If 
the full social opportunity cost is incorporated into the price of 
water this could further reduce use to point C. The amount of water 
allocated among the uses will depend on the powers each user has to 
influence the decisio,n process. 
Figure 2.3 
INFLUENCE qF POWER ON WATER ALLOCATION 
p 
P:Q 
A 
a 
The second part of this chapter, therefore, examines a 
conceptual framework which explains, in terms of a power-rights 
approach, how resources are allocated. 
2.3 POWER AND CHOICE: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Resource management involves making choices between competing 
uses. Where resource demand exceeds supply, the decision maker 
must determine which uses are to be favoured. Choosing among 
uses involves applying weightings to each use; in effect, a 
ranking, and as such is the outcome of a political process because it 
involves choosing between values. How the ranking of one use compares 
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to another depends on how power is dis~ributed among users. The 
amount of power held by each user determines the rights which 
that user holds. Rights exist to protect the interests of the right-
holder, but they also influence the power structure, so that rights 
and power exist in a dual relationship (Samuels, 1981). Because 
decision makers must determine whose interests are to count, it 
becomes necessary to examine the power structure and determine 
how it functions·, and how it allocates resources. 
2. 3. 2 Power and. Rights· 
This section is cOlilcerned about the relationship between 
institutionalised power and non-institutionalised power in resource 
I 
allocation. 'Power' is the means or capacity by which the objective 
of a resource user is achieved. For some resource users their 
power is institutionalised, that is, their objectives are recognised by 
the political and legal systems which govern social and group 
relationships. Examples include Federated Farmers, local authorities, 
Nature Conservation Council and irrigation associations. In comparison, 
non-institutionalised groups include pressure groups such as the Waiau 
Ri ver Action Committee, recreational groups and other special interest 
groups. These groups seek to achieve their objectives by exerting 
pressure or power on decision makers from without, while the 
institutionalised groups can function within the political and legal 
systems. Whether or not the power of a resource needs user is 
institutionalised determines the structure of that party's opportunity 
set which, in turn, determines a party's sphere of choice (Samuels, 
1981). Thus, a resource user whose power is institutionalised will have 
a more complex opportunity set and a larger sphere of choice or 
courses of action .. Whereas a non-institutionalised user will have 
a more tightly constrained sphere of choice. An example is the ability 
of the institutionalised resource group to promote projects for the 
development and use of a resource. Irrigation and hydro-electric 
power projects are good examples. The promoters of a project 
usually receive support from a wide range of interests because of per-
ceived benefits: employment, income and increased standard of living. 
The non-institutionalised user is seen to be reacting to development 
-.:.','.: 
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projects and to be promoting ideas and objectives which are believed 
to be contrary to the IIpublic interest ll • Proposals, especially for non-
development or conservation of resources, are seen by some institution-
alised powers to be a waste of resources. 
When the two types of resource users meet, the issues are 
discussed and decisions made in a zone of mutual coercion. Although 
this term implies the .idea of force and conflict, the process is really 
one of interest identification and trading between the parties where 
they mutually agree to mutual coercion. Here many ,factors and forces, 
values, beliefs and ideas enter into the arena, and the decisions are 
. I I 
a result of the interaction of these forces. The decisions reached in 
this area of mutual coercion, in effect, represent the "public interest" . 
In the context of this study, the areas of mutual coercion include the 
hearings and procedures for the environmental impact reports, the 
water allocation plans and appeals to the Planning Tribunal. 
The process is represented in Figure 2.4 where the interaction 
of resource users is illustrated. 
Institutionalised 
Power 
Figure 2.4 
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As relationships between institutionalised and non-institution-
alised power evolve, so also do opportunity sets and the rights and 
powers of the parties. It is important to recognise that rights and 
powers evolve with time - relationships are dynamic. The range of 
legal powers, political recognition and economic strength of the 
parties in a resource allocation situation determines how much of the 
resource each will receive. Rights therefore have important distribu-
tional consequences. The outcome is that the working rules (laws) 
and decision-making arrangements require further examination, and 
foir this purpose the case study approach is a Useful mechanism. 
I 
The validity of the power-rights hypothesis can be challenged 
if'a long-term approach is adopted. In the short-term, resource 
allocation can possibly be explained in terms of 'power'. However, 
in the long-term, other variables, collectively termed the environment, 
may be equally valid in explaining resource allocation through exerting 
pressure on the opportunity sets of the parties. The variables 
include information, property rights, access to the decision maker, 
relationships with the media, and the ability to present a rational and 
technically sound case. They also help explain why opportunity sets 
change with time. 
A result of the power-rights approach is that there can be no 
"best" or "optimal" solution in resource allocation. In this situation 
optimal refers to the economically efficient allocation of resources. 
This result does not occur because environmental variables distort 
the process - the outcome represents a combination of what is 
economically efficient and politically feasible. For example, an economic 
analysis of an irrigation s~cheme may show an IRR less than the 
government stated minimum, but because it is politically desirable the 
scheme may still proceed. 
Consequently, in a specific time period, there can only be 
solutions based upon the existing power structure. Both the allocation 
(who gets what) and the distribution (how much a party gets) of 
resources is made primarily to meet the requirements of those whose 
power is institutionalised. However, every decision changes the sphere 
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of choice of the concerned parties. Where a resource allocation 
situation is economically efficient, it is not possible to make one 
party better off without making anyone else worse off. For example, 
in the allocation of water between irrigation and in-stream uses, an 
optimal situation would mean that a change of allocation would leave 
the other party worse off. In reality, however, it is possible to 
reallocate water resources because the initial allocation was not 
necessarily economically efficient. Nevertheless, whenever a reallocation 
is made costs are incurred by the parties. These costs. termed 
transaction costs, cover a wide range: time, monetary loss, the cost 
of achieving the reallocation, and the cost of policing the reallocation. 
. I 
For example, if the amount of water allowed to be abstracted is 
decreased then policing may be necessary to ensure that the limit 
is not exceeded. In the context of this study, there are some 
transaction costs. These include the costs incurred by the non-
institutionalised powers in challenging the water allocation plans and 
appeals to the Planning Tribunal. The WRAC was an unofficial group 
of concerned local people who provided funds for the Committee from 
their own financial resources. Likewise, these same individuals and 
others who represented special interest groups had to sacrifice time 
and wages when appearing before the RWB. Time spent researching 
and preparing submissions is also a cost to these groups. On the 
other side, each cubic metre of water left in the river represents a 
potential loss of income to the irrigator. The task of the resource 
manager is to reduce the occurrence of these costs and, especially 
to ensure that some parties are not unduly disadvantaged. Over time, 
the costs absorbed by the parties should balance out. 
2.4 DECISION-MAKING 
~ 
The previous section examined the role of institutionalised 
power and non-institutionalised power on water resource management. 
The next step is to study of the process of decision-making, and the 
factors which shape the decision outcome. 
Decision-making is the process of choosing from a set of 
competing alternatives (Mitchell, 1979: 294). In this study, the RWB 
had to select a minimum flow for the Waiau and Hurunui Rivers which it 
believed would protect in-stream uses yet permit irrigation to 
proceed as planned. 
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Theoretical explanations of decision-making are wide-ranging 
yet there is no one best wayof approaching the task. The literature 
spans the fields of economics, political science, public administration, 
sociology and resource management. Some of the more well-known 
approaches include 
(i) the economic model which assumes that decision-
makers seek to optimise in the econo~ic sense 
(Mitchell, 1979); 
(ti) the decision maker who II satisfices ll rlither than 
maximises (Simon, 1957); 
(iti) the incremental model (Lindb~, 1959; 1979) ; 
(iv) the stress model in which an. environmental stress, 
for example, a drought, precipitates action by 
interest groups and the subsequent interaction 
of groups and resource managers (Kasperson, 
1969; O'Riordan, 1971a). 
Studies on decision-making seek to ascertain how decisions are 
made - who participates, what forces are involved, how the particular 
decision was arrived at and why some other alternative was not 
selected. Moore (1975) has comprehensively reviewed the literature 
on decision-making in resource management. He concludes that no 
generally accepted model exists which explains how resource management 
decisions are made in the political arena. Moore considers that a 
decision consists of five elements: situation, participants, organisation, 
process and outcome. These elements are not mutually exclusive 
nor are the boundaries between them sharply defined. 
A similar approach to the Moore framework is the systems model 
(Dye, 1972; Jenkins, 1978) which comprises: 
(a) environmental forces such as organisations, groups, 
individuals which are external to the political 
system. Associated with these forces is the social 
and economic situation of a region which can be quite 
influential in deciSion-making. This is especially true 
F_1 
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if the decision outcome will effect regional 
economic development. 
(b) the political system, being the institutional 
structures and processes which allocate resources 
and determine social values. 
(c) the decision outcome, where the actual decision can 
be divided into the decision output and the actual 
outcome which is the implementation of the decision. 
37. 
Figure 2.5 shows the essential components in a systems approach 
to decision-making. 
I 
A quite different approach is the stress model first suggested 
by Kasperson (1969) and later develored by O'Riordan (1971a, 1971b). 
Kasperson looked at a local community in order to understand how 
various actors behaved when water had to b·e allocated in a 
developing drought. O'Riordan placed emphasis on the perception of 
a problem (on environmental stress) and the involvement of special 
interest groups (Figure 2.6). An interest group perceives an environ-
mental stress and its concern is conveyed to the resource manager, 
often a politician or political entity such as the RWB. Once a decision 
is made, other groups will protest to the resource manager resulting 
in a further and final decision. The last decision is viewed as being 
the outcome of a group struggle. 
O'Riordan tested his method by examining a controversy over 
the discharge of sewage effluent and considered how the local authorities 
managed the problem of increasing lake eutrophication. In both 
instances the first decision was made without public input and on 
technical advice in which~public preferences were assumed. These 
decisions were opposed by special interest groups (for example, 
ratepayers' associations) and, after discussions, a second decision 
was arrived at to meet the objE;lctions of those principally involved 
(O'Riordan, 1972). He believes that this process is .neither efficient 
nor necessarily very "democratic", for the result is a compromise 
reached through group bargaining. Special interest groups attempt 
to modify the first decision because 
r04;;tt'~ 
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"the policy or decision contains implications for the 
amount and distribution of societal benefits and 
costs ... " 
(Mitchell, 1979: 307) 
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Clearly, two quite different approaches exist. The first takes 
a systematic view of decision-making where the final decision which 
reflects the "public interest''', results from conscious choice. The 
second approach concentrates more upon the participants. The 
emphasis is on the range of stresses acting upon a community, 
including its political leaders, and how the politicians cope with those 
stresses.' The decision is something which "satisfices" and is 
incrementally changed as new infcirmation is obtained, other interest 
groups become involved, and different strategies adopted. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter established a three part analytical framework for 
examining water allocation in Canterbury. It was shown that the 
regional water economy exhibits characteristics of both development 
and mature phases. It is in a mature phase that choices must be made 
about competing uses. To encourage more efficient resource use and 
so reduce the area of potential conflict requires new '910cative 
mechanisms, one of which is a system of marketable water rights. 
For this study the stress model is more applicable than the 
systems approach. It places a greater emphasis on the participants 
and their objectives. More attention can be focused upon the relative 
strengths of the parties and how this affects the decision outcome. 
As the influence of groups change, so also is the perception of 
the "public interest". It re~ognises that resource allocation is a 
dynamic process incrementally working toward a resolution of the 
conflict over use of resources. 
Resource allocation is a dynamic, political process involving 
competing interests and values. Consequently, there is unlikely to 
be a situation where resource allocation is truly rational. The resource 
manager should aim for the most rational allocation for the reasonably 
foreseeable future. To say that a 'best' or 'optimal' allocation exists 
~:::~:c~::!~~;:~:;j 
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in the long-term involves a subjective, judgemental assumption as to 
how the wealth from a resource should be distributed. 
Rational allocation of water is influenced by the institutional 
structure, administrative procedures and the economic and social 
environment. Chapter 3 examines the institutional arrangements and 
administrative procedures relevant to water management in Canterbury. 
This provides the foundation for understanding the issues and 
decisions which will be described in Chapter 4. 
) 
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3.0 INSTITUTIONS AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many resource management and environmental studies conclude 
that institutions play an important role in natural resource management. 
Studies can be found which focus primarily on suggesting criteria or 
identifying features useful in evaluating or designing institutions in 
an attempt to improve environmental management and resource use. 
These studies would suggest that social values and society's current 
I 
institutions have more influence on the allocation and distribution of 
resources than other forces. such as the market (Scott and Nigro. 
1982: 45) . Bromley et. al.. (1977) sees institutions as more than just 
I 
organisations; they are a way of approaching problems and dealing 
with issues. While it is the political process that seeks the clarific-
ation and definition of that nebulous creature - the public interest. 
The challenge is to formalise the political process into institutions 
capable of defining that interest with the added ability of accommodating 
change. 
In this chapter. I examine the concept of institutions and 
discuss existing institutional arrangements in the \light of a theoretical 
analysis. Embodied within the institutional structure is a decision-
making system for resource allocation. A model is established whereby 
the influence of participants on the decision-making process can be 
identified and assessed. How the institutions and decision-making 
processes actually function is reviewed in Chapter 4 where the 
allocation of water in the Amuri Basin is used as a case study. 
3.2 INSTITUTIONS:. T-HE CONCEPT 
The concept of institu ions has generated a great deal of 
research and. in fact. there appear to be as many definitions and 
criteria as authors writing on the subject (Table 3.1). This led Mitchell 
(1979) to emphasise the need for agreement on operational definitions 
and analytical criteria. Definitions vary widely in analytical content and 
comprehensiveness. The basic concepts and subsequent refinements are 
found in the literature of Fox. Ostrom. Wengert and Ciriacy-Wantrup. 
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TABLE 3.1 : SELECTED DEFINITIONS OF "INSTITUTIONS" 
1. Craine (1971) in Mitchell (1979: 281-282) 
Institutions and institutional arrangements refer to a definite system 
of public decision-making, one that includes specific organisational 
entities and governmental jurisdictions,. .. In addition .. the term 
"institutions: suggests special attention to the configuration of 
relationships: 
(1) established by law between individuals and governments; 
(2) involved in economic transactions among individuals and 
groups; 
(3) developed to articulate lega}, financial, and administrative 
relations among public agencies; and 
(4) motivated by s0cial-psychological stimuli among groups 
and individuals. 
... Thus institutional studies focus on the linkages which tie the 
authority and action centres together into a public decision-making 
system which is responsive to the environment within which it must 
operate. 
2. Fox (1976:743) 
... Institutions refers to either an entity; an organisation or ab 
individual, or a rule; a law, regulation, or established custom. An 
institutional arrangement is ... an interrelated set of entities and 
rules that serve to organise societies' activities so as to achieve 
social goals. 
3. Ciriacy-Wantrup (1969: 1319) 
An institution is ... a social decision system that provides decision 
rules for adjusti~g and accommodating over time, conflicting demands ... 
from different groups in a society. 
4. Shaffer (1969: 249) 
Institutions ... mean the more or less formalized relationships among 
,members of the community including the laws, regulations, customs and 
standard operating procedures. 
5. Sclimid (1972: 893) 
Institutions are a set of ordered relationships among people which defi:l.e 
their rights, exposure to the rights of others, privileges and respon-
sibilities. 
6. Commons (1931) in (Randall, 1978: 3) 
Institutions are defined as collective action in control, liberation, and 
expansion of individual action; institutional forms are unorganised 
customs and organised going concerns. 
7. Bromley et; al.,-{1977:36) 
Institutions ... are those social decision systems which, by defining the 
working rules, accommodate change and reconcile conflicting demands. 
lif 
*'" ~
43. 
with a critical survey of the literature being made by Bromley, et. al., 
(1977). There is a definite domination by writers involved in natural 
resource management, especially those associated with water management. 
The studies cover a wide spectrum: 
(a) The development of institutional analysis theory: Fox 
and Craine (1962), O~trom and Ostrom (1972), Goldston 
et. aI., (1971), Fox (1976; 1982(a)), Swainson (1976), 
Ciriacy~Wantrup (1967), Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 
(1975), Bromley (1974), Bromley et. al., (1977). 
(b) The role of institutions in water quality: Kneese and 
Bower (1968), Davis L1968), O'Riordan (1972), Bromley 
I 
et. aI., (1977). 
(c) Case studies of environmental policy issues: strip mining 
(Landy, 1976); coastal zone management (McLauchlan, 
1981); soil conservation (Warriner, 1961); public land 
management (Baden and Stroup, 1977). 
(d) Water resource planning and management in various 
countries: Australia (Musgrave, 1972); Britain (Craine, 
1969; Porter, 1978; Parker Ii Penning-Rowsell, 1980); 
United States (Maass et. al., 1962; Ingram, 1971, 1973 
and 1978), Canada (Power, 1975). 
(e) Studies with an economic orientation:,,---Ciriacy-Wantrup 
(1969; 1971), Shaffer (1969), Schmid (1972), Randall 
(1978), Seckler (1971). 
Fox (1976) regards institutions as being a combination of rules 
and entities: 
"The term institution refers either to an entity; an 
organisation or an. individual, or a rule; a law, regulation 
or established custom. An institutional arrangement is 
defined as an interrelated set of entities and rules that 
serve to organise societies' activities so as to achieve 
social goals." (p. 743) 
In contrast, Bromley et. al., (1977) sees institutions as being social 
decision systems which accommodate change, attempt to reconcile 
conflicting demands, and define property rights. Combined, 
fi;~;~':~ 
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these two definitions contain the essential elements of the concept. 
Institutional design should be such that it gives a comprehensive and 
co-ordinated approach to resource management, rather than being a 
constraint because the design is not suited to achieving the desired 
objective. 
Fox (1976) suggests that the design of a water allocation system 
generally involves two issues. First, the question of equity; the 
distribution of the resource within and between existing and potential 
users. Second, the objective of efficiency: the 'allocation of water to 
l?rin,g the largest return to society. In other worlds, does the allocation 
system encourage the use of available supplies in ,an economica'lly 
sufficient manner, and does it allow the water to be transferred to a more 
efficient use? An evaluation of water management institutions must 
consider these two issues. 
As an institutional arrangement consists of an interdependent 
set of entities and rules, the task is to design a system which enables 
both to interact so that decisions reflect societal wishes. Whether 
existing institutions achieve this goal can be tested against a myriad 
of evaluative criteria suggested by many researchers. For example, 
Swainson (1976) proposes a set of criteria for testing institutional 
arrangements: 
(i) facilitation of social choice; 
(ii) that the jurisdiction of the decision-making entity be 
such that the interests and preferences of those clearly 
affected by decisions are taken into account; 
(iii) constraints on the losses which can be imposed on 
individuals; 
(iv) that institutional atrangements should move toward 
maximising social values. 
These criteria reflect Fox's view that institutional design should 
produce decisions which reflect social objectives (1976: 746). He suggests 
that the following social values are important in institutional analysis: 
(a) representation of legitimate interest groups in the 
deciSion-making process, 
l ~~ ~;~ ~ ~ _~~~~~ ~~_ ~ ~~~_~:. j 
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(b) adequate information. 
(c) an effective decision-making system (time and resources 
should not be wasted), and 
(d) implementation should faithfully reflect the decisions. 
Combined, these criteria suggest that ,as institutions are social 
decision systems they should be designed so that all legitimate interests 
are represented in the decision-making process, thereby reflecting 
societal values. Goldston et. al., (1971) express the view that 
institutional research should identify the existence and probable magni-
tude of potential social benefits not currently being captured by existing 
institutions. If these insti11utions fail to capture potential social benefits I 
they cannot be maximising social objectives. On the other hand, Bromle~ 
et. al., (1977: 62) reiterates the view of Ciriacy-Wantrup that 
"the ability of an institution to successfully accommodate 
change is more important than whether it achieves 
optimality at any particular instant. " 
Thus, if the factors which determine institutional structures and change 
are understood, the probability of these institutions being successful in 
capturing those potential social benefits is increased. 
3.3 INSTITUTIONS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
As well as serving as social decision systems, institutions also 
exist to define property rights. In this context property means more 
than ownership of land. It can take many forms .including intangible 
items, for example, ownership of copyright, access to information, the 
right to the use of a scarce natural resource. The existence of an 
unappropriated resource (water) gives an incentive for individuals or 
groups to claim that resource before others can do so. Their claim 
,.. 
establishes a property right which is difficult to counteract. Thus 
constructing an irrigatio\ scheme with its specific water requirement is, 
in effect a property right. 
However, the concern for the environment in general and, 
specifically in this study, water, is a reflection of the concern about the 
traditional disposition of property rights. As more information becomes 
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available, or other persons, activities and pursuits become adversely 
affected, questions are asked about the use of natural resources. Thus, 
any presumptions that agriculture or industry has a right to the use 
of water is being challenged. The outcome is an incremental change 
in the arrangement of property rights. 
Natural resources should be managed so that property rights are 
clearly defined. . Institutions responsible for this management should 
further the availability of information as the degree of knowledge 
determines the relationships between resource users. As we have 
seen from Chapter 2, thj3 existing power-rights relationship exerts a I 
considerable influence on resource allocation, so that the distribution 
of power in society is a significant factor in the assignment of property 
rights . Consequently , where natural resources are publicly owned 
their allocation may be "inefficient" or "inequitable", and some of the 
reasons for this can be traced back to the institutions governing 
resource management. 
3.4 INSTITUTIONS AS A MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM 
The starting point is an identification of the structural components 
of the system. Ciriacy-Wantrup (1967) suggests that water policy may 
be regarded as a set of decision rules in a multi-stage process. There 
are three levels in this hierarchy. The lowest - the operating level -
is the primary functioning level and comprises the decisions of the 
management agency, while the middle level - the'institutional - regulates 
decision-making at the operating level. The highest is the policy level 
which effects changes at and regulates the institutional level. Decision-
making processes at each level are interrelated because the effects of 
each decision can be followed through lower levels. 
Ciriacy-Wantrup's approach was later refined by Bromley et. al., 
(1977) who expanded the hierarchy by adding a fourth level - the 
constitutional. \ Bromley separates laws and organisations, arguing 
that they have different functions. Policy is expressed by the legal 
system which then defines the institutions or interrelationships to be 
formed. Whereas organisations give meaning to those relationships so that, 
in effect, they institutionalise the Ie gal framework. This argument is 
- - - .'. . -. ~. - - - -; - - ,-. 
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strengthened through its clear identification of the relationship of the 
legal system to the other hierarchic levels. Ciriacy-Wantrupdid not 
specify the components of his institutional level but it covers "social 
institutions" such as laws, regulations, land tenure and taxation systems. 
This multi-level, decision-making system with a feedback loop, is 
illustrated by Figure 3.1. Below, each level is briefly summarised 
while the concepts are explained later in the context of the current 
institutional arrangements . 
. 1. Decisions at the constitutional level determine the basic rules 
of society: the sytem of government, and the structure and 
function of its branches. I Decisions at this level are the 
authority for decisions at all other levels. 
2. The second level comprises the legal framework. Laws and 
regulations embody policy and determine the range of 
institutional relationships and structures. Legislation is 
also defined and amplified at this level by the judicial 
system. 
3. The organisational level gives meaning and substance to the 
policid and laws framed at the second level. 
4. The ope\;,ationallevel implements decisions of agencies at the 
organisatitmallevel. Here changes result more from second level 
legal or policy changes than from changes at the organisational 
level. 
Within Figure 3.1, the feedback loop exists because changes at 
one level may affect the structure, performance and functions of other 
levels. Changes may redefine rights, privileges and the distribution of 
, 
decision-making power. Two examples serve to illustrate the effect of 
changes at the first and second levels. First, in 1967 the Crown 
assumed ownership of all natural water and, with limited exceptions, 
a "permit" is required to use or take or to discharge into water. This 
was a major cOnstitutional chang-e radically redefining resource ownership 
and property rights. The second example relates to the 1981 "wild 
and scenic rivers" amendment to the Water and Soil Conservation Act 
1967. This change increases legal acknowledgement of the value of wild-
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life habitats and recognises wild, scenic and "other natural 
characteristics" of rivers, streams and lakes. New legal mechanisms 
(water conservation orders) were created to implement this social 
objective. This second level change will influence decision-making 
at the organisational level. 
However, in some instances inter-level distinctions become 
confused by the feedback loop. For example, the Minister of Works 
and Development as a Member of Parliament and Cabinet, and as 
Chairman of the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority, 
assumes constitutional and policy making roles. This highlights the 
I I 
view of Bromley et. al., (1977: 40) that 
". .. institutions are the web of interdependencies 
among law, agency operations and public finance, 
rather than any specific part of the .whole". 
3.5 WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 
3.5.1 The Constitutional Level 
This level formulates the broad aspects of water resources 
policy in terms of other policies, for example, irrigation policy is a 
component of the national agricultur al policy. Policies reflect social 
values and needs which are then translated into legislation and 
administrative guidelines. Politics is an integral part of the structure 
of this level and political activity is high when laws and policies are 
reviewed. The formulation of a "wild and scenic rivers" policy began 
at this level in response to a demand evidenced at the organisational 
level. 
Two key components are the Minister of Works and Development 
and Parliamentary Select Committees. The Minister is a key regulator 
in the resource management process. Any institutional changes must 
be approved by the Minister whose support is necessary if they are 
to be i.mplemented. Even if pressure is exerted on politicians from 
outside the parliamentary system, it is rare for changes to occur 
which the Minister does not support. The Minister, as Chairman of 
NWASCA, knows that decisions of the Executive will be incorporated 
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into decisions of the 9rganisational level. The Minister's control 
is guaranteed by being able to translate policy into legislation and 
by determining the extent of financial support to the organistional 
level. For example, some RWBs have ·a low rating base and rely on 
NWASCA to supplement their administrative rates with grants from 
central government funds. These grants must affect the adminis-
trative and decision -making flexibility of the recipient boards. For 
the year ending 31 March 1982, the NWASCO allocated $1. 547 million 
in grants to RWBs for water planning (NWASCO Annual Report, 
1982). Other boards, however, such as North Canterbury, have 
a good rating base and are more financially independent, although, 
. I 
they still rely on grants from NWASCO for water resources surveys 
and management planning. In 1981/82, 38 per cent of the Board's 
income came from central government grants and subsidies, but of 
this nearly 83 per cent related to soil conservation works. Figure 
3.2 illustrates the Board's pattern of rev~nue and expenditure. 
Figure 3.2 
NORTH CANTERBURY CATC~~ENT BOARD AND REGIONAL 
WATER BOARD : REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE 
Source 
GRANTS AND SUBSIDIES 
lB, 
EXPENDITURE 
OPERATIONS 
Ie:nqineerinq and 8011 
conU8cvAtion work.s) 
50' 
Annual Report (NCCB and RWB) 1981-1982 
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Select committees are created by Parliament (House of 
Representatives) to hear submissions on proposed legislative changes 
and to ad vise on chan ges. This process gives special interest 
groups an opportunity to effect changes at the second and third 
levels. The Caucus Committee is a relatively new entity gaining 
increasing influence at this level. The power and influence of a 
Caucus Committee depends largely on Ministerial interest and attitude 
toward the committee and the subject under investigation. These 
committees have a useful role where policy issues are in flux or being 
redefined, and provide,s non-Cabinet Members of Parliament with 
an opportunity to shape legislation or review policy (Alley, 1978). 
For example, in Octobe~ 1982, Cabinet approved changes in irrigatiori 
funding policy. Draft policies were prepared by a Caucus Committee 
and all three members had a close political interest in irrigation. 
Because of the high degree of interest in irrigation in Marlborough 
and Canterbury, membership of the Caucus Committee provided these 
Members of Parliament with an opportunity to influence government 
policy, and to assist their constituents and region. It goes without 
saying that a committee fully in favour of irrigation is unlikely to 
recommend a new policy which will antagonise their rural electorates! 
3.5.2 The Policy and Legal Framework 
In the decision-making hierarchy, the second level is pivotal 
for it expresses policies and defines the structure and functions of 
third and fourth level institutions. At both this 'and the third levels, 
the decision systems are not designed to achieve welfare optima 
" ... but rather to maintain and to increase welfare by 
continuously influencing decision-making on the lower 
level under constantly changing conditions that for 
any point in time cannot be projected, or can be 
projected only vaguely, and that are always uncertain 
with respect to actual occurrence" . 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975) 
Institutions should exist to serve social policies and goals and 
the legal system actually specifies the institutions to be created. 
The legal system also serves to ensure a predictable pattern of 
response between decision-making levels. 
r~?c~t;~ 
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However, not only does the legal system codify social values 
and goals, but it also attempts to balance conflicts. Thus, the legal 
system comprises not only the Ie gal rules such as statutes and 
regulations which bring a degree of certainty to the socio-economic 
system, but it also qas a judicial role where administrative decisions 
are reviewed. At this point we can analyse the legal system in terms 
of i~s structure, function and performance. The legal rules in New 
Zealand for managing water resources are primarily embodied in two 
statutes. 
First is the ,Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act, 1941 
, I 
[SC q RC Act] which is very much a mechanical statute. It was 
passed to remedy the problems of depleted vegetation, soil erosion, 
and flooding which arose from some unfortunate land use practices. 
The Act provides the necessary decision-making processes at the 
second level to give a co-ordinated approach to soil erosion control. 
Two agencies were created - the Soil Conservation and Rivers 
Control Council [SC q RCC], and Catchment Boards in the regions. 
The principal function of a catchment board is to promote soil 
conservation in its region and to minimise .and prevent damage by 
floods and erosion (Marshall and Page, 1957). 
Second, and more important in the context of this study, is 
the Water and Soil Conservation Act, 1967 [W q SC Act]. The Act 
reflects a gradual tendency in natural resource management to move 
from private ownership of resources to a form of common property. 
In part, the change reflects a belief that legal systems should not 
only recognise and manage societal conflicts, but also the 
environmental consequence~ of societal activities: for example pollution, 
soil depletion and timber wastage (Bennett and Chorley, 1978: 309). 
Strictly speaking, common property refers to a natural resource 
which is physically and legally accessible to more than one user, who 
compete with one another to the ultim-ate detriment of themselves, the 
resource and society (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). A classic 
example in New Zealand was the uncontrolled exploitation of the 
Chatham Island crayfish (lobster) resource in the late 1960s - early 
19708. The problems inherent in this concept have been well 
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documented (for example, Hardin and Baden, 1977), leading to a 
search for more socially acceptable institutions. One concept 
gaining favour is the "public trust doctrine", (Sax, 1970). Its 
actual implementation has been more effectively achieved in New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada, rather than the United States where 
common law concepts such as riparian rights and prior appropriation 
have become legally and politically entrenched. 
To reach the present situation water management institutions 
have moved through four phases, each with greater degree of Crown I 
involvement and regulation in order to improve the common good: 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
Phase 4 
I 
1852-1908 Local control; urban and rural 
drainage; water supplies, public 
health. 
1908 
1941 
1967 
River Boards Act 1908 
Increasing' concern about the effects 
of forest clearance on land stability, 
soil conservation and flood control. 
Bills were introduced, but not 
passed, to control water pollution: 
Pollution of Water Bill 1912, and the 
River Pollution Prevention Bill 1937. 
Soil Conservation and Rivers Control 
Act 1941 
Greater appreciation of land - water, 
interrelationships; research into 
hydrological characteristics of New 
Zealand rivers; development of policies 
... for water allocation,. water quality and 
groundwater management (the Under-
ground Water Act was -passed in 1953 
but repealed in 1971). 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
Concern over increased hydro-electric 
power development of rivers; increased 
interest in irrigation; debate over the 
I· 
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"wild and scenic rivers" concept. 
1981 Water and Soil Conservation Amendment 
Act 1981 
The transition from the Common Law riparian doctrine for water 
management and use is an example of the tendency to replace common 
law rules with comprehensive statutory water provisions (Williams, 
1980: 78). Over time the riparian doctrine was perceived to be an 
inadequate institution for the management of water resources. The 
1967 Act effectively "nationalised" all natural water, giving the Crown 
complete responsibility for water management. Thus, the WSC Act 
i.s a functional aJjlplication of the public trust doctrine to water 
resource manage~ent. However, it was necessary to establish a 
complex regulatory structure to administer and control the resource 
(Williams, 1980: 92). The Act states that the Crown has the sole 
right to the use and flow of all natural water (including sea water) 
in New Zealand. 
Within the WS C Act are two important institutional mechanisms 
which, in turn, govern decision-making at the organisational level. 
First, the right to use or take or discharge into water is 
regulated by a water permit system. A RWB may grant a water right 
to dam, divert, take or use natural water, or to discharge natural 
water or waste into natural water, or to discharge natural water 
containing waste on to land or into the ground .. The term "right" 
is not defined in the Act but is a legal concept whereby the holder 
may do a certain thing "as of right". However, because the applicant 
is really obtaining a privilege from the Crown, the authorisation may 
carry certain duties, obligations and responsibilities. These must be 
clearly identified but should not be such that the right is reduced 
to a licence revocable at will. 1 The water right system applies to 
both ground and surface water. This approach is not unique to 
New Zealand. Similar systems can be found world-wide, for Teclaff 
(1979) shows a growing trend away from customary and common law 
1. See: Alliance Freezing Co. (Southland) Ltd v. Southland 
Catchment Board [1977] 6 NZTPA 247. 
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principles to a written codification of water law. 
Regulation of Water Use 
The Act gives a very skeletal description of the permit system 
with little policy guidance on water right administration. Consequently, 
Planning Tribunals often refer to the Long Title of the Act, and the 
functions and powers of the National Authority and duties of the 
RWB, to obtain some insight into water policy. When conflicting 
uses are involved, for example, recreational and ecological interests 
may challenge an application for waste discharge, the RWB must adopt 
~ balancing test, in Iwhich no one use has precedence over another 
(Williams, 1980: 120). Thus, while the RWB must "take adequate 
account" of the needs of recreational and wildlife interests, this does 
not create a priority in favour of them, 
"but does require that they be given specific consider-
ation in every case, the conservation of water for 
those purposes being one of the specific objects of 
the Act" ,Z 
When studying a water right application, the RWB is not 
required to determine whether the use is a "beneficial one". Its task 
is simply to "balance interests". While a function of the Board is 
to promote "the conservation and most beneficial uses of natural 
water" (Section 20 (5) (c) ), the concept of "beneficial use" is not 
referred to in the section 3 which gives the Board the authority to 
grant a water right. Despite the vagueness of the term, some attempt 
at definition is necessary when society places a high value on its 
water resources. 
At the regional level, the RWB has exclusive right to issue, ,.. 
cancel and amend permits for water use. Where the Crown is involved, 
the NWASCAfulfills the same function, with the RWB being restricted 
to an advisory role. Although responsibility for "minor" Crown water 
right applications has been recently delegated to RWBs. Appeals 
2. Greensill v. Northland Catchment Commission [1971] 4 NZTPA 59. 
3. Section 21( 3) . 
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may be made against a water right decision of the RWB. and also of 
NWASCA but the Crown is not bound by a decision of the Planning 
Tribunal. 
Before a water right can be granted. whether for ground or 
surface water. two. conditions must generally be met. There should 
be sufficient unallocated water at the site to meet the applicants' 
needs and the use should be "beneficial". although this term is not 
defined. Approvals may be given "on such terms as the Board may 
specify" but this is subject to the criterion of reasonableness. A 
beneficial use is considered to be one tpat is "positive". which 
generally means the consumptive use of water. for example. agriculture. 
domestic and commercial uses. Thus an application to protect the 
right to go fishing is not a "positive" use of water. 
If a water right is approved but is not exercised. or the water 
is wasted through excessive abstraction or inefficient reticulation or 
distribution procedures. the Board has no power to cancel the right 
for failure to apply the water for a "beneficial use". The power to 
impose restrictions on water rights is restricted to occasions where the 
Board seeks to maintain minimum flows or stabilise groundwater levels. 
Water rights are issued on a "first come. first served" basis. 
but prior permittees do not have an unassailable right to the flow 
allocated to them. They may be required to share the available flow. 
usually on a roster system. if the flow is insufficient to meet all 
demands. A regular sharing (rostering) of water abstraction occurs 
in the Ashley River catchment where low flows coincide with high 
water usage for irrigation ',. 
Water rights are often issued on incomplete hydrological 
knowledge about water resource.s, especially groundwater flows. The 
RWB> has been progressively preparing water allocation and manage-
ment plans but, as this only began in 1967, much work remains. 
Despite the legal requirement for water usage, many water users do 
not have water rights. Recently the RWB estimated that 20 to 50 
'- ----_._."-,-,- '-"--". 
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per cent of users did not have permits. The large number of non-
authorised uses makes it difficult to quantify resources and to ensure 
fair allocation. 
The second mechanism for controlling withdrawals from surface 
waters is the requirement that a prescribed "minimum flow" be left 
in the rivers. The RWB is required to determine the minimum amount 
of water which sh04~d be left in a river before any abstraction is 
permitted. Minimu~ flow provisions are intended to provide for 
in-stream uses, (recreation, scenic, wildlife, intrinsic), but prescribed 
flows are often the subject of controversy whenever minima are set. 
In Britain, thd problem of calculating a "minimum acceptable
l 
flow" 
was so great that the concept was abandoned (Porter, 1978:58). 
Minimum flows can be calculated in various ways and the braided 
nature of Canterbury rivers makes calculation even more difficult. 
In its draft allocation plan for the Hurunui River, the RWB stated 
(1979) : 
"There are no precise criteria for establishing desirable 
minimum flows in New Zealand rivers and each river 
must be considered individually". 
By contrast, the State of Florida defines minimum flow as 
"the limit at which further withdrawals would be 
significantly harmful to the water resources or 
ecology of the area". 
(Teclaff, 1979) 
but this still leaves open to debate the question of what is meant by 
"significantly harmful" . 
Above the minimum now, water is allocated among uses on a pro 
rata basis, not all surplus water is actually available for abstraction, as 
the surplus is allocated between both in-stream and positive uses. 
It is the proportion which each receives which can generate conflict, 
although some of this conflict arises from a failure to understand how 
minimum flows are calculated. 
Once approved by the RWB, the minimum flow is prescribed 
:~~:~:I~~;::~ 
~i;:::;\~ 
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in a water allocation and management plan. The function of the plan 
is to 
1. specify how available water is to be allocated 
among competing demands when such demands 
cannot be fully met, 
2. indicate the estimated frequency. and severity of 
restrictions to be imposed upon different users 
if water supply is restricted, 
3. guide the RWB when issuing new water rights 
or varying existing rights, and 
4. warn intending resource users of possible 
restrictions so that they might assess the 
economic impact of such restrictions. (NWASCA, 1975) 
The plan is a non-statutory document, that is, it has no legal 
standing and opponents of a plah. cannot challenge its contents or 
test its acceptability in a court., Because the plan is not binding 
on any party it is a guide to those involved in water management 
rather than a prescriptive document. The two case studies in the 
next chapter are very much concerned with the processes leading to 
the approval of a water allocation plan. 
3.5.3 The Organisational Level 
At this level the emphasis is on a structure and function 
analysis of the decision-making systems, inherently political ones, 
which have national and regional responsibilities. The WSC Act 
signalled a move towards a less fragmented approach in water 
resource management (Table 3.2). 
While this system has reduced the number of entities, 
Williams (1980: 101) believes that the structure remains quite complex, 
unwieldy and undemocratic. Its complexity arises from a desire to 
retain institutions under the SC Ii RC Act alongside those created 
by the WSC Act resulting in a strong central authority, with less 
independent Boards at the regional level. Although the trend is 
towards consolidation of water administration entities, a similar move 
is pot so apparent in the total spectrum of water law. Quoting a 
1967 United Nations survey of global water management systems, 
Teclaff (1979) points out that New Zealand has more than 100 separate 
enactments concurrently in force and relevant to water management. 
..*".;.;.~~;-::~:"'-~;~«":: .:=-~ 
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TABLE 3.2 
Water Management Authorities in New Zealand 
Organisational 
Function 
1876 1890 1910 1930 1950 1960 1970 1974 1982a 
Land Drainage 
Boards 
Urban Drainage 
Boards 
Water Supply 
'Boards 
River Boards 
Underground Water 
Authorities 
Catchment Boards 
Catchment 
Commissions 
Regional Water 
Boards 
Valley Authority 
(Waikato) 
Auckland Regional 
Authority (as 
RWB) 
Total 
1 
16 
17 
41 64 
1 3 3 
7 6 
28 ,39 44 
29 90 117 
43 
4 
2 
16 
12 
77 
40 
5 
1 
11 
3 
13 
1 
74 
34 
4 
1 
9 
5 
13 
4 
1 
71 
33 
4 
1 
6 
13 
4 
1 
1 
63 
24 
4 
1 
6 
1 
1 
55 
Source 
Notes 
Scott (1979); NWASCO publication, No. 28; Dept of Statistics (1982) 
a New Zealand Department of Statistics (1982) . Local 
Authority Statistics 
b Wellington Regional Council acts as a RWB and Catchment 
Authority 
c The South Cap.terbury Catchment Board acts as the RWB 
for the Waitaki Valley Commission. 
There has been no consolidation of this law and so the figure is 
still applicable. 
At the national level, the NWASCA is the principal policy 
making organisation and is the conduit between the constitutional 
level and the RWBs. Many of the Authority's powers are delegated 
to subordinate councils. The Authority has the responsibility, 
, ...... - -,.- .. __ ~-:<r~_~ _~.::.-;.-:,:~~:;:.:..~~ 
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inter alia, 
"To examine problems concerning, and make plans in 
respect of, the allocation and quality of natural 
water; ... 
conservation of natural water . .. 
the needs of fisheries and Wildlife and all other 
recreational uses of natural water." 
(Section 14(3) (a), WSC Act, 1967) 
"To co-ordinate all matters relating to natural water 
so as to ensure that this national asset is avail-
able to meet as many demands as possible and is 
used to the best advantage of both the country 
and the region in which it exists in the course 
of nature." 
(Section 14(3) (d~, WSC Act, 1967) 
"To promote the best uses of natural water, including 
multiple uses, and to allocate natural water between 
competing demands. " 
(Section 14(3) (m), WSC Act, 1967) 
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Regional water resource management is the responsibility of 
the RWB. In respect of water management and allocation, the main 
objective of the RWB is to: 
" ... promote the protection of water supplies of local 
authorities and the conservation and most beneficial 
uses of natural water within the region, including 
the planning for and promotion of works and projects 
for the conservation of natural water, and projects 
for the multiple use of natural water. " 
(Section 20(5) (c), WSC Act, 1967) 
Using a catchment water allocation and management plan the 
RWB plans to meet the many demands made upon the regional water 
resources. Given that the minimum flow concept is the primary 
planning tool, any criticism of those flows is, ipso facto, a criticism 
of the allocation and management plan. 
While the plan itself has no legal status if determined by the 
RWB (that is, it is not enforceable in a court of law), it has significant 
implications for it specifies how water resources are to be allocated 
" 
and how much water must remain in the river to protect in-stream 
uses. Teirney (1981) suggests that the minimum flow gains legal 
recognition when it is fixed by NWASCA and, once the flow is fixed 
by NWASCA, it cannot be further reduced if the WAP is revised. This 
,;:,:",;.:,:-:-:,:;,.0;;-,;';:1 
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method has only been used once in Canterbury, however the legal 
machinery is very unwieldy and this management approach is unlikely 
to be used again. In addition, it does not make for responsible 
resource management. 
Interest groups in Canterbury have not sought to have minimum 
flows fixed and two reasons may exist: 
1. interest . groups do not require better protection 
(Teirney, 1981) and, 
2. the interest groups may believe that given the 
composition of NW ASCA th~re would be little 
point in applying to have the minimum flow for 
a river fixed. 
Membership of both national and regional organisations 
reflects common characteristics although the manner of appointment 
is different. At the national level, all members are either nominated 
by central government departments or interest groups, or are 
Ministerial appointees. However, interest group membership is not 
balanced, giving some water users a greater influence on water manage-
ment and allocation than others. Figure 3.2 clearly shows this. 
In contrast, membership of the North Canterbury RWB (Figure 3.3) 
is a mixture of elected and appointed persons, with a 2: 1 voting ratio 
in favour of elected members. Elected persons represent a particular 
local authority or group of local authorities. RWB membership is a 
mirror image of catchment board membership as constituted under the 
SC q RC Act. When regional water board responsibilities were added 
to those of catchment boards, membership was not altered. However, 
these Boards have quite different functions and, while all relevant 
interests were represented in the catchment board system, the same 
cannot be said for RWBs. How this particular aspect of institutional 
design affects water management is considered in Chapters 4 and 5 
as its impacts are significant. 
Appointed members at both national and regional levels generally 
represent those government departments with an interest in land and 
water management. Representation is expanded in the case of the WRC 
~{:~:~~~~:~:~;*~~ 
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FIGURE 3.3 
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
MINISTER OF WORKS AND DEVELOPMENT 
I 
NATIONAL WATER fr 
SOIL CONSERV ATION - Minister of Works fr Development 
AUTHORITY (Chairman) 
(7 persons) 
SOIL CONSERVATION 
AND RIVERS CONTROL 
COUNCIL 
(12 persons) 
- Governor-General's 
App·ointee 
- 2 persons from the NZ 
Catchment Authorities 
As sociation 
- One person from each of: 
Land Drainage fr River 
Boards Assn 
Counties Association 
. Municipal Association 
Federated Farmers 
L q S 
NZFS 
MWD 
Treasury 
MAF 
- One person from each of: 
SCRCC 
WRC 
NZ Catchment Authorities Assn 
Municipal Assn 
Counties Assn 
- One person appointed on the 
advice of the Minister 
WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL 
(14 persons) 
- Chairman (not being a public servant) 
- One person from each of: 
MAF 
MWD 
DSIR 
Dept of Health. 
Ministry of Transport 
Federated Farmers 
NZ Manufacturers' Federation 
NZ Dairy Board 
NZ Meat Industry Research Institute 
Recreational Interests 
- 3 persons representing the: Municipal 
Assn, Counties Assn, and Catchment 
Authorities Assn. 
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FIGURE 3.4 
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
REGIONAL LEVEL 
NWASCO 
NWASCA 
A WATER 6 S OIL DIVISION WD 
/ SCRCC WRC I 
I 
NORTH CANTERBURY CATCHMENT BOARD 
AND REGIONAL WATER BOARD 
(15 persons) 
- 3 representing: Christchurch City, Lyttelton and 
Riccarton Boroughs 
- 1 representing: Kaiapoi and Rangiora Boroughs, 
Eyre County and Rangiora District 
ELECTED---t- 1 representing: Waimairi County 
- 1 representing: Hurunui and Oxford Counties 
APPOINTED 
OPERATIONS 
- 1 representing: Malvern and part Ashburton Counties 
- 1 representing: Paparua, Mt Herbert and Heathcote 
Counties 
1 representing: Akaroa, Ellesmere and Wairewa 
Counties 
- 1 representing : Parts Amuri and Cheviot Counties 
- One person from each of: 
MWD 
NZFS 
MAF 
L 6 S 
DSIR 
BOARD COMMITTEES 
- RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION 
D o"o 0 ~O to 1 VIsIOns: pera IOns ~Resource Resource \ Reserves 
Investigations Planning 
6 
Management 
Administration 
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and includes those interest groups which use large quantities of 
water in processing industries or which discharge waste into waterways 
(Manufacturers' Federation, Dairy Board, Meat Industry Research 
Institute). Significantly, the Municipal, Counties and Catchment 
Authorities Association are represented on all three entities comprising 
the NWASCO, whereas all other interest groups are only represented 
on the NWASCA through the single representative from each of the 
other two councils. For example, both farmers and recreationists must 
rely on the one representative from the WRC to the NWASCA to present 
any views they might have on water allocation. 
To assist the RWB, the constitutional decision makers have 
established a quaSi-judicial institution. In some defined cases the 
Board can refer a water right application to either a standing Tribunal 
or a special Tribunal. 4 All applications are advertised and, if an 
objection is received, the Board may require the matter to be heard 
by one of the Tribunals. The Board may refer matters "of predeter-
mined natures or of minor importance" to a standing Tribunal or it 
may constitute a special Tribunal to consider one or more specific 
issues. If an objection is received to an application, the applicant 
may advise the Board that he desires the application and objection 
to be referred to a special Tribuna1. 5 To date, costs incurred at a 
Tribunal hearing have been left "as they fall", that is, each party 
bears its own costs whether successful or not. 
The standing Tribunal comprises three RWB members and 
adjudicates as required, that is, if and when the Board refers cases 
to it. It is appointed annually. A special Tribunal is constituted by 
the Board to hear specific issues or if requested by the applicant. 
,. 
A special Tribunal can comprise up to five persons, and the chairman 
is appointed by the Board. Members of both standing and special 
Tribunals mayor may not be members of the Board, and are chosen by 
the Board "for their knowledge and experience in matters of the 
4. Section 24(7), WSC Act. 
5. Section 24(BA) and (BB), WSC Act. 
I:~':£'~:tit 
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nature under examination." 6 Tribunal decisions are framed in terms 
of recommendations to the Board. Generally, recommendations are 
first considered by the Resources Committee which, in turn, makes 
a recommendation to the full Board. Experience so far shows that 
recommendations are rarely changed at committee or board levels. 
A special Tribunal was constituted by the Board to hear 
submissions on the proposed Hurunui River water allocation plan. 
In a majority opinion, the Tribunal slightly increased the minimum 
flows for some months above those contained in the draft plan. The 
Water Resources Committee endorsed those recommendations, which 
. 1 ! 
in turn were accepted by the full Board. In this case the Board was 
not legally obliged to constitute the Tribunal but did so in order to 
show some impartiality in reaching its final decision. Four of the five 
Tribunal members w~re members of the Board and on its Water 
Resources Committee. 
3. 5.4 The Operating Level 
At this level policy is implemented, and effects monitored and 
fed back into other levels in a process of continuous assessment. 
Adequate and relevant data on resource problems is also generated 
for use in the decision-making process. 
Bromley suggests that the case for institutions existing at 
this level is not very strong: 
"Institutions indigenous to the operating level would seem 
to be limited to those situations in which operating rules 
have been developed at the operating level itself and 
have not been imposed through, although accepted by, 
the legal and organisational levels." (1977: 38) 
Examples of "institutions" indigenous to this level tnclude, adminis-
trative staff manuals, and policies of a local nature. The structure 
designed to achieve these ends varies between regions and that adopted 
by the North Canterbury RWB is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
6. Section 24(8), WSC Act. 
. - .... . 
i'"~-;: \~:-.::~--;.::~<.!~-~~~~~-~~ 
I 66. 
In October 1982, the RWB adopted a decision-making system 
whereby committee business is conducted by the full Board con-
stituted as a particular committee. The Boar.d has three committees 
(Resources, Operations and Administration), and this is reflected in 
the Board's executive organisation . Executive staff are responsible 
for assessing public preferences, and identifying regional social and 
economic goals in respect of water management and conveying the 
results to the Board. This tends to overlap with the role of elected 
Board members who should also be aware of social values and goals. 
However, if some interests are not as well represented as others, 
~hen th€l water planner assumes the "representative" fole so that 
"minority" interests are considered when decisions are made. The 
Board's 'water management system is based on a corporate management 
structure in wl;lich the managers of all divisions are equal and 
responsible to a Chief Executive Officer and a Deputy Chief Executive 
Officer. The Manager in charge of the Resource Planning and 
Management Division has primary responsibility for allocating water 
resources amongst competing uses. This division works in closely 
with the Resource Investigation Division which is responsible for 
research, data collection and monitoring to assist forward planning. 
The rationale for the corporate approach is that regional water planning 
problems can be viewed in their totality, reflecting inter-dependencies 
inherent in the hydrological cycle (Parker and Penning-Rowsell, 
1980: 33) . 
3.6 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
Because central government departments are represented at 
both national and regional levels of water planning they, and in 
particular, the Ministry of 'Works and Development [MWD] have a 
powerful and influential role. Finance for water and soil projects 
and some administration grants are funded through the Ministry of Works 
and Development Vote. These departments initiate many water 
development projects and this reinforces their influential role. 
Ministry of Works and Development 
The Ministry has been closely involved with soil conservation, 
flood control and water management since 1941. It services, 
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funds, formulates policy, and ad vises the NW AS CO. It also 
plans, constructs and, often operates and maintains irrigation 
schemes, although it now has a policy of encouraging local authorities 
to assume responsibility for operating and maintaining irrigation 
schemes. Crown water rights are sought by the Ministry. Initially 
the application goes to NWASCO which, in turn, refers it to the 
appropriate RWB for a report and recommendation. The Board's 
report is considered by the WRC and NWASCA but the final decision 
rests with the Minister of Works and Development. 
. Thr influence of the Ministry extends to advisinr NWASCA on 
policy, priorities for irrigation construction work, and the allocation 
of finance: The tight control exercised by the Ministry' over finance 
rankles with RWB. They object to the additional responsibilities 
imposed by the WSC Act without being given increased financial powers 
or support. In 1981-82 the Ministry was constructing irrigation schemes 
worth $96.6 million and rural water supply schemes worth $39.2 million 
(NWASCO, 1982). It also operates a large water-resource research 
unit and is primarily responsible for the collation and publication of 
national water resource data. 
The Ministry's power extends to influencing changes in water 
management policy, an example being the "wild and scenic rivers" 
concept. Although the concept was strongly championed by the 
Commission for the Environment, with an independent agency suggested 
as being responsible for administering the concept, the MWD was able 
to promote its preferred alternative, namely, a change to the WSC 
Act,7 which incorporated protection for "wild and scenic rivers". " 
Now, all proposals for a ~ater conservation notice to protect a "wild 
and scenic" river must be lodged with the NWASCA, and the Minister 
decides whether a national conservation order or local conservation 
notice should be sought. Onc~ a proposal has been considered by the 
RW!3 in the case of a conservation notice, or NWASCA in the case of 
a conservation order, the final decision again rests with the Minister. 
At all stages, therefore, the Ministry has the opportunity to guide 
and ad vise on the handling of an application for an order or notice. 
7. Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act, 1981. 
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Other Departments 
The role of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries [MAF] 
is especially relevant to this study. The Ministry's main involvement 
in water allocation centres upon the economic analysis of irrigation 
schemes. When a scheme is planned, the Ministry is responsible for 
preparing preliminary and final economic reports on the agricultural 
potential of the scheme. If a scheme is approved, MAF farm advisory 
officers are available to advise farmers on changes ftom dryland to 
irrigation farming systems. Even if economic reports show that 
schemes may not meet minimum criteria for government funding', 
they may still be constructed ~f political pressure from interest 
groups is sufficiently intense. Schemes are expected to show an 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 10 per cent and this has only 
recently been reduced from 15 per cent. The use of the discount rate 
to ration public sector capital spending has been criticised by Brown 
and Hubbard (1980) on the grounds that it is not a suitable criterion, 
and a high rate could make society worse off. 
The Ministry is also responSible for freshwater fisheries 
administration and research in New Zealand. However, protection of 
freshwater fisheries may, at times, conflict with irrigation development 
if water is abstracted from rivers. Ministry representatives on both 
the RWB and the WRC must, therefore, "wear two hats" - farming and 
fisheries. While the Ministry would prefer to reconcile conflicts 
internally, fisheries research staff have publicly objected to water 
allocation plans when they believe that the proposed minimum flows 
are too low. This situation arose in the Waiau and Hurunui case 
studies. 
Other central government departments are represented on the 
RWB through their original appointment as catchment board members. 
It can be argued whether the pr~sence of representatives from the 
New _Zealand Forest Service [NZFS], Lands and Survey Department 
[LaS] and Department of Scientific and Industrial Research [DSIR] 
is warranted on the RWB. But this is not to say that their involvement 
on the NCCB is superfluous. Along with the MWD and MAF, only 
- --.-'.-' .,- .-. -"<, 
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the DSIR is represented at the national level on the Water Resources 
Council. 
3.7 A FRAMEWORK FOR GROUPING PARTICIPANTS 
In a resource management situation it is suggested that three 
principal groupings can be identified: The politician, the expert 
resource manager and the special interest group. Social goals and 
preferences are identified by the pOlitician who then authoritatively 
allocates resources in a manner which is perceived to best advance 
social welfare. This involves identifying, refining and evaluating 
values, the choices and outcomes. In this process the politician is 
. I 
often guided by an expert resource manager, and Parker and 
Penning-Rowsell suggest that: 
" ... the water planner is seldom a free agent to mould 
policies and plans to obtain optimum results bu.t is 
buffeted by market forces and by the whims of his 
political masters ... " (1980: 243) 
However, this view is not substantiated by other research 
(O'Riordan, 1971a, 1972; Kasperson, 1969) which highlights the 
considerable influence of experts on pOliticians. The importance of 
this advice is borne out in the discussions I held with a number of 
Board members. They rely heavily on expert advice in reaching 
decisions. 
Interest groups are "collective organisati~ns with a common 
goal or interest or activity II (Moore, 1975: 35) whose objective is to 
protect or enhance their association's goal. They tend to view 
resource allocation as "a struggle" (Wengert, 1955) and seek access 
to the decision-making points in order to influence policy, so that the 
outcome will benefit group memb ers. Their activities are characterised 
by: 
1. a need to secure de,cisions in harmony with or, at 
least, not in opposition to the group position; 
2. they view the process as a struggle for advantage 
and position rather than a fight against specific 
adversaries and, therefore any conflict occurs 
as a secondary outcome and is not the primary 
goal; 
[ 
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3. the "weapons" are alliances, alignments and friends 
able to ihfluence decisions; 
4. it may involve protection of the status quo; 
5. a group with access to information and technical 
knowledge has a greater advantage in the struggle 
than less informed groups. 
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These characteristics apply to all interest groups, which can 
be distinguished· on the basis of whether they are public interest 
groups (organisational) or sectional (private interest groups), 
although there is some overlap between the groups. Public groups 
.include government and quasi-government agencies and local 
authorities, and function, at the national, regional and local levels. 
Sectional ,groups are further categorised into private .and civic 
interests. Private groups have a personal interest in the decision; 
it includes those who perceive a threat to their health or economic 
welfare, with little attention being paid to the broader issues . They 
can be very effective because their interest is motivated by a fear 
for their own well-being (O'Riordan, 1976). In this study the 
main private groups are irrigation associations, wildlife and recreational 
interests. Civic interests represent those groups and individuals 
who participate out of a moral or intellectual concern, for example, 
a "conservationist" group, or those concerned at how resource 
allocation might affect the local community or region. They see the 
broader aspects of an issue. Their emphasis is as much on the 
changing or improvement of the decision-making' process as in 
changing the actual decision. Consequently, their actiVities will be 
more discrete and policy orientated. Figure 3.4 illustrates the frame-
work adopted in this study for categorising participants. 
Each participant becomes involved for a particular reason and, 
while many believe that they represent the "public interest". this is not 
the case. Rather, they advance a "self-interest" objective which may 
be sloaked in terms of the re gional or national interest. It rests on 
the politician and experts to differentiate between these objectives. 
Thus, they need to be clearly informed as to why the participant became 
involved. The politician must also consider the interests of the non-
involved public : those who are unaffected or unaware of the issue and 
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the implications for them. The result is a IIbalancing of interests II 
with the politician balancing the demands of those actively involved 
against the unknown views, preferences and future needs of the 
society. How well this task is achieved depends on the institutional 
arrangements which society has evolved for natural resource management. 
3.B CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explained the significance of institutions in 
resource management and c;:lescribed those institutions most relevant 
to water management in Canterbury. The review has identified some 
issues and problems to be concentrated upon in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Among these are first, hbw does the present water planning sy~tem 
incorporate the views and interests of various groups. Secondly, how, 
effective and useful are some of the institutional ,mechanisms, including 
water rights, allocation plans, and the minimum flow concept. Third, 
membership of the RWBs, and last, how suitable are the present 
institutional arrangements for integrated water resource management? 
Resource management is very much a process of problem 
perception, behaviour interpretation and interaction among interest 
groups. Analysing resource allocation decisions involves lOOking at 
how groups were able to influence the decision makers, and the 
IIjockeyingll for positions of influence. 
In the final analysis, the decision maker in ,resource management 
is the politician who balances both articulated and non-articulated 
demands and needs with the aim of improving social welfare. However, 
at both national and regional levels the politician is guided and advised 
by experts. A decision will be only as good as the institutions which 
facilitate that decision and this really means a politician having access 
to all available information. 
Chapter 4 brings together the themes of Chapters 2 and 3 through 
a cas-e study of water allocation from the Waiau and Hurunui Rivers. 
This approach is a useful mechanism to test the interaction of the power-
rights concept and the stress model in determining resource allocation. 
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4.0 THE NATURE OF WATER MANAGEMENT TWO CASE STUDIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Approval of the first Rakaia River water management and 
allocation plan in October 1974, signalled a major advance in regional 
water resource management. Although prepared in consultation with 
interest. groups, the draft plan was not initially acceptable to all 
parties, however, after revision, general approval was given. In the 
following year, the political environment surrounding the use and 
development of the region's rivers took a different shape, as more 
p!e~sure was exerted on the decision-making system by outside forces. 
These forces focused their attention and criticism upon a proposal to 
take water from the Waiau River for irrigation. This concern was still 
manifest a few years later (1979) in the allocation of water from the 
Hurun ui River. 
I have focused upon the allocation of water from these two 
rivers as an example of an evolving political awareness and pressure 
group involvement in resource management. This study throws into 
strong relief the range of conflict situations which develop when choices 
must be made about which social goals and values should be recognised 
in the resource management process. Throughout, the conflict between 
resource conservation and economic growth becomes apparent, and the 
ability of the decision-making process to reconcile this conflict is 
traced and evaluated. By using the case study me'thod I seek to 
pinpoint the extent to which present institutional arrangements are 
able to function as a system for resolving conflict in resource manage-
ment. The relevance of ex paste studies of resource management 
decisions rests in the neces~ity for regular reviews of the actual 
decision -making process. However these studies are often difficult 
to implement because of the problems involved in obtaining valid data. 
Part of the problem lies in post r':ltionalisation of decisions even if the 
origiQal decision is shown, in hindsight, to have been "sub-optimal". 
Within the decision -making process a number of issues emerge. 
In broad terms they are: 
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(1) the quantity and usefulness of the information available 
to the participants; 
(2) how the information was used to reinforce the demands of 
the parties; 
(3) how the RWB responded to the demands and its procedures 
for resolving conflict and reaching decisions; and 
(4) the reaction of the participants to the decisions. 
Each of these themes appears in this chapter. 
4.2 DAT A COLLECTION 
During 1982 I Interviewed eight of the fifteen members of the 
North Canterbury Catchment Board and Regional Water Board, of whom 
four were elected members and four were appointees. Each interview 
combined a questionnaire (Appendix 2) and open-ended discussion on 
water management. As information and views sought varied from 
person to person, not every Board member was asked the same questions, 
and the questionnaire was used as a guide for raising issues in general 
discussion. 
After the November 1980 local authority elections ,and through 
retirements and resignations of appointed members, there were seven 
changes in Board membership. The Chairman of the Board and two 
other members were not re-elected, and four other members did not 
seek re-election. For an appreciation of the issues and decisions I 
met and discussed the case studies with the former Chairman of the 
Water Resources Committee. Seven representatives of special interest 
groups interested in water allocation were also interviewed in which 
the questionnaire was used as a basis for discussion. 
An extensive search was made into the literature on policy 
and decision-making in resource management, with an emphasis on 
water policy. At the same time, I attended meetings of the Board 
and its Resources Committee to observe the public decision-making 
processes. This gave an understanding of the issues discussed by 
the Board, how they were handled, the influence of advisers and the 
contributions of individual Board members in the decision process. 
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Local newspaper reports and internal Board reports were also used 
to provide material and insights into the partiCipants' expectations. 
4.3 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AMURI BASIN 
Amuri Basin is an inland plain formed by broad, coalescing 
glacial outwash fans (Bowden, 1977) covering an area of 640 
square kilometres. The basin is bordered by the Waiau River to the 
north, the Hurunui River to the south, with the Lowry Peaks dominating 
the eastern boundary (Figure 4.1). To the west the plains gradually 
merge into higher inland ranges which, while providing a barrier from 
t~e north-west rains, also ~enerate the high temperatures and low 
summer rainfall characteristic of the basin. The plains vary in 
elevation from 150m to 275m'. The mean annual rainfall is about 622mm 
at Culverden, but 928mm on the coast and rising to over 5000mm towards 
the Main Divide (Bowden, 1977). Severe droughts were experienced 
in 1962, 1971, 1973 and 1978. 
A change from extensive sheep farming began in 1907 when the 
Culverden Estate was broken up into a larger number of smaller farms 
(280 hectares to 600 hectares). While the plains were developed for 
dryland pastoral farming, agricultural production is limited by summer 
soil moisture deficiencies and an extensive area of light, shallow Balmoral 
and Chertsey soils. These soils are susceptible to wind erosion when 
disturbed by ploughing. Some smaller areas of deeper soils are suited 
to cropping. Mean soil moisture deficiencies range from 52mm (±5.6) 
in January to 24mm (±4.0) in October. 
Primary economic activities are pastoral farming and forestry. 
Dryland pastoral farming car}ies about 8 stock units per hectare, with 
extensive use being made of forage crops, lucerne and hay for 
supplementary feed. Cash cropping rarely occurs on lighter soils. 
In 1974, 356 hectares of land in Amuri County were being irrigated 
for which eight water rights totalling 1.066 m 3,s had been issued. 
By 1979, 18 farms in the County were irrigating 650 hectares, of 
which 538 hectares were in grass and lucerne. Plantation forestry is 
the other dominant land use in the basin. Balmoral State Forest covers 
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9 500 hectares on the north bank of the Hurunui River. The forest 
is planted mainly in' Pinus radiata, which because 'of the shallow soils, 
Low rainfall and high winds, is vulnerable to fire and windthrow. 
In 1981 the population of Amuri County was 3060. The main 
township in the basin is Culverden (490), with Rotherham (192) 
of lesser significance. Employment is heavily oriented towards 
agriculture and forestry and their servicing. 
I Table 4.1 shows the employment of industry: 
I 
TABLE 4.1 
EMPLOYMENT IN AMURI COUNTY 
MALES' FEMALES 
INDUSTRY 
Agriculture, hunting, 
fishing and forestry 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas fi 
water 
Construction 
. Wholesale fi retail, 
restaurants fi Hotels 
Transport fi storage 
communication 
SERVICES 
Finance, insurance, 
real estate fi business 
services 
Community, social fi 
personal services 
OTHERS 
Total Aptively Engaged 
531 81 
3 
36 12 
18 3 
153 3 
. 90 81 
63 27 
6 9 
153 117 
1083 351 
Source Department of Statistics (1981), Regional Statistics Series, 
Bulletin 8 : Canterbury. 
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Political management of the county is the responsibility of 
the Amuri County Council, with the county offices in Culverden. 
Irrigation has long been supported by the council as a means of 
stimulating economic activity and community development. For the 
county, irrigation is seen as an agent of change. In terms of 
agricultural production, irrigation is expected to increase the 
stocking rate from 8 to 16 - 20 stock units per hectare. 
4.4 WATER ALLOCATION FROM THE WAIAU RIVER 
4.4. 1 Background 
I 
Irrigation in the Amuri Basin was first promoted in 1950, 
with'some preliminary planning being executed, but it took a 
revision of government irrigation policy in 1973 and a succession 
of droughts to stimulate real interest in irrigation. Interested 
farmers renewed their ,application in 1974 with the result that the 
scheme was given top priority in Canterbury (MWD, 1975). In the 
light of this renewed interest in irrigation, the RWB saw the Waiau 
River as a major resource with significant development potential, 
and a catchment water resources investigation began in 1972. Data 
from this study was used to prepare a water allocation and manage-
ment plan. Table 4.2 is a chronology of events for both the 
irrigation scheme and -the allocation plan. 
The Board's report (Bowden, 1974) concluded that the most 
likely requirement for water in the future would be for irrigation. 
However, it was pointed out that a potential conflict situation 
existed, for the seasonal flow pattern of the river was similar to 
possible irrigation demands : the gap between water availability and 
demand narrows in summer when river flows are low and irrigation 
requirements are high. 
4.4.2 Waiau Plains Irrigation Scheme 
Construction of the Waiau Plains Irrigation Scheme will 
initiate a series of major social, economic and environmental changes 
in the Amuri basin. Approximately 15 000 hectares extending from 
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TABLE 4.2 
WAIAU RIVER CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
DATE . IRRIGATION SCHEME 
1972 
1974 
J AN Farmers apply for a community 
irrigation scheme. 
FEB Crow:f. water right application: 
111 m Is. 
RIVER MANAGEMENT AND 
ALLOCATION PLAN 
Investigation of water 
resources of catchment. 
NOV Report on water resources 
DEC 
1975 
FEB Govt approval in principle 
to scheme. 
Water right application 
advertised. 
published. I 
Draft Waiau River water 
management and allocation 
plan authorised by RWB. 
Draft plan agreed to and 
circulated to interested 
parties. 
Public meeting at Culverden 
sponsored by R WB . 
Public meeting at Cheviot 
at request of Cheviot 
County Council. 
MARCH Public meeting in Christ-
church to determine level 
of acceptance of plan. 
MAY Water right hearing by RWB. 
JUNE Farmers vote 011 scheme. 
JULY 
SEPT 
RWB recommends that the 
right be granted. 
Water right approved by 
NWASCA; valid until 30 
April 1983. 
RWB adopts draft water 
management and allocation 
plan. 
Plan forwarded to NWASCA. 
DATE 
OCT 
1976 
JAN 
APRIL 
IRRIGATION SCHEME 
MWD publishes EIR for the 
scheme. 
Economic analysis gives an 
IRR of 11%. 
Appeals against water rignts 
adjourned to April. 
Appeals by NCAS, Cheviot 
I County Council and 
Environmental Defence 
I Society heard by Town q 
Country Planning Appeal 
Board. 
CFE releases audit of EIR; 
"highly critical" . 
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RIVER MANAGEMENT AND 
ALLOCATION PLAN 
Plan approval by NWASCA. 
. the Pahau River to the south bank of the Waiau River are to be irrigated. 
Using water from the Waiau River, a further 7 300 hectares could be 
irrigated, but only 2 100 hectares would be in the basin (the Pahau 
extension). Including this extended area, the scheme involves 80 
farms. A general meeting of farmers in the basin was held in November 
1974 when 49 of the 50 farmers present supported a proposal by the 
MWD for irrigation of the plains. Farmer involvement next occurred 
in May 1975 when the County conducted a poll of all those affected by 
the scheme. The Public Works Act, 1928 required a 60 per cent level 
of acceptance for the scheme to proceed. Results showed 78 per cent 
were in favour of the scheme: 
Eligible to vote 
Voters 
For 
Against 
85 
83 
65 (78%) 
18 (22%) 
Construction began in 1976 and water began flowing in 1980, with 
land development expected to continue until 1983-84. 
• • - • + ~'. - _ ... ' 
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Developing land for irrigation involves a substantial financial 
commitment, by both the construction agency and the farmer. A 
preliminary economic analysis by MAF estimated the Internal Rate of 
Return to be 11 per cent, which met the government criterion of 
10 per cent return to the nation. Government approval-in-principle 
l' 
to the scheme was obtained on the basis of this favourable economic 
analysis. In 1974 the scheme had an estimated cost of $7. 5 million, 
of which $4.5 million was for capital construction works and $3.0 
million for land development. 
For the farmer, development of land for irrigation is not a 
I 
decision to be taken lightly. Not only is a large capital mitlay 
involved, but there is also a need to adapt to a new farming system. 
In both areas the farmer has access to government assistance. 
Financially, the farmer is committed to on-farm costs of around $1200 
per hectare. On-farm subsidies amount to $450 per hectare leaving 
a net $750 per hectare to be found by the farmer (Davison, 1979). 
Davison breaks down the subsidies into: 
Earthworks (50%) 
Water supply (50%) 
Livestock Incentive Scheme ($12 s. u.) 
Total 
$28,550 
4,400 
12,000 
$45,050/100 ha 
For each hectare in the Waiau scheme, landowners receive a 
visible public subsidy of $450/ha for on-farm costs and $125/ha in 
off-farm costs for a total of $575/ha. The government policy upon 
which this scheme (and, for that matter, the Balmoral scheme) is 
based, assumes that the scheme should cover working expenses and 
that assistance should be- in the form of subsidies rather than grants 
or interest only on part of the capital cost (NWASCO, 1971). 
The government meets all costs of headworks (intake, settling 
ponds, etc) and half the costs of all other off-farm development. All 
off-farm costs are initially paid for by the government but it 
recovers half from the farmers over a 40 year period at an interest 
rate set by the Rural Bank. Half of some on-farm costs are also paid 
," :,: ~:: :;': c, e:c: c, ",:;:~:~, 
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for by the government in the form of a suspensory loan from the 
Rural Bank. If the property is not sold and the development 
programme is adhered to the loan is written-off after 10 years. The 
other half of the on-farm costs are generally met by Rural Bank 
financing. A farmer must meet the full costs of roading, shelter 
belts, staff housing, stock, fencing and cultivation but, ag ain, 
Rural Bank financing is usually available. Once operative, irrigators 
are expected tameet all scheme operating and maintenence costs, 
which gives an incentive for the farmers to generate revenue as soon 
as possible. 
To encourage early development, a water charge is levied on 
both irrigators and non-irrigators. Non-irrigators being those with 
properties over four hectares who do not irrigate but who could use 
water from the scheme. Water charges exist in two forms: a basic 
charge which applies to all irrigable land in the scheme and commences 
two seasons after water has become available from the scheme. Once 
a farmer has adopted an approved farm development plan, the basic 
charge is converted to an availability charge. Charges increase from 
the third to the seventh seasons after which they are subject to 
review to account for actual costs (MWD, 1975). 
Even before the official poll on the scheme (May, 1975), the 
MWD had applied for two water rights (February, 1974). The rights 
sought to take up to 11.0 m3 /s from the Waiau River for the Waiau 
scheme and 0.5 m3 /s for the Waiareka Downs scheme. MWD considers 
3 11. 0 m Is the amount necessary to supply 15 000 hectares of the 
Waiau scheme at O~ 07 m3 /s per 100 hectares. Expansion of the scheme 
to cover an additional 2 5~0 hectares would require a further 2.5 m 3 /s . 
Bowden (1974) used a different method to calculate the amount of 
water necessary to overcome soil moisture deficits. In Table 4.3, for 
example, in a 5 year period about 12.6 m3/s of water would be needed 
to ~eet a possible January soil moisture deficit. If this situation 
arose, water from the scheme would have to be rationed as the 
water right is for only 11. 0 m 3 /s . Occasionally, river flows might 
be so low that the full amount could not be abstracted. Bowden also 
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showed that in the period 1948-1972, only in January and February 
1956 would flows have been less than the calculated irrigation 
requirements. 
TABLE 4.3 
SOIL MOISTURE DEFICITS 
Month Mean 5-year 10-year Continuous Flow Required 
Deficit Deficit Deficit (40% efficiency) 
(mm) (mm) (mm) mls 
I 5-year 10-year 
Deficit Deficit 
October 24±4.0 29 44 4.9 7.3 
November 36±3.6 53 63 8.9 10.6 
December 42±5.6 69 85 11. 6 14.3 
January 52±5.6 75 87 12.6 14.7 
February 42±4.0 60 74 10.1 12.5 
March 30±4.2 49 62 8.2 10.4 
Source: Bowden (1974) 
The water right applications were referred to the RWB and advertised 
in February 1975, with a hearing held in July 1975. In the same month 
the Board recommended that the rights be granted and the applications 
were approved by NWASCAin September 1975. 
However, that was not the end of the matter, for the North 
Canterbury Acclimatisation Society (NCAS), the Cheviot County 
Council (CCC) and the Enyironmental Defence Society (EDS) all 
appealed against the Waiau scheme water right. The appeals were 
finally heard by the Town and Country Appeal Board (Appeal Board) 
in April 1976. 8 In these appeals, the Appeal Board adjudicated on 
a number of issues including the issue of who had legal standing and 
the admissibility of an Environmental Impact Report Audit as evidence. 
8. EDS v. NWASCA (1976) NZTPA 49 
r~:;:~~ 
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Of relevance to the irrigation scheme was the decision of the Appeal 
Board that it would not decide on the merits of border-dyking versus 
spray irrigation nor would it look at the suitability of the soils for 
irrigation. The Appeal Board was of the view that it could not direct 
how the water should be used but, it voiced the opinion that if it 
felt that the method of distribution was a wasteful one, it could 
reduce the allocation leaving the abstractor to decide how to manage 
the allocation. 
The Environmental Impact Report Audit was prepared by the 
Commission for the Environment ~CFE) which is a government "watch-
dog" agency with responsibility for evaluating the environmental 
impacts of major development projects. The MWD originally prepared 
an Environmental Impact Assessment (usually prepared only for 
minor projects), but Cabinet directed that a full Environmental Impact 
Report be prepared. The day after this decision, the MWD re-submitted 
the original assessment with a new cover and without amending the 
contents. Not surprisingly the Commission (1976a) was highly critical 
of the nature, timing and content of the Environmental Impact Report. 
However, the Audit came too late to be of u,se to the RWB or the public 
in the hearings on either the water rights or the allocation plan. 
This was an unfortunate situation for the environmental impact reporting 
system is intended as a mechanism for public participation and environment 
assessment at an early stage of project planning. 
4.4.3 Waiau River Water Allocation and Management Plan 9 
When the RWB began investigating the water resources of the 
Waiau River catchment project existing water "positive" demands for 
water were: irrigation (1. (}66 m3/s), public and rural water supply 
(0.044 m3/s), stock water race supply (0.3 m3/s) and livestock water 
demands (0.041 m3/s). The sum of these uses (1.451 m3/s) was not 
a significant demand on the water resource. 
There are no plans to use the Waiau River for hydro-electricity 
power generation within the next ten years. 
9. Hence referred to as "the allocation plan" 
;;:~:":;):~vl-•• ~~~~_;.;.~~ 
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Recreational use of the Waiau River is mainly angling and 
jet-boating. Trout fishing is good, especially in the upper reaches 
and while the river carries salmon, it is not as good as some of the 
rivers to the south such as the Rakaia. The river is navigable by 
jet boats for a considerable distance and is also suited to canoeing. 
Wildlife values were not well-known in 1974 and the Wildlife Service 
made a major survey of the river in October 1975 to assess bird 
populations, species and habitat. 
A water allocation plan was prepared by the RWB to establish 
the amount of water available for abstraction from the Waiau River. 
Above the Stanton River confluence (seJ Figure 4.1) the plan would 
allow abstraction of 15 m 3/s , reducing to 3 m 3/s downstream of the 
confluence. From October to December the flow in the Waiau River 
would not be reduced by abstraction to less than 60% of the natural 
flow at Marble Point, or to 25 m3/s, whichever is the greater. In 
January the residual flow would be not less than 20 ~3/s and in 
February and March, 15 m 3 /s . Figure 4.2 shows how the water is 
allocated in these critical months of October to March between the 
residual flow and abstraction (for irrigation, livestock, rural water 
supply, etc). 
The draft allocation plan was publicly notified in December 
1974, and circulated by the Board to interested parties. Three 
public meetings were held to explain the plan. The first, sponsored 
by the RWB, was held in Culverden while the second was held in 
Cheviot at the request of the Cheviot County Council. A third meeting 
in Christchurch, also under the auspices of the RWB, was heated by a 
clash of personalities rather than value s. Both the Chairman of the 
... 
RWB and the Chairman of the Board's Water Committee were strong 
personalities and not all participants at the meeting were happy with 
the way it was conducted. It also happened that these two individuals 
were "quick thinkers" and very familiar with the plan, thus compounding 
the problem when technical issues had to be explained to laymen. One 
view expressed to me is that the strong and dominating influence of 
these individuals had an adverse reaction on the Cheviot County Council 
I 
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which lead to its supporting the appeals made against the water 
rights. 
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There was no statutory obligation on the RWB requiring it 
to hold these meetings and, as we have seen earlier, because the 
allocation plan lacks legal status no appeals can be made against the 
Boards decision. If the plan had statutory backing an Appeal Board 
could assess its acceptability without having to adjudicate on a specific 
right. In the EDS v. NWASCA appeal, the Appeal Board accepted 
without challenge, the accuracy of the water resources report and 
the water allocation plan. 
From the first public meeting it became apparent that ,lack of 
quantitative information on in-stream uses was having a significant 
impact on the decision-making process. Concern over the paucity 
of information on in-stream uses and values of the effect abstraction 
might have on them lead to the interest groups being suspicious of 
the Board and its motives. This situation was not helped by the 
irrigation proponents failing to provide information on the probable 
impacts or consequences of possible design alternatives for the 
irrigation scheme. 
These public meetings could not be classed as "hearings" in 
the formal sense of the word, rather, they constituted an exchange 
of views. In the interviews, I received the impression that the 
allocation plan was promoted in a manner which would discourage 
opposition. Board members were confident that its river flow 
calculations were of sufficient accuracy that minimum flows could be 
specified without being in fear of substantial error. It was significant 
~ 
that river flow data was not challenged, especially as a computer 
model was used to generate synthetic flow records (Connor, pers. 
comm. ) . Computer models were used to generate flows for the period 
1948-1967, as actual known flow records were only available for five 
years. Runoff yield for three years of known flow records were 
matched to within six per cent of the computer generated flows 
(Bowden, 1974). Thus 90 percentile flows, 10 and the minimum flows 
, 
10. A 90 percentile flow is the flow which is equalled or exceeded 
90 per cent of a specified period. 
, 
I" 
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for the critical October-March period, were based largely on synthetic 
flow models and not hard data. 
4.4.4 The Political Setting 
In this section we are concerned with knowing how the 
participants viewed themselves, other participants, the political setting 
as a whole and of the rules encountered in the decision-making process. 
Because the heatIngs on the irrigation scheme and the allocation plan 
were so interrelated, they are discussed here together, especially 
as some groups saw the allocation plan as a means of stopping or 
amending the irrigation scheme. 
Allocation of water from the Waiau River involved groups and 
individuals with varying degrees of interest, but they all had a 
common objective which was to ensure that water allocation should be 
in the "public interest". However, it is how each group perceives 
the public interest which leads to conflict about how water should be 
allocated. 
I have grouped the participants in this study using the frame-
work described in Chapter 3. This system is subjective for there is 
some overlap between the groups, especially the private and civic 
groupings (Figure 4.3). Differentiation was achieved by attempting 
to identify the objectives of each party. For example, recreational 
interests have a more "private" (self-interest) approach compared to 
the more civic orientation of other groups, such as the Waiau River 
Action Committee. 
Each grouping is nGW discussed in detail. 
1. Organisational 
(a) National 
National organisations show a diverse array of objectives. roles 
and values. ranging from the resource development orientation of the 
MWD and Ministry of Energy to the biological concerns of the Wildlife 
Service. Between these extremes lie such government agencies as the 
MWD (Water 6 Soil Division) 
MAF (Advisory) 
~1AF (FRD) 
DSIR 
Wildlife Service 
NZED 
NZFS 
Dept of Hoalth 
Rural Banking 6 Finance Corpn 
MAF (Wlnchmore Irrigation 
Research Station) 
MWD (Town Planning Division) 
FIGURE 4.3 
WAIAU RIVER PARTICIPANTS 
Arnuri County Council 
Cheviot County Council 
CuI verden - Rotherharn 
Irrigation Committee 
Balmoral Irrigation Scheme 
Committee 
Federated Farmers 
Nth Canty; Amuri; Cheviot 
N. Z. Jet Boat Assn 
N. Z. Salmon Anglers Assn 
Nth Canty Acclimatisation 
Society 
Canterbury University Canoe Club 
Waiau Plains Irrigation Committee 
R. F • 6 B. Protection Society 
Waiau River Action Committee 
Friends of the Earth 
Environmental Defence Society 
Nature Conservation Council 
N. Z. Institute of Engineers 
Royal Society of N. Z. 
Boffa Jackman 6 Associates 
Lincoln College 
N. Z. Agricultural Engineering Institute 
Individuals (non-affiliated) 
OJ 
co 
90. 
Department of Lands and Survey and Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research which have a less active role in irrigation 
development but with wide responsibilities in land use. Rarely 
though, will one department publicly oppose a project promoted by 
another. In default of opposition they identify with the environmental 
or social concerns which might arise from the project. These concerns, 
along with those voiced by the public are analysed by the Commission 
for the Environment which, in turn, makes recommendations for changes 
or consideration to the promoting organisation. There is no statutory 
obligation on the department promoting a project to implement the 
Commission's findings!. 
A trend in cen'tral government administration towards multi-' 
function organisations, for example the MAF, raises the possibility of 
component agencies being in conflict. Thus, the Fisheries Research 
Division (FRD) and the Advisory Services Division can be in 
opposition over the effects of an irrigation scheme. The conflict was 
not viSibly apparent in the Waiau study because information on 
fisheries was lacking. It was also evident to all involved that neither 
the scheme nor the allocation plan would be held in abeyance while 
research and surveys were instituted. 
(b) Regional 
In both the Waiau and Hurunui studies, regional organisations 
showed a lack of interest. There was no involvement by the 
Canterbury Regional Planning Authority, 11 the Chamber of Commerce 
or any organisation which might ordinarily become involved because 
of possible regional benefits or problems. 
(c) Local 
Naturally, Amuri County Council supported the Waiau scheme 
because it stands to be the main recipient of the economic and social 
benE3fits the scheme is expected to produce: economic stimulation, 
increased population and better services. Whereas on the eastern side 
11. Although at this time Amuri County was not a member of the 
Authority. 
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of the Lowry Peaks range, Cheviot County Council was worried about 
the possible combined effects of the scheme and allocation plan on 
water-based recreation and rural water supplies in the county. The 
Council conducted a lengthy correspondence with the RWB and 
sought changes to the minimum flow levels and the water right. But 
F~ 
I 
at the same time the Council was not opposed to abstraction for@iIBE~£d 
irrigation. Rather, it acted to protect county interests as it saw them 
and this involved leaying a bit more water in the river, so while there 
were no inter-Council arguments or tensions, it was believed that 
Amuri County could not have all the water;. 
·2. Sectional Groups 
The private grouping encompasses those activist organisations 
which consider themselves to be potentially advantaged or disadvantaged 
by a project, for example, the Culverden-Rotherham Irrigation 
Committee, and the New Zealand Salmon Anglers Association. They 
have different reasons for involvement, for example, local and 
regional economic development is supported by agricultural interests, 
especially irrigation committees and Federated Farmers. Whereas 
those interested in recreation and "quality .of life" include anglers, 
jet-boaters and canoeists. 
Because their interest is self-centred, these participants form 
some of the more active pressure groups. They perceive a threat 
to their economic or personal welfare and they react by seeking to 
remove that threat by whatever legitimate means they have : media 
publicity, information, meetings, etc. It is often a high profile 
type of activity. Their objectives may be diverse and their activities 
unco-ordinated resulting in a wide discrepancy in demands. For 
example, the New Zealand Jet Boat Association sought an October to 
March minimum flow of 30 m3/s, while the NCAS sought a 20 m3/s 
minimum flow. In total contrast the Balmoral Irrigation Scheme 
Committee suggested that the Balmoral scheme should use water from 
the Waiau River thus requiring an extra 3 m 3/s from the Waiau River. 
The intention was that water from the Hurunui River would then be 
·i~ 
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12 
available to irrigate land to the south of the Hurunui. 
T-he RWB did not attempt to reconcile these demands for it 
was confident that its data gave the best plan and that the irrigation 
demands could be accommodated without affecting other uses. MWD 
planning for the B<;llmoral scheme showed that it would be supplied 
from the Hurunui River and so the irrigation committee's suggestion 
was not adopted. , In any event, the Board had to rely on the expert 
advice of the MWD and not the views of a pressure group; it could 
not arbitrarily increase the amount of water applied for under the 
water right application. 
I 
In a resource management issue such as this, it is often 
impossible to resolve the conflicting demands of the private groups. 
Consequently, the decision makers' attention turns to those groups 
whose views or demands are less dogmatic and where there is a 
possibility of understanding. This reflects the difference between the 
bargaining and consultative processes of decision-making. Bargaining 
is a common procedure where decision-making occurs in an arena of 
opposing power bases. In such a situation the outcome is dependent 
upon the ability of the parties to use or manipulate the existing 
political or legal institutions. If project opponents are sufficiently 
adroit in their use of these institutions, they can affect the design, 
location or distribution of benefits emanating from the project. D'Riordan 
(1976:236) suggests that 
"Bargaining is common when interest groups already exist 
in a particular political arena, or when they spontaneously 
form around a controversial proposal that causes anger 
or fear amongst the affected population". 
Bargaining was not -a necessary pre-requisite to the decisions 
in this study for there were no groups with sufficient power to 
seriously affect the irrigation scheme. Existing interest groups, such 
as the irrigation committees, supported both the scheme and the 
allocation plan; the opposing private interest groups lacked local 
support which would otherwise have been of value to them. Confident 
in the belief that the draft allocation plan was secure from challenge, 
12. MWD (1975) p. D28. 
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the Board could afford to put a~ide the demands of the private interest 
groups and turn its attention to the civic groups. 
The term civic group generally describes those interest groups 
(and individuals) which participate because of an intellectual or moral 
stance on a conservation issue or, if not personally affected, believe 
their community or neighbourhood to be threatened. Without doubt, 
this was the largest and most diverse group, ranging from the Waiau 
River Action Committee to the Royal Society of New Zealand and 
including national, regional and local interest groups. For the 
purposes of this study, the civic group has been defined so that it 
. I I 
includes two sub-groups; the civic and the ideological, although other 
writers including Kasperson (1969) and O'Riordan (1971(a), 1976), I 
suggest that the civic and ideological groups are quite different. 
These pressure groups are quite attuned to the consultative 
process of decision-making, for they tend to emphasise institutional 
change. They become adept at using data, political influence and 
established institutions in seeking to achieve the desired changes, with 
the result that decision-making involves less confrontation and more 
consultation and negotiation. In addition, this process more readily 
lends itself to "behind-the-scenes" conflict resolution, for it regards 
the idea of power politics as being counter-prodU:ctive in the long-
term. 
With one exception, the RWB did not find it very difficult to 
appreciate the concerns of the civic interest groups. To the surprise 
of many, a small, dynamic, articulate and informal interest group was 
formed in Cheviot to challenge the irrigation scheme and the water 
allocation plan. The Waiau ~iver Action Committee 13 had only five to 
seven core members whose own interests and reasons for joining were 
diverse. All its members came from Cheviot County and they were 
concerned with the possible effect irrigation might have on recreation 
(fishing and jet-boating), rural water supplies, closing of the river 
mouth and whether, in fact, water should be taken from the Waiau River 
13. The Committee first used the term 'Preservation', later changing 
to 'Action'. 
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at all. Initially the Committee lacked outside support but towards the 
end of its campaign it received support from the Cheviot County 
Council, although their objectives were quite different. This highlights 
the point that possible sources of solidarity exist among interests 
which ostensibly have no common grounds (Landy, 1976). For a time 
various opinions existed on Committee as to how intensely it should 
oppose the scheme, however, its submissions emphasised that it was 
"totally opposed'" to the granting of the Crown water right. It argued 
that (a) abstraction could not always be restricted or stopped even 
if river flows became critical, and (b) low flows due to abstraction 
could have adverse effects on t?-e lower researches of the river. As 
'an alternative, it proposed that the Waiau River should become a 
"national waterwayll. 
First impressions show that the Committee's activities fit the 
ideal model of a civic interest group: ' political contacts and influence, 
intellectual ability and policy orientated. Yet, its management alter-
native stated for the Waiauwas viewed by the RWB as a non-co-
operative approach, resulting in its exclusion from the decision-making 
process. At the third public meeting held in Christchurch the 
Committee's proposals were rejected out of hand. V. Novis (pers. 
comm.) believes that the Committee's representatives at the meeting 
were IIbelittledll and IIhumiliatedll by statements 'of the Board's Chairman. 
At the outset the intention was to exclude the national waterways idea 
from the political agenda. This action supports the view expressed in 
other studies that decision makers seek only opinions which support 
their own views, with those in opposition being treated as irrelevant. 
The RWB did not attempt to coerce or bargain with the Committee over 
the alternatives and, agai~, the Board itself was constrained by the 
Crown water right application: it could only favourably or unfavourably 
recommend that the water right be granted. In addition, it had no 
power to incorporate as a management strategy a programme which was 
not permitted by legislation. 
Despite an inability to have its views recognised at local level, 
the Committee moved into the national political arena in an attempt to 
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bring more pressure on the Board. One Committee member with personal 
media contacts was able to secure an airing of the water rights issue 
in the North Island. In an editorial of 26 March 1975, the "New 
Zealand Herald" challenged the economic viability of the scheme and 
promoted the national waterway concept. In retrospect, former 
Committee members believe that they have not been given sufficient 
credit for introducing the "wild and scenic" rivers concept to the 
. national political agenda. In consequence, because the Committee 
failed to work within the established "system" it failed to achieve any 
of its gO,als. In fact, because of its stance on irrigation the Committee 
was viewed with hostility by pro-irrigation groups. 
By removing the national waterways idea from the political 
I 
agenda, the RWB was able to turn its attention to those groups whose 
concerns could be considered without upsetting the status quo. Within 
this group I include such organisations such as the Royal Forest and 
Bird Protection Society (RFBPS), Friends of the Earth (FOE), and 
independent organisations of the nature of the New Zealand Institute 
of Engineers. Some concerns of the private groups overlap into this 
grouping because they can be reconciled without upsetting the 
decision makers' declared objectives. Some examples illustrate the 
functioning of this cons~1tative process. 
The Fishery: The FRD considered that: 
"the residual flows have no basis in scientific fact for 
fishery purposes and there is little idea of actual 
effects" . 
When the Waiau scheme was mooted research into the possible 
effects of water abstraction on both salmon and resident fish in 
braided rivers was in its infancy. Consequently little data was 
available, and the CommIssion for the Environment sought flexibility 
in design of the irrigation scheme, especially at the head works. 
Concern for the fishery was also expressed by other groups, for 
example, the NCAS. The RWB recommended that fish screens be 
placed at the intake and, although not happy with this request (Connor, 
pers. comm.), the MWD did comply. However, Novis (pers. comm.) 
suggests that the screens have not proved to be very successful. 
t- . -. -- , .. ;-~<~ ... . 
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Waiau river mouth: an often voiced concern in submissions referred to 
the possibility that water abstraction, especially in periods of low 
flow, might cause the Waiau river mouth to close, thus preventing 
upriver salmon migration. An independent expert opinion sought 
by theRWB concluded that "it was possible but unlikly" that the 
mouth would be blocked in late summer when irrigation demands would 
be high. This report was sufficient to forestall any serious opposition 
but nevertheless the issue was raised by the Action Committee. This 
concern was treated seriously by Board staff, however they could not 
find any substantive evidence which would support the concern and 
much of the Ejlvidence was hearsay and ~ard to verify. 
Irrigation efficiencies the environmental impact report proposed that 
border-dyking would be the main method of irrigation on the heavier 
soils or more uneven land. This method was challenged on the ground 
that compared to spray-irrigation it was an inefficient use of water. 
For example, a university farm management lecturer calculated that 
a predominantly spray irrigated scheme would require 7.48 m3 /s 
(MWD, 1975:D86). This view and accompanying data were seized 
upon by others who wanted to challenge the "efficiency" of the scheme. 
However, "efficiency" in terms of water use and irrigation schemes is 
more complex than at first appears, for it involves the whole question 
of scheme design and alternatives. Border-dyke and spray systems 
have their unique advantages or disadvantages, but the RWB could 
not investigate the merits of either and decide which might be the 
"best" use of the resource. The problem was that the scheme had 
already been designed on the basis of certain parameters and the 
Environmental Impact Report and the water right application assumed 
that these were irrefutable. Discussions on water use efficiencies only 
occurred because the Impact Report failed to present a series of 
equally feasible alternatives. One submission stated 
"It is a pity that the choice of certain important 
alternatives. .. appears to have been made rather 
arbitrarily, and then the particular combination of 14 
alternatives justified by general, non-specific arguments". 
14. CFE (1976b) : Submission of the New Zealand Agricultural 
Engineering Institute. 
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The same submission went on to say 
"To ensure an 'optimum' irrigation development of the 
Waiau Plains area, including 'optimum' environmental 
impact, would surely have required various combinations 
of alternatives (various levels of development of irrigable 
area, various mixtures of different water application 
methods - border-dyked and sprinkler) to be carried 
further in planning and a choice made of the 'optimum' 
scheme in terms of water used, use of the soil resources, 
environmental impact, total annual costs and benefits 
to the farmers, the peop le of the area and the nation". 
--, 
The lesson here shows that when technical data and terms 
from one report arlf taken out of context and become embodied iq 
letters and submissions of non-expert groups, confusion bounds. 
This particular issue was beyond the power of the RWB to resol~e 
but a clearer discussion of alternatives in scheme design could have 
avoided the controversy which arose about which was the more 
lIefficient ll method of irrigation. 
In this section I have traversed some of the salient forces, 
values, beliefs and issues which influenced the character and direction 
of the management of the Waiau River water resource. It is not 
possible to traverse all the views and problems which arose. Rather, 
the objective was to identify and background those issues which are 
part of the political process and how the deciSion-making process 
actually functioned. 
Many of these issues reappeared in 1977-80 when decisions had 
to be made about the Balmoral Irrigation Scheme and the Hurunui 
River water allocation plan came under public scrutiny. It is to 
that case stUdy which I now turn. 
4.5 WATER ALLOCATION FROM THE HURUNUI RIVER 
4.5.1 Background 
Planning for allocation of the Hurunui River water resource was 
accorded the same intensity of interest by pressure groups as they 
gave to the Waiau River. However, it was characterised by a greater 
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availability and understanding of technical information on the part 
of the pressure groups. Events relevant to the Hurunui began just 
as the Waiau issue was reaching a conclusion. The main events in 
this study are shown in Table 4.4. 
The Balmoral scheme is really an extension of the Waiau scheme, 
except that it uses water from the Hurunui River rather than the -Waiau. 
Although the amount of water required is small (5 m 3/s), compared 
to the Waiau scheme demand, the surface river flow can at times be 
quite low, with a greater likelihood of water shortages. Problems 
resulting from low floWS would be further accentuated if an addit~onal 
"fi ve irrigation schemes were constructed on the south bank of the 
river. However, some of these problems could be alleviated if water 
harvesting techniques were used to augment the river supply, or 
if a darn were to be constructed in the upper Hurunui River to store 
flood waters and regulate river flows during the irrigation season. 
Periodic surveys of Lake Sumner and the upper Hurunui River gorge 
have been made to assess their potential for generating hydro-electric 
power. While the possible effects of water abstraction for irrigation 
received the most attention from outside groups, the RWB had also 
to consider other potential uses in its allocation plan, especially 
hydro-electric power potential. With the result that it was more 
difficult setting minimum flows for the Hurunui River than for the 
Waiau. 
4.5.2 Balmoral Irrigation Scheme 
The Balmoral scheme covers 5 500 hectares, involving 24 
farms, at an estimated capital cost of $13.8 million (Le Page, 1981). 
This is ,about $2,500 per hE!Gtare (in 1981 dollars) compared to the 
Waiau scheme which involves 80 farms at $500 per hectare (1974 
dollars). Spray irrigation will be used on 1 303 hectares of the 
scheme. Livestock carrying capacity is expected to increase from 
10 su/ha to 18.3 su/ha. While the overall area in crops is not expected 
to expand, yields should increase considerably with a change in the 
area of individual crops. A preliminary economic analysis in 1979 
indicated an IRR of 12.8 per cent, but the final report (Le Page, 1981) 
Fi::"':'l;;~ 
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DATE 
1974 
JAN 
1975 
FEB 
I 
1977 
OCT 
1978 
MAY 
1979 
MARCH 
JUNE 
JULY 
AUG 
NOV 
DEC 
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TABLE 4.4 
HURUNUI RIVER : CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
BALMORAL IRRIGATION 
SCHEME 
Feasibility study. 
Report on water resources 
formally received by RWB. 
Preliminary economic analysis 
(MAF) gives an IRR of 12.8 
per cent. 
Planning q Environmental 
Report commissioned. 
Crown water right for 5 m 3/ s 
from Hurunui River. 
Govt approval in principle 
to scheme. 
Farmers vote and approve 
scheme. 
RIVER MANAGEMENT AND 
ALLOCATION PLAN 
Hurunui River seminar. 
In vestigation of water 
resources of catchment. 
NCEPB publish scheme 
statement for proposed 
power development on 
the river. Preparation 
of Draft water allocation 
plan (the "working 3 
proposaP' ) . Proposes 8 m /s 
minimum flow for Jan-
July. 
Draft considered by RWB 
(Water Committee) and 
made publicly available. 
Public meeting in Christ-
church to discuss draft. 
RWB discusses submissions 
and staff report. 
RWB establishes a Special 
Tribunal to consider 
draft and submissions and 
Crown water right applic-
ation. 
I~~~{€E~ 
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DATE 
1980 
JAN 
JUNE 
1981 
AUG 
BALMORAL IRRIGATION 
SCHEME 
Planning a Environmental 
Report released by MWD. 
Water right recommended. 
IMinister of Works and 
Development approves water 
right. 
Final economic evaluation of 
scheme gives an IRR of 
7. 9 per cent. 
100.' 
RIVER MANAGEMENT AND 
ALLOCATION PLAN 
Special Tribunal hears 
evidence on: 
1) working proposal (draft 
manageme,nt plan) . 
2) water right application. 
Tribunal reports. Major-
ity (4:1) recommends 
changes to minimum flows 
for Jan-July. Recommend-
ation of Tribunal 
accepted by RWB. 
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showed a substantial reduction to an IRR of 7.9 per cent. The 
Treasury IRR guideline of 10 per cent was surpassed by the preliminary 
report, but by 1981 this guideline had been increased to 15 per cent. 
Consequently, the final report showed the scheme to be very uneconomic 
from the national point of view. Le Page attributes the SUbstantial 
reduction in IRR to the high off and on-farm capital costs in the 
scheme. Inflation caused a 26 per cent increase 'in off-farm capital 
costs and a 12 per cent increase in on-farm irrigation costs. 
For this scheme, the Crown lodged an application for 5 m 3 /s, 
3 
calculated on the same basis as for the Waiau; 0.07 m /s per hectare. 
Compared to the Waiau, there is a greater likelihood that surface flows 
from the Hurunui will be unable to meet irrigation demands. Flow 
records show that there would be few years which would not suffer 
from restrictions on abstraction. In anyone season, abstraction could 
be restricted for up to 26 days, in dry seasons up to 100 days, and 
one year in seven, up to 60 consecutive days with no water at all 
(Gabites, Alington and Edmondson (GAE), 1980). As with the Waiau 
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River, groundwater is not a significant factor in the total water 
resources of the catchment and exploitation of the resource will be 
restricted (Bowden, 1977: 64). 
To avoid the consequences of extended water shortages, the 
water right application of 5 m 3 /s incorporates a 30 per cent excess 
capacity. One reason is given as: 
"This will enable the whole irrigation area to be 
irrigated in 14 days instead of the normal 17 days 
and thus enable a more speedy recovery from 
shortages" (GAE, 1980: 19). 
'This statemerit raises the issue of what the marginal returhs will be 
from irrigatiq.g three days earlier, as research shows that ,as more 
water is applied the marginal return declines. Moreover, a scheme 
which is designed with a 40 per cent overall efficiency and requiring 
a further 30 per cent excess capacity is open to criticism of water 
wastage. 
The Crown water right was lodged in August 1977, although it 
was not until December 1979 that farmers voted on and approved the 
scheme. Voting showed an 87.5 per cent majority in support of the 
scheme: 
For 21 
Against 3 
Total 24 
Eligible to Vote: 24 
The same government incentives, loans and subsidies available for the 
Waiau scheme also apply to this scheme. In making its application the 
Crown waited until after tile draft water allocation plan was publicly 
notified so that both issues could be processed together. This 
contrasts strongly with. the way the Waiau scheme application was 
handled, where the water right was approved prior to the Environ-
mental Impact Report (EIR) being audited. The EIR presumed that the 
water right would be granted without any problems. 
MWD commissioned an environmental report (GAE, 1980) to 
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supplement engineering, economic and other technical data. This 
report was not the same as an EIR which is audited by the Commission 
for the Environment. Lewthwaite (pers. comm.), explains that the 
difference in approach resulted from an expectation by the MWD that 
the main environmental concerns would be covered in the water right 
application, the RWB's resources report and in the water allocation 
planning process. To prepare an EIR, therefore, would be to 
duplicate work. However, the scheme was a major government work 
and with the failure to prepare an EIR an additional avenue of public 
involvement was removed. 
°4. 5. 3 Hurunui River Water Allocation and Management Plan 
The specific objectives of this plan are: 
(i) To preserve the natural flow pattern of the river. 
(li) To set minimum flows below which no water other than 
for stock and domestic and fire fighting shall be 
abstracted. 
(iii) To specifiy clearly how the water available will be 
allocated among competing demands. 
(iv) To set a range of minimum and maximum levels for 
Lake Sumner. 
(v) To serve as a guide to intending users to allow them 
to assess the degree and frequency of the restriction 
they may have to face. 
These objectives are quite wide ranging although the plan concentrated 
upon setting the minimum flow levels for the river, rather than with 
presenting a total package for management of the catchment water 
resource. Any disputes surrounding the minimum and maximum levels 
of Lake Sumner played only a small part in the decision process. Thus 
the plan is really only a water allocation plan for it does not presume 
to contain overall management strategies. One person suggested that 
the document was not even an allocation plan, but rather a "minimum 
flows" plan. 
The water resources report (Bowden, 1977) showed that there 
were few "positive" uses of the river water, with the biggest uses 
being rural water supply schemes in the lower and middle reaches of 
"",' 
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the river. These schemes are operated by the Amuri, Hurunui and 
Cheviot Counties, with Amuri having a livestock water race supplying 
the Balmoral and Culverden areas. At present, most of the water 
taken for irrigation comes from the Waitohi and Waikari Rivers (Bowden, 
1977). As with the Waiau River, the seasonal flow pattern of the 
Hurunui River is such that low summer flows coincide with high 
irrigation demands. In 1979 water rights for taking water from the 
3 Hurunui River totalled 0.8 m Is. 
Recreational uses of the river are mainly angling, canoeing, 
jet-boating and picnicking. Public access to the river and its margins 
I. 1 
is mainly restricted to areas adjoining State Highways or the river 
I mouth. The upper gorge above the Mandamu:s confluence, has 
highly valued white-water canoeing areas, while below the confluence 
the river is suited to less demanding canoeing activities. Extremes 
of water condition makes the river difficult to fish, especially when 
prolonged dry periods result in low flows. A small but recreationally 
significant sport fishery (trout and sea-run quinn at salmon) exists 
in the river (GAE, 1980). One major concern of the RWB and interest 
groups was the interrelationship between river flow and depth, and 
water and air temperatures. Some groups felt that by lowering river 
flows and depth, fish would be stressed by warmer water temperatures. 
All probable points of abstraction will be downstream of the 
Mandamus confluence, and it is the reach of river between the 
confluence and the lower gorge which is the most critical from a low 
flow aspect (Bowden, 1977). In this section the wide, braided nature 
of the river means that during low flows the available water is spread 
over a wide area. This is palleged to raise water temperatures and 
contribute to the stress on fish, and also making it difficult to canoe 
or jet-boat with a reasonable margin of safety. 
The draft plan proposed a minimum flow of 8 m3 /s in February 
and March rising to a high of 17 m3/s in October. However, after 
public discussions, submissions and a report from a Special Tribunal, 
the minimum flow was raised to 10 m 3 /s for January to July, with 
L~ __ _ 
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the flow for the other five months remaining unchanged (Table 4.5). 
TABLE 4.5 
HURUNUI RIVER MINIMUM FLOWS (DRAFT AND APPROVED) 
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Minimum 
flows 
(m 3/s ) 
Draft 9.5 B.'O B.O 9.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 11.0 13.0 17.0 16.0 11.5 
Approved 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 11.0 13.0 17.0 16.0 11.5 
When water is available in excess of the minimum flow it is 
shared on a 50: 50 basis: half to remain in the river and half to be 
available for abstraction or impoundment. Figure 4.4 illustrates how 
this concept functions. For example, if the actual river flow in March 
is 20 m 3 /s, then 10 m 3 /s must be retained as residual flow, 5 m 3 /s 
maybe abstracted for irrigation or other "consumptive" uses, and 
5 m3/s being allocated- for wildlife and recreation (in-stream uses). 
Therefore, raising the minimum flows by 2 cumecs as the RWB finally 
proposed only resulted in an increase of 1 cumec in the river. So 
that if the river flow was 20 cumecs then: 
- if the minimum flow is B cumecs, 12 cumecs can be 
allocated: 6 to the river and 6 for abstraction. 
- if the minimum flow is 10 cumecs, 10 cumecs can be 
allocated: 5 to the river and 5 for abstraction. 
Arriving at the draft flows involved combining five factors: 
water depth, surface width in a major braid, velocity of flow, quality 
and temperature. As a "working proposition", the major river braid 
was considered to have a maximum depth of not less than O. 6m, a 
surface width greater than 10m, and a mean velocity greater than 
105. 
Figure 4.4 
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O. 4m Isecond. Taken together the main braid would contain a flow 
of 2.4 m 3 /s . RWB river gaugings showed that 60 per cent of the 
Ul 
~ 
Ul 
~ 
l? 
Z 
~ 
Z 
o 
H 
E-i 
~ 
U 
o 
H 
H 
~ 
ri ver flow is in the main braid, and so the total river flow would be 
4 m 3 /s . This flow was doubled to err on the conservative side to give a 
minimum flow of 8 m 3/s . The draft plan then used the 90 percentile 
flow as an indicator of what the.low pattern should be for each month. 
At 8 m3 /s, the river velocity would be 0.43 m3 /s. The 90 percentile 
flow for each month was then multiplied by this constant (0.4) to 
give the proposed minimum flows. Table 4.6 gives the mean monthly 
90 percentile flows which, in turn, gives the draft minimum flows. 
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TABLE 4.6 
BURUNUI RIVER 90% FLOWS AND ABSTRACTION 
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
90%Flow 23.920.419.8 23.S 24.3 2S.4 24.9 27.632.642.4 39.9 28.7 
to give 
min of 
8 m3 /s 
Flow to 29.S 28.0 28.0 29.S 30.0 30.0 30.0 31.0 33.0 37.0 36.0 31.5 
allow ab-
o straction of 
10'm 3/s 
The table also shows the flows at Mandamus which will allow the 
abstraction of 10 m 3 /s. 
Faced with this data the Board then had to decide how water 
in excess of the minimum flow should be shared. For the Waiau River it 
used a 60/40 sharing basis: 60 per cent to in-river uses and 40 
percent for abstraction. This was considered by the MWD to be 
arbitrary and a SO/50 sharing suggested. Taking up the challenge 
of the MWD, the Board adopted the SO/SO basis as being the most 
satisfactory and simplest for the Burunui River. It is the simplest 
to explain, gives the impression that all users accept the benefits 
and costs equally and, for these reasons, it is a II satisfactoryll 
approach from the Board's view. But the MWD was not satisfied 
with this approach either, for it stated: 
and, 
If a minimum flow figure is deduced and is accepted 
as satisfactory, then any water in excess of that 
minimum flow should be available for abstraction. 
To divide the excess flow on a 1: 1 basis is to give 
a bonus to fishery and recreation interest over 
and above the acceptable minimum (which is, it 
appears, at least twice their basic need) and to 
further penalise any person who wishes to abstract 
water. 
r~;~?i;\;i 
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It would seem more reasonable to divide any excess 
water above the minimum flow on a basis which 
favoured those wishing to take and use the water in 
the national interest. Even a basis of 2: 1 or 3: 1 
would help irrigators considerably, while having 
very little effect on river flows. The philosophy 
that abstractions should not be able to reduce the 
river flow to the minimum value is one which, 
although it sounds reasonable, on the one hand does 
little for the river an on the other penalises irrigators. 
There appears to be no sound reason for adopting 
such a phi.losophy. 15 
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This view is oriented towards reducing any risk for irrigators but 
ignores the risk factor associated with river flows and the needs of 
. in-stream uses. Both appt'Oaches (60/40 and 50/50) have been 
criticised by the MWD as not being in the "national interest II but, 
as MWD is representing the irrigators, its interpretation of the 
national interest will be different from the resource manager who 
has to balance interests. The impression is that unless the RWB 
adopts the MWD's proposals, then the result is unsatisfactory to the 
Ministry. 
Submissions on the water right and allocation plan show a 
great deal more care and understanding of technical data. This is 
reflected in at least four submissions justifying demands with a 
technical interpretation of available data. Proposals for alternative 
minimum flows were couched in terms of specific flows for which 
technical justification was given. Faced with these submissions, the 
Board took a more conciliatory line and appeared more amenable to 
other views. 
After a public meeting in July 1979 in Christchurch to discuss 
the draft plan, the Board considered a staff report on each submission. 
It then constituted a Special Tribunal to consider the plan and 
submissions, and to make a recommendation back to the Board. 
Five persons were on the Tribunal of whom four were Board members, 
while the fifth was the Chief Engineer of the South Canterbury 
Regional Water Board. The RWB representatives included the Board 
15. Letter to RWB (19 September 1979). 
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Chairman, the Chairman of the Water Committee and two others. 
In a 4: 1 decision the Tribunal recommended minimum flows of 10 m 3/s 
for January to July; for February and March this represented a 
2 m 3/s increase. The majority concluded, inter alia: 
1. that abstraction of water within the limits of the 
draft plan would have little effect on natural low 
flow conditions; 
2. that only a complete departure in the basis of 
calculation of the minimum flow would produce 
a flow approaching the fishery interests 
desirable minimum flow; 
3. that the divergence in the range of minimum flows 
advocated by the various interest was not capable 
of resolution by compromise. 
Changes to the draft flows were justified in terms of the number 
of variables associated with the minimum flow calculations and, that 
by giving different values to those variables (such as velocity and 
mean channel width) slightly different results could be produced. 
Therefore, the Tribunal was of the opinion that 
"The determination of the minimum flows requires some 
judgement and appraisal beyond the arithmetic 
calculations used", 
and it recommended that no monthly minimum flow should be less than 
10 m3 /s. 
This approach was no less arbitrary than the SO/50 sharing 
basis used by the RWB to allocate excess water. Their suggested 
10 m 3/s minimum was selected only because there was less concern 
with the 10 m 3/s minima than with 8 m 3/s . The Tribunal did not 
address the question of whether minimum flows higher than 10 m 3/s 
were really warranted, or whether an extra two cumecs would make 
any real difference to the other river uses. One view even suggests 
that the flows were increased because double digits appear more 
acceptable than one! 
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The dissenting opinion (who was the "outsider" on the 
Tribunal), applied only to the minimum flow. It was argued that 
a safety margin had already been included and that the recommended 
increases 
"cannot. be shown on the evidence . .. to be of any 
worthwhile benefit to those who made submissions 
against the planning proposal". 
As will be seen in the next section, the jet-boating and canoeing 
interests gained little benefit from the additional flow. 
4.5.4 The Political Setting 
I 
The resolution of differing views and demands in this study 
, 
reflects the consultative process of decision-making. I suggest 
that to explain the result in terms of the bargaining model would 
not be appropriate, mainly because there was nothing to bargain 
about and the RWB had nothing to bargain with. Perhaps it was 
fortunate for the sectional groups that, for the allocation plan, the 
decision maker was at RWB level and not at central government level, 
for example, the Water Resources Council or NWASCA, where the 
MWD's influence would be more difficult to counteract. Grouping of 
the participants in this study (Figure 4.5) is similar to the Waiau, 
with a great deal of similarity in the participants, but excluding 
those whose interest was more civic or ideolOgical, for example, 
Friends of the Earth, Environmental Defence Society and the Royal 
Society of New Zealand. 
In the challenges mounted against the allocation plan, the 
essential issues and divergent views were:-
(i) The proposal for a minimum flow of 8 cumecs for 
the months of February and March and the 
specific characteristics of depth, channel braiding, 
velocity and temperature taken into consideration 
in determining that minimum. 
(ii) The validity or otherwise of the submission of 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries that water 
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~WD (Water El: Soil Division) 
MAF (FRD) 
Wildlife Service 
Mi<1istry of Energy 
Lands and Survey 
TABLE 4.5 
HURUNUI RIVER: PARTICIPANTS 
Amuri County Council 
Cheviot County Council 
Hurunui County Council 
NCEPB 
Balmoral Irrigation Scheme 
Committee 
Masons Flat/Hawarden! Waikari 
Irrigation Committee 
N. Z. Jet Boat Association 
N. Z. Salmon Anglers Assn 
Nth Canty Acclimatisation Society 
Canterbury Canoe Clubs and 
N. Z. Canoeing Association 
Hurunui Salmon Company Ltd 
Federated Mountain Clubs 
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temper·ature is inversely related to flow, and the 
effect on the fishery from the flow reduction by 
allowable abstraction. 
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(iii) The effect of reduce flows as an influencing factor 
on closure of the river mouth. 
(iv) The determination of Lake Sumner levels. 
Of the national organisations, the MWD and Fisheries Research 
Di vision played the major roles. After a few years of research, 
Fisheries Research Division ,was able to disseminate more information 
and provide more quantitiative data on fishery needs in braided river 
I 
systems. Variations in water temperature was an important issue. 
An inference from the FRD submissiopl was that water temperature 
; 
was inversely related to flow, but the Special Tribunal was sceptical 
of this assertion 16 and sought an independent opinion. This opinion 
was in the form of a research report (Hockey, 1981) who, after 
analysing historical data (river temperature and meterological) , 
concluded that only slight increases in temperature were likely to 
accompany withdrawals up to 10 m 3 /s. Demands for higher minimum 
flows were reiterated by the NCAS, the NZSAA and the Hurunui 
Salmon Company Ltd. These groups all had a proprietary interest in 
maintaining the highest possible flow. 
On the other hand, the Balmoral Irrigation Scheme Committee 
sought a reduced minimum flow (to 7 m3 /s); their experience as 
fishermen lead them to believe that even at the lowest natural flows 
the fishery was able to survive. Endorsement for this view came 
from the MWD which strongly opposed the 8 m3/s minimum. By 
substituting what were c9nsidered more "realistic" values for the 
variables in the flow equation, the Ministry sought a minimum flow 
of 6 m 3 /s. It argued that the RWB had based its flows on the 
assumed minimum need for fish and, therefore, all monthly flows 
should be at the 8 m 3/s minimum. The 90 percentile was alleged to 
be an unnecessary refinement. 
16. Report of the Special Tribunal (RWB, 1980). 
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Once again, at the regional level only the NCEPB was sufficiently 
interested to become involved. It did not want lake levels formally 
set until more definite development ,plans were prepared, arguing 
that to set levels now 
"would be prejudical to the best use of the water 
resources" . 
To the NCEPB, "best use" clearly incorporates a flexibility to manage 
lake levels in a way which would allow it to generate the optimum 
amount of electricity. In support of its demands for a liberal treat-
ment of lake levels, the Power Board included data to show that if 
~aka levels could be manipulated the increased storage could result 
in a further 13 840 hectares being irrigated - all on the south bank , , , 
\ 
of the Hurunui River. This. evidence would appeal to the Hurunui 
County Council because it sought "the fair and equitable" distribution 
of the water from the Hurunui River, with a special emphasis on the 
future needs of the south bank farmers. 
Of the local councils, Amuri again supported the scheme, only 
this time it supported its view about the necessity for irrigation by 
,emphasising the social differences and tensions which might arise 
between irrigators and non-irrigators. The argument is founded 
upon the belief that irrigation provides additional financial and social 
benefits of which the non-irrigator would be envious, resulting in 
community disruption. Therefore, the solution would be to irrigate 
as much land as possible in the basin. Cheviot County repeated its 
concern over water flow in the lower reaches of the river and the 
possible impact on fisheries, recreation (at the river mouth) and on 
rural water supplies. The county did not promote its concerns with 
the same enthusiasm as it did with the Waiau plan. Perhaps it was 
disillusioned by its failure to achieve any changes in the previous 
exercise, or it might have been content to identify its interests 
feeling secure that they were not under serious threat. 
A feature of the debate over this water allocation plan was 
the dominance of the private interest groups, with irrigation committees, 
angling enthusiasts, and water oriented recreational groups all 
. :-.': . _. 
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being involved. Five irrigation committees were interested in the 
allocation of water, with the two south bank committees most con-
cerned that water should be available for possible irrigation schemes 
in their areas. The Masons Flat-Hawarden-Waikari Irrigation Committee 
opposed Hurunui water II going north", thereby restricting the amount 
of land which could be irrigated in the south. Opposing evidence was 
presented by the Balmoral Irrigation Scheme Committee which pointed 
out that only its scheme and the proposed Peaks-Medbury scheme 
(south bank) appeared at present to be practicable, thus seeking to 
ensure that sufficient water would be available to ~upply the Balmoral 
scheme. All the irrigation committees favoured the idea of a dam for 
the a1dded advantage it would give in storing watet for release at 
critical times during the irrigation season. 
The Salmon Anglers Association, Cano.e Clubs, Acclimatisation 
Society and Jet Boat Association all made lengthy submissions, with 
the canoeists and Acclimatisation Society showing some initiative in 
presenting evidence for alternative flows based on technical approaches 
other than that used by the RWB. The canoe clubs challenged the 
minimum flows on safety grounds: the need for adequate water depth 
(i metre) for safe capsizing and to reduce damage to boats in riffle 
areas. They argued that flows of 11 m3/s in riffle areas would be 
"highly marginal" and suggested that the 90 percentile flow be as 
the minimum. The Acclimatisation Society outlined three "rule of 
thumb II methods in order to justify a 30 m 3/ s minimum flow but offered 
no other supporting evidence. The Salmon Anglers Association 
relied on FRD research to support its case for a 25 m 3/s minimum flow. 
Despite the large amount of work evident in some of the 
submissions, no substantive changes resulted. The Acclimatis-
ation Society's three "rule of thumb" methods were rejected 
because they were not applicable to braided river systems. If the 
RWB's approach is correct it points out the pitfalls in applying overseas 
research work to different locations and to rivers with quite different 
hydrological characteristics. 
1·."-----'-_-'. -.-.'. 
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The Canterbury Canoe Clubs submission was technically 
impressive arguing that the Board should adopt the 90 percentile 
flow as the minimum flow. Figure 4.6 shows how this suggestion 
related to the Board's draft and approved minimum flows. Also added 
for comparison are the·suggestions of other participants. A noteable 
feature of the Canoe Club's alternative was its monthly variability. 
Previously, both it and other participants sought a one level minimum 
flow without all9wing" for naturally occurring changes. The club was 
assisted in its supmission by a hydrologist with experience in braided 
river systems but, in spite of this assistance the alternative flows 
were rejected. Partly because the RWB considered it to lack under-
I 
standing of the objectives allocation plan, and partly on the basis 
that a 1 metre depth in the main braid would require a flow of 23 m 3/s . 
Clearly this was a variation far in excess of what the Board could 
contemplate as being an acceptable change. 
As part of its consultative process the Board had widely 
circulated its Hurunui Catchment water resources report, seeking 
comment on it as a preliminary to preparing the allocation plan. It 
was at that stage that most of the civic and ideological groups 
presented their views. A survey of their comments shows a greater 
concern for the iQlpacts of damming the river rather than water 
allocation per se. Thus, these groups were not as forceful as they 
could well have been. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have traversed the main issues which arose 
with the allocation of water from the Waiau and Hurunui Rivers. In 
both cases the allocation ,plans were used as the vehicle for articulating 
and promoting opposition to the irrigation schemes. No formal process 
of objection existed by which the Crown water rights could be 
challenged at RWB level, so the procedures adopted by the Board for 
public scrutiny of its own plans became surrogates for the lack of 
objection procedures elsewhere. But ironically, the allocation plan 
is a non-statutory document and it is up to the Board to decide how it 
should prepare a plan and what opportunities should be given for 
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public input. The problem therefore, is that the public hearings held 
by the RWB on the Crown water rights and its allocation plans were 
all informal, with the public having little opportunity to dispute 
decisions. 
From the above description and interpretation of two cases in 
water allocation a number of points arise for discussion in Chapter 5 
where I look at the decisions, the lessons learnt, transaction costs 
and usefulness of coalitions in decision-m!;lking. In turn, this will 
point to any institutional changes which might be, required to improve 
the decision-making process. 
I 
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5.0 THE CHARACTER OF WATER PLANNING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this penultimate chapter I critically examine the institutions 
which society has created for the allocation of water. 
Chapters 2 and 3 were concerned with a critical exposition 
of the principal concepts and hypotheses that form the basis for this 
study. Chapter 3 went on to define institutions as 
"as social decision systems that provide decision rules 
for adjusting and accommodating over ti"le, conflicting 
demands from different interest groups in a society". 
(See Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1969) 
And, later in the same chapter, I described the structure of the 
decision-making institutions in North Canterbury, emphasising the 
legal, political and administrative arrangements. Chapter 4 followed 
with an interpretation of the actual functioning of those same institu-
tions, and for this purpose two case studies were used. From these 
chapters there surfaced a number of important themes and issues 
which require critical review. For .example, what transaction costs 
became apparent in the decision-making process? were the decisions 
of the RWB 'good' or 'bad'? what opportunities existed for coalitions 
to form and were these opportunities exploited by the participants? 
Having defined and clarified the structure and functioning of 
these institutions, the next step is to evaluate their performance to 
determine how closely they compare to Ciriacy-Wantrup's definition. 
I propose to use the analytical framework in Chapter 2 as a guide 
for this evaluation. 
5.2 RESOURCE USE AND ECONOMICS 
New Zealand moved away from the Common Law doctrine of 
riparian ownership of water to ownership by the Crown in order to 
secure its better control and management. However, even in times 
of shortage, state control is no guarantee that water will be put 
to its most productive use. Requirements of "beneficial use" aside, 
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water use is licensed on the basis of first come, first served. This 
may be an adequate control technique in a development phase water 
economy for which the WSC Act is generally suited. But as the 
aggregate demand curve moves to the right and a mature phase water 
economy evolves (Figure 2.1), new institutions are required for 
managing the resource, especially for its distribution between uses. 
Alternative mechanisms for allocation are sought as a water 
economy moves into the mature phase. The market decides the prices 
of resources which, in turn, reflects the willingness of the user to 
pay for them. An economic approach rests upon twin goals of 
I I 
efficiency and maximised net returns, and in so doing the outcome 
(resource distribution) could be inequitable. Alternatively, one can 
rely more upon the political process where a more socially equitable 
distribution of resources is achieved at the expense of economic 
efficiency. A trade-off situation results and neither the market nor 
the political process can ensure that net general welfare will improve. 
Some natural resource conomists, for example Lecomber (1979), would 
argue for maximising efficiency and then using other mechanisms, such 
as compensation, to counteract for inequities. Others such as Johnson 
(1972), together with Campbell, Pearse and Scott (1972), while 
arguing for more market involvement in water resource management, 
do not reject the need for poltical institutions as a corrective force. 
The merits of a market approach have long been discussed and 
debated in welfare economics literature (see Randall, 1981). Inherent 
in these debates is the pricing of water so that its supply and use 
reflects its true marginal cost. However, there are social and political 
institutional constraints which make it difficult to follow this pathway 
" 
to optimising resource use. Despite the wealth of literature on the 
topic the concept remains normative. The fact that it has not been 
introduced anywhere illustrates the problems in implementing the 
concept. Charging for water on a scale contemplated by the market 
process is generally inimical to many New Zealand water management 
authorities and users. 
Rational resource planning requires the manager to assess 
" 
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what some of the future problems might be and to develop solutions 
to avoid some of the pitfalls of "crisis· management". As the North 
Canterbury water economy moves into the mature phase, water 
planning for the future should emphasise demand restraint and methods 
for reallocating resources. Thus, in preparing policies for water 
management I suggest that the RWB should consider the role water 
pricing might play in meeting its statutory responsibilities. One 
method of incorporating the market process into water management is 
through a system of transferable water rights (TWRs). The following 
discussion. is based on the work of Watson and Rose (1980), Randall 
(1981, 1982) and Dragun (1982), and examines the merits and 
. I I . 
applicability of the transferable water right concept in Canterbury. 
5.2.1 . Functioning of a Water Market 
At the time of introduction, water rights are made available for 
a long time period and distributed among all users. Later they may be 
transferred from one use to another, generally a higher valued use, 
so that the transfer price represents the marginal cost of the water. 
Rights may be sold, leased or rented depending on the requirements 
of the user. A lesser valued, secondary class of right would be 
created for catchments with naturally varying supplies, for example, 
the Ashley River. In contrast to the present system, the transferable 
right would exist independently of either the land or the right holder. 
Transfers would not require consent from the RWB except where 
unreasonable costs or risks might be imposed upon the Board. However, 
the Board would have to be notified of each transfer so that it had 
accurate information on water pricing and use (type and location) , 
which could then be correlated with its data on water availability. 
This system would not apply to existing irrigation schemes 
unless scheme participants decided it was in their interests to join. 
They would remain responsible for annual operating and maintenance 
charges but could not expect the public to finance the rehabilitation 
of old schemes. The Manuherikia Valley scheme in Central Otago is 
an example of an old scheme nearing the end of its engineering life, 
with a new scheme estimated to cost around $70 million (1982 dollars). 
For new schemes, water could be allocated by auction, giving the 
.:-:.-.:->:-=-.=-,~<--. f~~:::i~~~~;~~~;J;:-B~ 
• ~r _-, -.-.-.- • •• _.J~_. "-:1 
:~4~~::~i:~:;:~ 
~ ~ "'':-:-;:.-::'::-:-;:::: ~~:~:~:-~ 
120. 
construction agency (for example, MWD) development capital. 
Revenue would also accrue to the RWB through water right sales. 
Auctioning w'ater would more clearly reflect the true value of water 
to the recipient besides reducing the financial burden to the nation. 
So that where schemes are marginally economic, for example the 7. 9 
per cent IRR on the Balmoral scheme, a greater proportion of the 
costs would be borne by the water user and not the nation. At 
present where subsidies are 'available to develop land for irrigation, 
the increased value of the land is a capital gain to the land owner. 
The auction system would see some of this unearned capital gain 
being returned to society, 'again recognising that water use has an 
opportunity cost. 
Given that current policy is to encourage multiple-use of water, 
how would other uses, such as in-stream uses, be managed? For 
multiple-use comprises two elements - the priVate good and the public 
good. We can price the value of the private good element by using 
the market but we shy away from pricing the public good aspect. 
Some might say that it is impossible to do so. For example how can 
one value the inherent values and qualities of a river: what O'Connor 
(pers. comm.) terms its "riverness". Attempts have been made to 
place a monetary value on these qualities. For example, Greenley 
et. al., (1981) were able to measure option value and other preservation 
values of water quality for a small catchment, compared to the benefits 
from water-based activities. Calculation of these benefits would help 
to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated by society to 
maintain sufficient surface flow in rivers in order to retain the 
inherent qualities and allow for other recreational activities. A 
problem, however, is that these monetary estimates remain valid for 
only a limited time period. They do not allow for changes in societal 
needs or values; for example, two decades ago recreational jet-
boating was not the popular recreational activity it is now. Because 
of these disadvantages it is difficult, using only the market, to 
arrive at an "optimal" use of water. Consequently, for in-stream 
uses there will be reliance on some of the present allocative mechanisms, 
such as the minimum acceptable flow. In terms of the water market 
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system, therefore, "satisfactory" minimum flows will first have to be 
established and only after these minima are set would other uses be 
considered. Obviously, this begs the question of how to determine 
the minimum flow, and it is at this stage that the political process 
would operate. If, the political decision-making system has run its 
course, including use of the legal system, and in-stream users remain 
dissatisfied with the outcome, they would be entitled to purchase water 
rights from a willing seller and leave the water in the river. 
15.2.2, Problems with a Water Market 
I Randall (1982) was aware of the technical, ~dministrative, 
political and social objections which could be mounted against a 
market in water rights. One major objection relates to social adjust-
men t to, and expectation of, subsidised irrigation schemes. Reviews 
of government irrigation policies in 1971 and 1982 have supported the 
availability of subsidies. Any policy changes have been designed to 
emphasise the "user pays" principle, with the intention that the 
goverment be able to recoup more of the capital costs. Opportunity 
cost has not been a consideration in either of the policy reviews. 
Distributing TWRs through an auction system would return 
some of the unearned wealth to the State, resulting in a more equitable 
distribution of the wealth. However, Randall (1982) points out, that 
perhaps the greatest political obstacle to the new system is that TWRs 
would highlight inequities in the present system. Objections raised 
and then countered by Randall have been taken a stage further by 
Dragun (1982) who looked in more detail at some of the institutional 
problems. 
First, was the warning that care must be taken in attempting 
to transpose ideas from one quite different political, legal and economic 
system to another. Just as Dragun pointed out that the United States 
and Australian legal system aredissiri:dlar, so too are the Australian 
and New Zealand systems. Water law in the United States remains 
based on the common law concepts of riparian rights and prior approp-
riation, which creates private property in water ownership. It also 
leads to profound problems in reallocating water in times of drought or 
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scarcity (Glantz. 1982). Dragun asks why a water market - private 
property system should be preferred over other systems such as public 
trust or public jurisdiction. 
Second. the market system requires a comprehensive knowledge 
of the regional or catchment water resource. The RWB will need to 
know the quality. quantity. availability and variability of the water 
supply so that the legal agreement (title) will be comprehensive. 
leaving all water users with confidence in the system. Contemporary 
information on regional water resources is far from complete and 
pr9bably not sufficient for a confident change to TWRs. Similarly. by 
, I 
the time the necessary detail is available. the. number of irrigation 
schemes either completed or underway may be so great that any change 
would be fruitless. So that if scarcity problems do surface other 
allocative mechanisms will be necessary. 
On the credit side. the market approach has benefits for the 
RWB. It reduces an administrative workload because transfers are 
recorded by the Board and new rights would not have to be approved 
by the Board each month. Rights over which the Board would like to 
keep control would have been tagged at the time of issue. In terms of 
information costs. the pricing system can take over the informational 
role. Through the recording of transfers the Board will have ready 
access to information on demand and supply and the value of the water 
to society. 
Changing the current system of water allocation both in North 
Canterbury and New Zealand would be a formidable economic. political 
and social task. Water is often made available for uses where social 
,. 
returns are very marginal. and these uses are maintained by a range 
of social subsidies. In a mature water economy. the TWR is one 
possibl~ mechanism for re-allocating water amon& where willingness to 
pay may be high. However. current political and legal institutions 
would make these changes very difficult. One difficulty arises from 
the fact that water law in New Zealand is applicable nationwide. 
Whereas some regions have an abundance of water (West Coast of the 
South Island. Southland and Taranaki), others face problems of scarcity 
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and decreased water quality (Canterbury, Hawke Bay and Nelson). 
If changes are attempted, the new institutions would nee d to have the' 
necessary flexibility to allow for regional differences. 
Should these political and legal constraints preclude the use 
of TWRs, reliance on the political process will remain with greater 
opportunities for conflict. The next section examines the power-rights 
framework to determine how other water users might secure a change 
in water allocation using the political process. 
5.3 POWER AND RIGHTS 
At its most simple level politics is about the use and distribution 
, 
of power, where power is the means by which a resource users' 
objectives are achieved. This view sees all politics as being power 
politics, but it is a satisfactory way of achieving goals if only the 
short-term is considered. But as resource management is necessarily 
concerned with the long-term, it is better to see politics as being a 
socially acceptable process through which power is recognised and 
conflicts negotiated with the outcome being the public interest 
(O'Riordan, 1976). In both case studies the political process was 
portrayed as a contest between institutional and non-institutional 
power, with the outcome being determined in the area of mutual 
coercion (see Figure 2.4). 
In this study institutional power belongs to central government 
departments and their supporters. They should have met the other 
power group ~n a decision area where the RWB would as an arbiter 
and decision maker. But, because Crown water rights were involved, 
the MWD also had the potential through its influence on the WRC and 
NW AS CA, to be a decision maker. By promoting two irrigation schemes 
and seeking an absolute share of the water flow from the two rivers, 
the MWD had placed the RWB in a position where it had to reach a 
decision as to how the water would be allocated. 
5.3.1 Institutionalised Powers 
Support for an irrigation scheme will most often originate from 
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the locality which it will benefit. Lobbying is carried out through 
district irrigation committees, farmers' associations (such as 
Federated Farmers) and local councils (Amuri and Hurunui County 
Councils). Once pressure and support are sufficiently widespread, 
MWD often assumes responsibility for steering the scheme through the 
necessary legal and bureaucratic machinery, resulting in a Crown 
water right application and a scheme which has the backing of central 
government. Irrigation committees can then retire into the background 
but they must remain as an active political force. After the MWD has 
assumed responsibility, a scheme it is likely to be abandoned only if 
a MAF report shows it to be hopelessly uneconomic, or if farmers 
I I 
within the scheme area decide that the project returns are not 
sufficient to counter the immediate costs. 
Both case studies saw five irrigation committees lobbying for 
irrigation schemes, with central government support coming from MWD, 
MAF (Advisory) and the Rural Bank and, locally, from the Amuri 
and Hurunui County Councils. All these parties made submissions to 
the RWB on the water allocation plan or (excepting MWD), to the 
Commission for the Environment on the Environmental Impact Report. 
5.3.2 Non-Institutionalised Powers 
The components of this group are those most often associated 
with "the body politic": the public, sectional interest and pressure 
groups. Irrigation committees are excluded from this grouping for, 
while they could be classed as a pressure group, they are much more 
closely aligned and linked with the institutionalised powers. Com-
position of this group revolves primarily around the more active 
participants - those who hq,ve an interest which they believe is 
threatened by the activities of the institutionalised powers. 
This power group comprises the private and civic actors. 
Private actors have the greatest opportunities to form coalitions in 
order to counteract the influence of the institutionalised powers. 
Their opportunities arise because they are motivated by personal 
reasons - financial or other - which they believed could be jeopardised. 
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Because they are goal oriented they differ from the civic participants 
where opportunities to work together are limited, as their reasons 
for involvement are more intellectually or ideologically based rather 
than "property" oriented. Reasons range from providing information, 17 
to raising issues which they believe the decision maker should be 
concerned with, but without a particular objective in view except 
improved social well-being. 18 
An interesting aspect of the case studies focuses upon the 
failure" of the non -institutionfllised powers to form coalitions. 
Ordinarily, environmental issues do not rank high in priority on any 
political agenda especially at Ithe national level, and to reverse this 
situation requires a concerted and co-ordinated strategy on the part 
of the private interest groups. Four years lapsed between the Waiau 
and Hurunui hearings" when some measures could have been taken to 
co-ordinate objectives, exchange information and study water resource 
issues more closely. That the Balmoral scheme and the Hurunui River 
allocation plan would be the next for public debate should not have 
been of surprise to any participant. 
Inter-group friction is one explanation for the apparent failure 
to form coalitions. For instance, there is antipathy between the 
North Canterbury Acclimatisation Society (NCAS) and the New Zealand 
Salmon Anglers Association (NZSAA). One view suggests that the 
NZSAA is a single-purpose organisation and unappreciative of the 
needs of trout fishermen. While a countering view from a committee 
member of the NZSAA considers the NCAS to be more concerned with 
game shooting than with increasing returns for salmon anglers, and 
so the NZSAA was formed to exert pressure on the Acclimatisation 
Society. Yet a third view (Connor, pers. comm.) is that these two 
associations and the Fisheries Research Division presented a united 
front. This last view is correct only to the extent that all three were 
17. For Example: New Zealand Agricultural Engineering Institute 
(NZAEl); Royal Society of New Zealand. 
18. Nature Conservation Council (NCC); Royal Forest and Bird 
Protection Society (RFBPS). 
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concerned with the effects abstraction and minimum flows might have 
on the fishery. But in each case their objectives were unco-ordinated 
and, considering that these objectives were reliant on FRO data, 
there appears little reason for the divergence. . One reason appears 
to be that these two parties sought as much as they could justify 
hoping that this included sufficient "excess" which could be sacrificed 
in the bargaining process. 
This activity highlights the pivotal role of the FRO. While 
it appears that the wildlife organisations had similar views, most 
of the private interest gr?ups were really "tagging along" behind 
the FRO, and were highly dependent upon the research information 
and expertise held by FRD. When, as in the Waiau case, FRO had 
little substantive data to justify increased minimum flows, attempts by 
other groups to exert pressure foundered. After the Waiau decision 
the Oi vision initiated a research programme on the needs of salmon 
and trout, and presented a substantial submission to the RWB when 
the Hurunui allocation. plan was heard. This information was used by 
the NCAS and NZSAA but the data was not accepted by the RWB. 
Perhaps dismayed by the lack of FRO data in the Waiau case, the 
NCAS submitted a technical case of its own in order to justify 
increased flows for the Hurunui River. Again these were not accepted 
by the RWB because the methods used were of doubtful applicability 
to the Hurunui River. 
In Chapter 4 I discussed the role of the Waiau River Action 
Committee as a pressure group. Unfortunately for the committee, its 
total opposition to any changes of flows in the Waiau River made the 
formation of alliances difficult. Consequently, had to conduct an 
,. 
independent case with the result that it was regarded as upsetting 
the status quo with "outrageous" demands. The committee did not 
receive support from any other pressure group and, while it expected 
some support from the FRO, this was not forthcoming because FRO 
lacked information which might have bolstered the case. However, 
the committee did receive support from an unexpected quarter; while 
investigating the Waiau scheme, advisory staff from the Nature Con-
servation Council discussed the scheme with committee and offered 
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information and contacts. This lead to the committee forming an 
alliance with the Environmental Defence Society (EDS) in an effort 
to challenge the water right and the allocation plan in the courts. 
EDS is a non-profit, public interest group established to provide the 
legal expertise needed to challenge environmentally suspect projects 
in the coutts. Early in its existence the society was unsuccessful 
in a series of court challenges because it lacked legal standing, 
(locus standi), and it was this problem which confronted both the 
Society and the Action Committee in their appeals against the Waiau 
water right. The legal status of EDS was challenged by the Crown, 
and the Appeal Board determined that the society lacked standing 
because 
I 
" the individual affection is being used as a 
method of gaining status for a Society the objects 
of which are far broader in scope than those of 
its member". 1-9 
Had individual members of the Action Committee appealed, even using 
EDS lawyers, the issue of standing would not have arisen, as the 
individuals could validly claim to be detrimentally affected by the 
possibility of lower flows reducing recreational enjoyment. 
It is difficult for some central government departments to form ~ 
alliances where there are no sectional interests or pressure groups 
which naturally gravitate to them. They are mainly departments with 
only a peripheral interest in irrigation but with a greater involvement 
in environmental issues, such as DSIR, New Zealand Forest Service 
(NZFS), Lands and Survey and Wildlife Service. One clear example 
is the management of water-based recreation. Although the RWB must 
take "adequate account" of water-based recreational activites, 
neither it nor any other agency is responsible for managing that use, 
nor is any agency responsible for research into water-based recreation. 
Organisations such as FRD limit their activities to specific research 
areas such fresh-water fisheries, and the Acclimatisation Societies 
are concerned with safe-guarding the recreational needs (angling and 
game hunting) of their members. Yet, when the Waiau and Hurunui 
19. EDS v. NWASCA (1976) 6 NZTPA 49 to 58. 
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allocation plans were prepared, agencies such as Lands and Survey 
Department (L&S) and CFE were left to raise the protection of 
water-based recreation, especially canoeing. The anomaly here is 
that Lands and Survey has a very tenuous involvement in the 
management of water resources for recreation where its own interests 
are not affected. By default of other agencies, it is gradually being 
cast in the role of a "common cause" agency in many resource manage-
ment issues. 
Water-based recreational groups are significantly disadvantaged 
by not b,eing able to identify with a sympathetic gove~nment depart-
ment. Interest groups seeking protection of native forests and 
wildlife can identify with particular government agencies, such as 
Lands and Survey, NZFS or the Wildlife Service, whereas water-
oriented recreational groups (canoeists, jet-boating) lack a similar 
linkage. Thus, an inability to derive this support makes it difficult 
for them to co-operate with or exert pressure on, a central government 
department in order to further their own interests. 
5.3.3 Decision-Making by the RWB 
The primary decision maker in these case studies was the RWB, 
although as noted earlier, the MWD functions as a secondary power 
because of its potential influence at a higher political and administrative 
level. In these studies all submissions were addressed to either the 
RWB or the CFE, but it was the RWB which was the more important 
of the two, because of the significance of the water allocation plan. 
It is most unlikely that the Board would reject a Crown applic-
ation for a water right for~ an irrigation scheme. Indeed, the Board's 
powers are limited to making recommendations on the application. 
Final approval rests at a higher level. Once the scheme has government 
and farmer approval very little will halt its advancement. Recognising 
this, the non-institutionalised powers directed their energies into 
questionning the practicalities of the allocation plan. 
Views expressed by pressure groups, sectional interests and 
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some government departments on the Board's allocation planning 
process are quite varied. There is no doubt that the Board relied 
heavily on its professional staff in preparing the plan. setting and 
justifying the minimum flows. Once the Waiau plan was prepared 
some outsiders gained the impression that the Board had already 
. . 
decided what the flows would be. Thus. the three meetings held 
to discuss it were of a public relations nature to explain the plan 
rather than debate its merits or faults. While small local meetings 
are a good forum in which to hear and debate local concerns. they 
can often result, in demands for exceptions with a purely loca,l applic-
ation. If these exceptions are agreed to it becomes difficult to prepare 
an allocation platt which is comprehensive. is widely applicabl~ (for 
example. on a catchment basis). and built around the variable nature 
of the hydrological system. 
On the other hand. one MWD view is that increasing the minimum 
flows for some months in the Hurunui River went against the weight 
of factual evidence. Although MWD considered appealing against the 
minimum flows it decided not to do so because it felt it could "live 
with" the decision. The same person felt that the RWB "ruled" on 
the plan in the sense of a final determination. rather than reaching 
a decision which fairly reflected all views. 
However. Wood (pers. comm.) considers that the Board began 
with a rational approach to allocation planning but lack of information 
caused problems. The upshot was that the Board had to make some 
key assumptions: on how much water fish required; the effect at 
ri ver mouths. and the effect the minimum flows might have on other 
uses. and future abstraction requirements. At the same time. the 
Board did not see as its function the investigation of the end use 
of the abstracted water. If the intended use is beneficial per se 
and abstraction does not affect other uses. then a water right should 
be granted. Wood acknowledges that the Board found it difficult to 
arrive at a decision on the Hurunui River which would be accepted by 
outsiders. The implication being that if the Board failed to satisfy 
all the protagonists then perhaps it was close to the "best solution". 
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resulting in a "no winners, no losers" situation. 
In reaching its decisions on the allocation plans, the Board was 
in the powerful position of determining the political agenda (that is, 
which politically sensitive issues could be discussed) and the procedures 
for decision-making. In Chapter 4 I showed how the demands of the 
Waiau River Action Committee completely upset the consultative process 
by which the Board hoped to reach its decision. The Committee's 
views were pushing the Board, and other participants, into an open 
conflict 'situation which all sought to avoid. At the Christchurch 
meeting Ithe Board avoided this problem by excluding Ithe national 
waterway concept from discussion, thereby excluding the Committee 
from the decision-making process. 
The decisions reached by the Board did not have any marked 
effect on the amount of water available to irrigators. On the basis 
of information available to it, the Board's decisions did not upset 
the status quo, with any changes being marginal ones. This view 
might be disputed by MWD which argued that the minimum flows for 
the Hurunui River were well above what the data indicated. At the 
draft plan stage differences between the two suggested minimum 
flows (RWB and MWD) were small, but the gap widened when the 
Board approved increases to 10 m 3 /s in some months. 
5.3.4 Power and Rights : A Summary 
The power-rights hypothesis as applied in this study is a 
useful concept for explaining how water is allocated among competing 
uses. Institutionalised powers had a well developed and established 
opportunity set and spherJ) of influence which was hard to chan ge. 
These powers represent the status quo and, shgrt of a radical 
institutional change, any reform is only likely to be marginal. An 
attempt at major reform was made by the Action Committee but because 
it chose to make a direct attack on recognised management options 
it was quickly "shut out" by the institutionalised powers. By 
narrowing the range of management options and alternatives for 
resource use the potential for multiple use and debate was also 
;:~j:::::;~:; r 
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extremely limited. 
Non-institutionalised powers will find their ability to affect the 
allocation process to be limited to marginal changes. Over time 
however, the cumulative effect of these incremental changes will 
result in some of their objectives being institutionalised. But not all 
changes are incremental ones and fringe organisations, such as the 
Action Committee, are valuable as "consciousness-raising" groups. 
In 1974, the national waterways concept was rejected as being too 
radical, but, by 1981 it had become embodied in legislation thus 
representing a significant institutional reform. However, despite 
this policy change, the institutionalised powers still1regulate water 
management. For between them, the MWD and the RWB have a 
considerable degree of control and influence over which rivers will 
ultimately receive "wild and scenic" protection. 
Having evaluated the inter-group relationships, the following 
section places the case studies in the context of the "stress" model 
of decision-making, to consider the application of the model in this 
type of resource management issue. 
5.4 AN EVALUATION OF THE STRESS MODEL 
Two quite different models were explained and illustrated in 
Chapter 2. The systems approach interpret!:! saw decisions as being 
the authoriative value allocations of the political system which in turn, 
has responded to a series of inputs from the surrounding environment. 
It is a prescriptive model for it attempts to show how decision-making 
ought to proceed. O'Riordan's (1971a) contrasting approach is 
descriptive, for it illustra,tes how decision-making actually proceeds. 
Its functioning relies on there being a problem which is believed to 
affect a party's interests. In developing his model, O'Riordan 
emphasises social processes in which decisions are reached as a result 
of a struggle for power, influence or resources. 
The previously reviewed case studies show that there was a 
perceived problem, (the "trigger point ll ): recurrent droughts and 
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prolonged dry spells which were limiting an increase in agricultural 
productivity. Once the problem was perceived and a solution 
identified the farming community began lobbying for an irrigation 
scheme. With the Amuri Basin situated between two large rivers, it 
was evident to the agriculturalists that there were two untapped water 
resources II flowing to waste". To the casual observer, the amount 
of surface water visible in rivers would appear to be sufficient to 
satisfy all users and to wonder why there seems to be so much compet-
ition between users. This is a view held by many farmers in the 
region who are also anglers and jet boat enthusiasts.' They believe 
that ab!j>traction of a few cumecs of water from each rjver would not 
adversely affect other river users. If their lobbying is successful, 
I 
as in the Waiau, the MWD takes over responsibility for the scheme 
and ensuring that it passes all administrative and legal hurdles. 
These hurdles include economic feasibility· studies, government 
approval-in-principle, and favourable approvals by the RWB, WRC 
and NW AS CA. If the result of the final economic analysis of the 
Balmoral scheme is anything to go by, a less than favourable economic 
report after all the necessary approvals have been received, is the 
least of the problems. All these events lead to the first major 
decision (Figure 5.1) which is then subject to protest by the 
impacted groups. 
The model and reality diverge at this point for, parallel to 
the Crown water right application is the preparation of a water 
allocation plan. So there are two decisions to be made and to 
challenge. But to the non-institutionalised groups, the first decision 
(the irrigation scheme), is a foregone conclusion, and so they "take 
on" the allocation plan questionning the technical and social bases for 
the minimum flows and how they will affect their own interests. 
Ground rules for questionning the allocation plan are set by 
RWB and procedures used to arrive at minimum flows are not prescribed 
by the WSC Act. Thus, the degree of public involvement is left 
solely to the Board to determine. Beginning with the Rakaia River 
allocation plan in 1974. the Board has gradually encouraged public 
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involvement. Even if the ground rules are not to the liking of the 
interest groups, or the decision seems to them to be inequitable, rights 
of appeal are limited. No formal appeals can be made to a higher 
authority; the minimum flows are considered and approved by the 
WRC and NWASCA on which users whose interests in water management 
are "positive" and heavily represented. Yet, the MWD has a private 
and informal appeal system because, as the servicing organisation for 
WRC and NWASCA, it has a strong influence on the business conducted 
by those councils. So that if MWD is unhappy with the minimum flows 
recommended by the RWB, it could at this late· stage advise against 
their approval. That it did not do so after the RWB announced its 
I I 
Hurunui River decision would indicate that it was pOlitically untenable 
to challenge the result. 
O'Riordan's model of decision-making accepts that the political 
allocation of resources is a struggle between interest groups and, as 
such, it fits in well with the power-rights paradigm of resource 
management. More often than not, those groups or interests which 
find themselves continually reacting to water development projects 
will find that only marginal changes can be made. The first decision 
involves a large number of political and administrative institutions, 
and the decision represents their "collective wisdom", or what they 
consider is wise use of natural resources. Once made, the decision 
and its consequences gather a momentum of their own, and in terms 
of irrigation schemes only sharply escalating costs and withdrawal of 
farmer support are likely to reverse the original decision. 
In these clashes between institutionalised and non-institution-
alised powers one concern is often overlooked: that of transaction 
costs. These are the costs'· which each party participating in hearings 
on water rights or the allocation plan incurs. They include time 
spent voluntarily attending pUblic meetings, preparing submissions 
(often of a technical nature), monetary costs and so on. They 
become invisible costs in the decision-making process because they 
are not included in the price of the final decision. Here again, it 
is the non-institutionalised powers, those whose sphere of influence 
~;~ ..... r:e~;j 
I 
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is the smaller, which often incur the highest transaction costs. To 
them the invisible costs appear in the time, money and effort 
individuals will spend advancing the objectives of the group and, 
indirectly, the non-involved public who might benefit. For example, 
in both studies the canoe clubs, lead by the Canterbury University 
Canoe Club prepared and submitted lengthy and detailed submissions 
on the water allocation plans and water rights. This vOluntary work 
represents the effort!? of a few people over many hours, time which 
might otherwise be spent pursuing their leisure activity. The burden 
often falls upon, a few individuals for while others may be concerned 
and have a good depth of experience, they fell ill-equipped to write, 
. i I 
present oral submissions or cross-examine witnesses. Submissions 
from these groups are often more emotive than factual, as they find 
it difficult to employ people to identify, articulate and quantify their 
concerns in a manner acceptable to the decision maker, and which 
will counteract the claims of the "positive" water users. 
A similar situation arose with the NZSAA which is also an 
amateur organisation. Decision makers ask for "facts" (how much 
water do fish require?), but the association is an interest group, not 
a research organisation. Therefore it relies on others to provide the 
factual data, such as FRD and, if the research has not been instituted 
or results are not available from that source it is difficult for the 
NZSAA to advance its case. Amateur organisations are frustrated 
by fluctuating membership and interest, and data and records which 
go missing so that maintaining continuity in demands and expertise 
is difficult. This contrasts strongly with professionally staffed 
agencies such as MWD, MAF and the RWB, which maintain this 
continuity and know what t~e issues were in earlier cases. They are 
in a stronger position to recognise inconsistencies and weaknesses 
in the arguments presented by the interest groups. In this manner 
the status quo or the development project builds respectability. 
When submissions are made there is little visible evidence to 
show that they have been of some value. Submissions are considered 
by the Board's staff and a report made to Board (as occurred with 
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the Hurunui plan), but the groups have no way of knowing how 
relevant their views were or why they may not have been ~ccepted. 
One person expressed disappointment -with this system and suggested 
that if the Board cannot show in some way how the submissions are 
used or why they are rejected, interest groups could pass up the 
participation programme as being futile. 
For the Waiau River Action Committee, the actual monetary 
costs were small and absorbed by the members. However, the 
antipathy generated by their views; resulted in a high emotional cost. 
Had any of these groups been able ~o afford legal representation at 
Tribunal hearings or at Board meetings, they might have been able 
to secure greater gains. However,' this is a cost which is beyond 
most interest groups. 
Transaction costs for institutionalised groups were small, 
Groups in favour of the scheme had a "free-ride" behind the MWD, 
although they did have a responsibility for maintaining some 
political pressure. This was achieved through submissions to the 
RWB and the CFE outlining the advantages of the irrigation scheme, 
why they felt other groups would not be affected and how, on 
balance, the schemes were beneficial to tqe nation and, specifically, 
the Amuri basin. While not a true transaction cost, the MWD was 
required, as a condition of the Waiau water right to install a fish 
screen at the irrigation intake. Even though it was reluctant to put 
in the screens, the balance of opinion was in favour of them (Connor 
pers. comm.). However, other opinion now doubts their effective-
,<:-:-
ness. ',:";;0,;:;,': <,:0' 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has systematically evaluated the case studies in 
Chapter 4 in light of the analytical framework formulated in Chapter 
2. Resource allocation and management has been shown to be a 
complex process working towards an attempted resolution of confli,cting 
values held by politically motivated groups. In terms of the four-
level decision-making system described in Chapter 3, it is the second 
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level which has a major impact on resource allocation. The organis-::, 
ational level gives meaning to the policies articulated at the second 
level. In doing so, some lee-way is given to institutions at the 
organisational level to develop procedures and secondary policies for 
resource management. The lesson for non-institutionalised groups is 
that to increase their power and range of legal rights they need to 
concentrate their attentions on the second level. The successful 
introduction of the "wild and scenic" rivers amendment is a case in 
point. Despite some set-backs at the regional level the non-
institutionalised groups must continue their involvement and intereat. 
Changes at the second level often take time and, if interest wanes 
at the organisational (Ithird) level, then it may be too late for actiori 
once the desired second level changes are secured. In addition, 
because many of the final decisions are made at the third level, 
pressure must be maintained even though success may be seldom and 
small. 
Often transaction costs are difficult to identify because they 
differ for each participant. However, Board procedures should be 
designed so that these costs are minimised. Some changes can be 
implemented by the Board on its own initiative (for example" public 
involvement) while others will have national implications, for example, 
a redefinition of some of the rules including clearer definitions of 
multiple use and beneficial use. Consideration could also be given 
to the present catchment board/regional water board structure and 
whether it adequately represents the legitimate interests of the region. 
Membership of a deciSion-making institution such as the RWB should 
constantly mirror the changing "public interest". 
138. 
6.0 FUTURE APPROACHES TO WATER MANAGEMENT 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This study has focused on the role politics. institutions and 
economics play in water resource management. For a number of 
years the Water and Soil Conservation Act has been the subject of 
central government reviews and reports. all with the idea of reform. 
Government has circulated various draft Bills within water management 
agencies for comment and criticism. Until reforms are instituted 
pressure groups will continue to expend large amounts of money and 
~nergy to protect their interests. 
Present day water resource management institutions favour 
existing political and economic forces whose values are reflected in 
legislation. New pressure groups believe that these institutions 
hamper their efforts in widening the concept of the "public interest". 
The Waiau-Hurunui Rivers case studies suggest that there is 
considerable scope for innovation and constructive reform at all 
levels of management. The political and institutional framework 
should be one which recognises diverse social values. discourages the 
wasteful use of water and adjusts to changing needs. 
The present process for lodging. hearing and recommending on 
Crown water right applications severely constrains the ability of non-
institutionalised powers to question the need for and impacts of an 
irrigation scheme. This study shows that where Crown water rights 
and water allocation plans are discussed together. non-institutionalised 
powers find it difficult to have their views recognised. To a large 
degree the problem extends from the privileged position the Crown has 
retained, viz. a viz. water rights, and the lack of legal status for 
water allocation and management plans. 
Ciriacy-Wantrup's definition of institutions highlighted the 
point that institutions should be continually changing. reflecting the 
continually changing public interest. At present memberShip of the 
catchment board and regional water board is identical and, for all 
k:'::~:;'~:::::~'::c::;;,~i 
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intent and purposes, they are one and the same. Unfortunately, 
this is a reflection of the third phase in water resource management 
when catchment board responsibilities were predominant. The current 
legal institutions merely reflect and embody past dominant forces. 
There appear to be solid grounds for evaluating the membership 
design of the combined catchment board and regional water board to 
determine whether it is representing legitimate regional interests. 
The rules governing water management are generally vague 
and without direction, especially in attempts to achieve multiple use 
of water. Two mechanisms are used to achieve this policy: "minimum 
! 
acceptable flows" and "beneficial use". Although water planners must 
ha ve flexibility and be adoptive, there are no legislative guidelines 
for the application of these mechanisms. The WSC Act is neutral 
towards uses which are not "positive" uses .. Thus "non-consumptive" 
water users are placed in a position of continued vigilance against 
encroachment of their as yet inadequately recognised uses. The 
price of inadequate information and continued vigilance is suspicion 
and conflict. Institutions, are required so as to minimise the area of 
conflict. 
Where major water development projects are proposed, such 
as hydro-electric power dams or large irrigation schemes, institutional 
arrangements, especially the legal structure, were insufficient to 
ensure early and comprehensively examine the impacts of the 
project. In one instance the EIR Audit was too late to make any 
substantive impact on the planning process and, in the other, an 
informal environmental report w~s prepared, so Side-stepping the 
formal public participation process. 
Similarly, economic reports are not give·n wide public 
scrutiny and, as was evident in the Balmoral scheme, a large 
decrease in expected economic returns can occur in a very short 
period. Yet, by the time a final economic report is available, it 
appears too late to reverse the planning process. 
k=~c-,:,,";,::i:,--~·; 
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Integrated water resource management is hampered by the lack 
of politically and legally sanctioned institutions for conflict resolution. 
Except for the 1981 amendment to the WSC Act, procedures for 
conflict resolution in water resource management are based on the 
adversary concept. Resource allocation and management founded on 
this system generates tension and conflict. It does not seek true 
conflict resolution and tends towards favouring the status quo - the 
desire of politicians and the institutionalised powers to maintain 
stability in the alignments of influence. 
In promo1ting changes to the public inquiry procedure~ the way 
is open for water planning to become more systematic in evaluating 
alternati ves and' the consequences of plans. These procedures 
should be so designed to ensure that all relevant interests will have 
a roughly equal opportunity to contribute and influence decisions, 
especially at the regional level. Non-institutionalised powers need 
to concentrate their attention upon this second level (policy and legal 
framework) in the decision-making hierarchy. It is only at this 
level that major institutional changes will be achieved. At the 
organisational level, institutional changes and changes in the incidence 
of costs and benefits will only be marginal. 
There is no doubt that for responsible water planning and 
management, the institutions must reflect and promote social values 
and goals. This study has shown that present institutions favour 
certain sections of society, especially irrigation proponents, and 
these groups tend to dominate the deciSion-making process. Future 
water planning processes need t? involve more critical evaluations 
of the economic efficiency~. equity and environmental factors so that 
the consequences of policies are more clearly identified. 
6.2 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
There is a definite need for a comprehensive and independent 
analysis of the costs and benefits of irrigation. There is certainly 
nothing on a scale similar to Davidson's study of irrigation in 
Australia yet periodic reviews are essential if natural resources 
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are to be used in a way which will maximise social welfare. 
An evaluation should be made of present legislation and 
administrative procedures in economic terms. The water rights system 
could be evaluated to determine whether it encourages the economically 
efficient use of water. This would involve an assessment of the legal, 
administrative and pOlitical factors inherent in combining the pricing 
system and the water rights system to manage water resources. 
6.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study into thr political economy of water resources has 
focused upon the North Canterbury water region. However, some of 
the following policy recommendations have a wider scope and will be 
applicable to other regions. 
1. Irrigation proposals should be subjected to far more 
critical evaluation than at present, particularly the 
assessment of expected benefits. A range of mutually 
exclusive options for a project should be evaluated 
in terms of costs and benefits to various groups. 
The RWB, representing society' s interests, should 
select the "best" option. At the present, the MW]} 
offers the RWB only its preferred options prejudging 
the option with the highest social value. While th'e 
MWD's selected option may be optimal from an engineering 
point of view, it may not maximise social net returns. 
2. The political composition of the RWB does not reflect 
the present day political structure of society. Some 
interest groups bave unwarranted political strength 
while other groups have none. . 
3. The Board should improve its "public participation" 
activities. Public participation is not a euphemism 
for abdication of political responsibility or reversion to 
village government. Rather, it assists in defining social 
values and objectives more sharply, and serving as a 
feedback mechanism. Some institutional improvements 
the Board should consider are: 
(a) sponsoring more regional public seminars on 
water allocation. A two-way dialogue from 
public seminars could be an advance on the 
one-way communication through pamphlets and 
so on. 
(b) establishing a sub-committee of the Resources 
Committee comprising pressure group represent-
ati ves whose functions would be: 
(i) to provide for circulation of information. 
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(ii) to act as a forum for inter-group discussion 
in ~ private arena facilitating conflict 
I 
resolution. 
(iii) to advise the Board on issues and topics 
related to the interests of the groups. 
Important points to note are: 
* the sub-committee would give advice but not 
make decisions. 
* pressure groups would maintain their right to 
present their views in the public arena. 
* composition should be fluid so that one-shot 
interest groups such as the Waiau River Action 
Committee could be represented. 
* central government interests such as the MWD 
could be represented on this committee or at a 
higher level. 
4. The Board should restrict its deliberative activities to 
debating and formulating policies for regional water 
management. Tbese policies are now in draft form but 
require public debate by making them available for public 
comment. Once the Board has established guidelines 
and criteria, more decisions can be delegated to executive 
staff leaving the Board time to devote to the policy issues 
of efficiency and equity of water allocation. 
5. RWB policies should provide guidelines so that the 
following objectives are achieved: 
* information is made available in a form that can . 
be assessed and understood by the interested 
layman. 
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* that water not yet allocated (or allocated only to 
low-value uses) can be allocated (or re-allocated) 
to higher-value uses. 
* that in-stream existing uses are given adequate 
consideration. 
* to prevent, discourage or constrain water uses 
that reduce the value of that water to others 
through lIexternal effectsll. 
* that all water right application for significant 
I 
development projects be accompanied by economic, 
social and environmen:tal reports for a range of 
mutually exclusive options, and that the expected 
outcome be stated but not ranked. 
6. The system for considering submissions on draft water 
allocation plans should be improved. Special Tribunals 
should be so constituted that they give all participants 
the confidence that the hearing would be fair and 
impartial. 
7. At the national level the following issues require urgent 
attention: 
(i) The government needs to give a clear definition 
or provide better criteria for determining what 
is a IIbeneficial use ll of water. Specifically, it 
should spell out whether or not beneficial use 
refers to IIpositive li uses only. The government 
should consider whether lIin-stream li uses are 
entitled to a \?ater right and, if so, on what 
grounds. Otherwise reasons should be given why 
lIin-stream li uses are not equated with IIpositive li 
uses. 
(ii) The government needs to consider the concept of 
transferable water rights along with a water market. 
(iii) Without restricting the flexibility of RWBs in their 
management of regional water resources, the 
government needs to spell out more comprehensive 
i.· 
criteria to guide water management. including 
~ater rights and allocation plans. 
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GLOSSAR Y OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS 
CCC 
CFE 
DSIR 
EDS 
EIR 
FOE 
FRD 
GAE 
IRR 
MAF 
MRC 
MSC 
MWD 
NCAS 
NCCB and 
RWB 
NCEPB 
NWASCA(O) 
NZFS 
NZSAA 
RFPBS 
SC q RC Act 
SC q RCC 
TWR 
WAP 
WRAC 
WRC 
WSC Act 
m 3/s ; cumec 
90 percentile 
flow 
Cheviot County Council 
Commission for the Environment 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
Environmental Defence Society 
Environmental Impact Report 
Friends of the Earth 
Fisheries Research Division 
. Gabites, Alington and Edmondson 
Internal Rate of Return 
I 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Marginal Resource Cost 
Marginal Social Cost 
Ministry of Works and Development 
North Canterbury Acclimatisation Society 
North Canterbury Catchment Board and 
Regional Water Board 
North Canterbury Electric Power Board 
National Water and Soil Conservation Authority 
(Organisation) 
New Zealand Forest Service 
New Zealand Salmon Anglers Association 
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society 
Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 
Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council 
Transferable Water Right 
Water Allocation Plan 
Waiau River Action Committee 
Water Resources Council 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 
cubic metres per second 
The flow which is equalled or exceeded 90 per cent 
of a specified period 
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APPENDIX 2 
QUESTIONNAIRE USED AS A BASIS FOR 
INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS 
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SECTION I : BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1. (a) How long have you been interested in water resource manage-
ment? 
. i 
____ years 
(b) If non-elected, were you interested in water management 
before appointment? What areas? 
2. Did any particular issue or area of interest prompt your 
involvement in water resource management? 
3. 
Irrigation Use 
Recreation Use 
Domestic lurban lindustrial 
supplies 
Flood control 
Soil Conservation 
Pollution 
Hydro-electric power 
development .. 
Did you hold office or were involved in any organisation closely 
identified with water use before election to the Board? 
e. g. On Irrigation Committee 
Pollution Group 
Recreation Group 
Fed. Farmers' Committee 
I~::': -:-:::::~::: 
! 
4. 
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Would you say you represent any particular interest group 
or view on water management on the Board? 
5. What prompted you to seek election to the Board? 
SECTION II : BOARD FUNCTIONS 
6. What do you, as a Board member, see as being the main 
functions and responsibilities of the Board, viz a viz water 
management? 
Resolution of allocation conflicts 
Water Quality 
Flood Control 
Multiple Use 
7. Are there any particular (resource) management principles you 
apply when considering a water management issue? 
e. g. ecological, economic (optimization of the resource) 
multiple/dominant/single use, equitable allocation, 
IIsatisficingll 
SECTION III : DECISION-MAKING 
8. Is decision-making on the Board a process of ensuring: 
Optimizing use of the resources 
Equitable use of the resources 
Compromise between uses 
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9. When considering an iss1;le (e. g. minimum flow, abstraction 
rates) do you act as -
1) A Board member with a political responsibility, or 
2) A Board member with a resource management 
responsibility, or 
3) Some combination of 2 and 3 
If No.3, how is this combination comprised - i. e. does one 
rank over the other? 
10. Within the existing decision-making structure of the Board, 
where are the crucial (focal) points of decision-making? 
11. What are your principal information flows to obtain data? 
e.g. staff Board, electors self, interest groups 
:-:-:.<. 
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12. As an elected Board me~ber, do you see your responsibility 
primarily to i) your electors (q district) or ii) to the 
region? 
For elected members ask: 
13. (a) How do you see the position on the Board of appointed members: 
on anachronism, interference by central government -
I I 
Helpful and desirable 
Helpful but not essential 
(b) Do appointed members contribute anything more to the decision-
process than could be obtained by a .wholly elected Board and 
advised by its staff. 
(c) If appointees were removed should: 
Additional persons be elected (and where from)? 
No change in membership numbers. 
For appointeees ask: 
14. (a) Do you consider that appointed members improve decision-making 
processes on the Board? 
(b) Do you believe that appointees should remain? 
If so, why? 
If not, why not? 
;~t;~~t~:1£:~g~~~ 
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15. 
153. 
How does the involvement of MWD affect decision-making 
processes on the Board? ... Improves ... Assists ... Hinders 
... No Impact. (Le. What sort of leverage does MWD have 
in water management planning)? 
16. In what areas of the decision-making process would you like to 
see improvement to assist you? 
17. Where water right applications are made, do existing statutory 
procedures enable you to: 
Obtain an adequate "picture" of the issue? 
Make a rational (optimal) decision on the merits? 
18. What changes (if any) would assist decision-making? 
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SECTION IV : PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
This section aims to abstract views about public involvement in the 
decision-making process within water management. 
19. With water planning decisions to date I in your experience I 
has public involvement assisted you in reaching a decision? 
i 
2'0. Have submissions changed your mind on an issue, e. g. through 
clarification I new factors? 
21. How effective do you consider outside groups/individuals to be 
in influencing Board decision-making? 
..... Highly Effective ..... Effective .. ~ Limited 
22. If no impact, how could effectiveness be improved? 
SECTION V : HURUNUI RIVEaR 
23. What did you regard as i) The most importan.t issues involved 
in the management plan? e. g. irrigation, recreation, fisheries 
ti) As minor 
! .... . 
i· "' .... . 
i 
! ..... 
i . 
k 
24. (a) What impact did public submissions /objections have in 
determinin g your ultimate decision on min. low flow? 
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(b) Was any particular issue /argument presented of particular 
significance? 
SECTION VI : GENERAL 
25. Is the current system of representation on the Board in need 
of change. Yes/No. Reasons for change. 
26. What water resource management literature do you read? 
27. Are you aware of theories of climatic change, build up of CO 2? 
28. Ask for opinions on the water rights tribunal (usefulness) 
1. 
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Of the 4 "objectives" below, how would you rank them? 
National Economic Development: 
water supply; energy; flood protection; irrigation 
Environmental Quality: 
improved water quality; wetlands and wildlife; 
provision of open space; wilderness. 
Regional Development: 
population distribution; economic stability; 
beneficial/adverse effects on regional income and 
employment. 
Social Well-Being: 
income distribution; public health and safety; 
cultural opportunities. . 
2. What issues or problems in water resource management, do you 
see as the most pressing in: 
a) the short term (up to 2 years) 
b) medium term (2 - 5 years) 
c) long term (over 5 years) 
f:.· 
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